From: "Saved by Internet Explorer 11" Subject: THE SOVIET MANNED LUNAR PROGRAM Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 22:40:23 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="multipart/alternative"; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0000_01CFA2D9.434DF860" X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.1.7601.17609 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0000_01CFA2D9.434DF860 Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: http://fas.org/images/_eye_ra1.gif R0lGODlhVAA/APfSAAAAAAAAMwAAZgAAmQAAzAAA/wAzAAAzMwAzZgAzmQAzzAAz/wBmAABmMwBm ZgBmmQBmzABm/wCZAACZMwCZZgCZmQCZzACZ/wDMAADMMwDMZgDMmQDMzADM/wD/AAD/MwD/ZgD/ mQD/zAD//zMAADMAMzMAZjMAmTMAzDMA/zMzADMzMzMzZjMzmTMzzDMz/zNmADNmMzNmZjNmmTNm zDNm/zOZADOZMzOZZjOZmTOZzDOZ/zPMADPMMzPMZjPMmTPMzDPM/zP/ADP/MzP/ZjP/mTP/zDP/ /2YAAGYAM2YAZmYAmWYAzGYA/2YzAGYzM2YzZmYzmWYzzGYz/2ZmAGZmM2ZmZmZmmWZmzGZm/2aZ AGaZM2aZZmaZmWaZzGaZ/2bMAGbMM2bMZmbMmWbMzGbM/2b/AGb/M2b/Zmb/mWb/zGb//5kAAJkA M5kAZpkAmZkAzJkA/5kzAJkzM5kzZpkzmZkzzJkz/5lmAJlmM5lmZplmmZlmzJlm/5mZAJmZM5mZ ZpmZmZmZzJmZ/5nMAJnMM5nMZpnMmZnMzJnM/5n/AJn/M5n/Zpn/mZn/zJn//8wAAMwAM8wAZswA mcwAzMwA/8wzAMwzM8wzZswzmcwzzMwz/8xmAMxmM8xmZsxmmcxmzMxm/8yZAMyZM8yZZsyZmcyZ zMyZ/8zMAMzMM8zMZszMmczMzMzM/8z/AMz/M8z/Zsz/mcz/zMz///8AAP8AM/8AZv8Amf8AzP8A //8zAP8zM/8zZv8zmf8zzP8z//9mAP9mM/9mZv9mmf9mzP9m//+ZAP+ZM/+ZZv+Zmf+ZzP+Z///M AP/MM//MZv/Mmf/MzP/M////AP//M///Zv//mf//zP///wAAAA0NDRoaGigoKDU1NUNDQ1BQUF1d XWtra3h4eIaGhpOTk6Ghoa6urru7u8nJydbW1uTk5PHx8f///+wBAABJJhYYn58BR/8AAPx6/C8M 4/Z6/AEBLwAAAIYAAABnJ4YAAKCBWSQAAHnA9gAAAAODHacAALaEhiH5BAEAANIALAAAAABUAD8A QAj/AKUJHEiwoMGDCBMqXMiwIUNUqPxoUaEiQBIlbyjl2riRksclbko8SfIEo5slkzxy9OjxjZJM T6r88TMKFTOHCP080bgSpBMqfkRJi+iHygolGDkqXaqUkhIASDM2dYO0RBU/fgihwplQJ8+llFw+ GZt1q0NUVICaNcgsIpUnJqRuxEXJzRM8a7nq3WsQlQoluOY+9SPNlQqebrTw7TuHp5K0SpguUYzT b+Rcld4AIMyWyhumHJWoyLsXz86Nk6D4IS3QVcQ8JVVudOnEz82HVJYsLaFClKvFwIMLH05cIERR fpyoAFCixAqZqZi5ul0cpwoSSJXIBu2UNxXWfg1A/83osgSAzX8MTkdLRUUJ7aA5wnnCGTfFo24y VlJaXgUVQtId5BlTTtVXEESo4OFeCZTsF59GSjix13pEVYHHCu/lBwdPDYblEh1K0CHiiHWAiJFG X630xme4PFadNH4gcdlKSiRh4F6oVAFfLnCQ8B1BVLhBYI0/4ugHHfu9QcVAzPhB0WgPEXLUV0/h 8RtCaH22VGYkaEEdcWgBkESKYJVAAgBF8oXWmJSUIOGLcMYp55x01mkcVguacOKDHiFVBxR6zDRK KqzViRYMJByA1HYc4bJEc2mtZtOVA22FICp/vLXCEox2RFebJDxJAhRK0MeQV/HlQtcbbgJlXEQU lf+AEpmpdudmFRCxlUpRK9ynQhX/VVYUsGq5ZVQSnH4VFlJP/MTrjGCtYGlRVFwk10qTrOjSG1Ak AeIcSeB66gq0dvRGEt8VihAeJWjpFJQNKcjgUm8gIWmADaEiilEjaUdJYEvB8QYdc+Qxk1aVRVRF SSuCVokbedhm54EIOolhcxi9gUslLLHE8adkPgoUABnB+yJEb7Fwl7o46sihEiRw5peWs3U5HCFO uAvaGyp8eRYVgM1Gn89+jJmqZipQitOAuShhlhbtctQGACwXNMpfHLmBZldKOFimE1UvlGVH4gr7 3leTPHbjQX5AQSYlJoBdXUQkfPWGG1CooBwdbmz/uJSj6K4tNslZbz3xUOy1l1auc7sl+OGQRy75 5JRX/uJ0rg1l+dxYtYfxEhu+ka0SUEBhsB/RhV05UZ6/tyLATbHE3Yohmj5TKtFN7Bqe15WQH6N0 LcFtEis4AWzFeGQ6VhKkkrlxS9zGpEVQCOLhKlda/HQdCUlcC5YSJQB1E9GAlA9IKge5MgqwrtMM Vi4o5jJJCV6KDXS5TcEhmlqtMUOIURhSwiRmp4Re1aZQhKqCCo4ilfhRAl0NCRJ3BLY/P/wGIkV5 j79SFbsUCawExAPKak5WLW2Vin8QUdAKrJUiD2UMf23yDxWcIEAy0Y4kzsKKDrEiCtURxFLI0dRF //zWEaeECw/3GgqqmDKJnv3QD3hYmO+8txL4cQx+ShjhQvDgBDdUYmM7a9XjfhgAIa3EBE9QnXRQ YQAzNgVmAQiV6iTIHd5YaS9UIIEb3JAEuSkEVn95g9fCgi4fHugtbpCdUjg2umZJKjgYfEtcBtiU NzwhTcCZDiH2lRaGvUF4LVwWFOYgQqwQAneoRMWuisKwBh3NVBObFisvJjrYYYYu8Mvlv/DXEeKR jBIrEMrmjIO4P+RhYQEAAAmSuUxlJvMJJRgA7LRGGDwAwCMrIASdfFYcVDhBNxxZwmYEwq6VlGCM avqL8KgSIXSehYYrSYIK6uMHclUyZsJp0grcx+SfJGhTTSVxUJuooDRUnIZAbzABPnGUB6lU4gmJ /FsW9WIZc6ngjgWhYx17wxc/XIYSJIAI4ThSCR/h5A9YU5XW6mcQP8xrZwDAA3C0YEYl3IYZWjBB 6KiWr/bMyA0GkGlCNPpGFfxzMaigQ2AqkQRDEsQVoqhC96g0z4UsUSnzw+RiljiJJxw1IbuLDX8u mS88QAt+8hQmmKjw0roc7yZuGcvv3rgypf1RBW7MBc++Orc87khVuUSoCdDEOK6g5TKTCMCS7ITB 60BBW3xcQaiuJxy/NGc03BymZjfL2c569rMLCQgAOw== ------=_NextPart_000_0000_01CFA2D9.434DF860 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_001_0003_01CFA2D9.435B65E0" ------=_NextPart_001_0003_01CFA2D9.435B65E0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: http://fas.org/spp/eprint/lindroos_moon1.htm
BY
ABSTRACT
Twenty years after the first American moon landing, on August = 18, 1989=20 the USSR officially acknowledged the existence of their manned lunar = program=20 with an initial release of information by the Soviet newspaper = Izvestija. An=20 increasing number of photographs and blueprints of Soviet lunar hardware = have=20 become available to Western analysts and space observers. It is now = clear that=20 personal rivalries, shifting political alliances and bureaucratic = inefficiencies=20 bred failure and delays within the moon program. There was strong = competition=20 between research teams and laboratories. This internal competition and = the low=20 budget for manned exploration of the Moon explains the failure of Soviet = technology against the successful American Apollo program.
This paper summarizes the Soviet manned lunar program in the = light of=20 the latest findings published in the West.
RED STAR IN ORBIT
Soviet capability in space became clear to the world in October 1957, = when=20 the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite. The = effect=20 it produced in the United States varied between shock and panic. A month = later,=20 the Soviets launched Sputnik 2 - a much heavier satellite carrying a = dog, Laika. Subsequent surveys revealed that within months nearly all Americans had = heard=20 of Sputnik. Press reaction discussed the Soviet satellites in terms of = American prestige, and its scientific and military reputation being at stake. = Watching for Sputnik was a world-wide event, and newspapers gave predictions on = its passes.
Two years later, the Soviets extended their early lead in space by = launching probes that hit the Moon (Luna 2) and returned the historic first = photograph of the far side of the Moon (Luna 3). Meanwhile, the unfortunate Americans = failed to launch far smaller satellites (Vanguard 1 in December 1957) and = lunar probes (Pioneer 1-4) during 1958-60. But on 31 January 1958, the US Army = finally managed to launch the first American satellite - a small 15kg cylinder = named Explorer 1. Since all the early satellites and lunar probes were = launched on converted intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Soviet advantage = underlined fears in the US that a "missile gap" existed between it and its Cold = War enemy,=20 an issue that Kennedy exploited to his advantage in the 1960 = presidential=20 campaign.
FIRST MAN IN SPACE
At first, the shape that a US-Soviet space race would take was = unclear. If President Dwight D. Eisenhower had had his way, there might never have = been one at all. He consistently refused to approve space programs justified on = purely political grounds, such as a $38 million manned circumlunar mission = proposed in December 1960. But Eisenhower did set up a civilian space agency to = plan ahead=20 - the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which was=20 inaugurated on 1 October 1958. Within seven days, NASA announced a = man-in-space=20 program called Project Mercury.
Politics affected the issue early in 1961, when John F.Kennedy became president. On 12 April 1961, Yuri Gagarin orbited the Earth in a Vostok spacecraft, Once again, the Soviets had beaten the Americans. Spurred = on by=20 this setback (and by the Bay of Pigs fiasco five days later), President = Kennedy=20 had the necessary base for a national commitment and, on 25 May 1961, = sent to Congress the message 'that this nation should commit itself to = achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the Moon and = returning him safely to the Earth.'
THE RACE BEGINS
Meanwhile, behind the scenes in the USSR, Sergei = Korolev was busy preparing a response to the American challenge. Korolev was the = top-secret "Chief Designer" who had developed the world's first intercontinental = ballistic=20 missile, the R-7 or "Zemyorka" (Little Seven). This rocket made a poor = ICBM but=20 an excellent launch vehicle; the R-7 had been used for all Soviet space = launches=20 to that point. Korolev was also a visionary and an excellent manager who = had=20 created & supervised most of the programs responsible for developing = the=20 rocket's payloads - Sputnik, Luna, Venera... His latest masterpiece, = Gagarin's=20 Vostok spacecraft, had been developed as a spy satellite but could also = serve as=20 a manned spacecraft.
Unlike the Americans, the Soviet space program had no centralized organization or long-term plan. Korolev realized early on, in 1959, = that the growing diversification of the space program would require a major = reform of=20 its organizational structure. Unfortunately for the Soviet space effort, = Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev ignored Korolev's proposal for reorganization = and the space program remained in the hands of mostly non-specialized design = bureaus, many of them working for different ministeries. Although Korolev = subsequently delegated most of the work on unmanned spacecraft to his associates, = overseeing so many projects must have placed a tremendous burden on him and may = have=20 slowed many of them down (Hendrickx, 1996).
DESIGNERS FALL OUT
Korolev was not the only designer of rockets and spacecraft, however. = Vladimir N. Chelomei had developed military missiles but = had no experience with space launchers. On the other hand, Chelomei had hired Khrushchev's son, Sergei. That family link offered a great advantage in = a political system where personal connections were often all-important. = With Khrushchev's blessing, he soon had the biggest project budget of all = bureaus in the USSR. Chelomei OKB-52 had ambitions to expand his works into what = had been Korolev's work (Harvey, 1996). In the USSR rival design bureaus not = only designed but built hardware. Decisions about which craft would fly were = taken much later by the Soviet leadership, based on recommendations from the = Soviet academy of sciences led by Mstislav Keldysh. As a result, the Soviet = space program contained several rival, parallel projects. This presented a = roadblock to establishing a single coordinated plan for reaching the Moon.
Chelomei soon got an extremely important ally when Valentin=20 Glushko, the primary designer of Soviet rocket engines, allied = his Gas=20 Dynamics Laboratory with OKB-52 following a strong disagreement with = Korolev.=20 Disputes between Glushko and Korolev dated to the 1930s, when Glushko's=20 testimony helped to send Korolev to a forced-labor camp (Logsdon,1994). = The two=20 men clashed over the new rocket engines for the next generation of = Soviet=20 launchers, but the conflict was also a question of authority. Korolev = had been a=20 former deputy of Glushko's before becoming chief designer, and both men=20 collaborated on the R-7 project in the 1950s. Korolev wanted to use new=20 high-energy cryogenic fuels such as liquid hydrogen. Glushko refused, = preferring=20 to design an engine fueled by storable but but highly toxic hypergolic = chemicals=20 that ignite on contact (Mishin, 1990). His new highly efficient RD-253 = rocket=20 engine was quickly adopted for use by Chelomei, who proposed a series of = "Universal Rockets" (Universalskaya Raketa - U.R.) derived from one of = his=20 designs for a giant intercontinental ballistic missile - the UR-500 = Proton=20 (Logsdon, 1994). The go-ahead for this program was given on 29 April = 1962 with=20 the initial goal being a 3-stage space launcher called UR-500K. This was = created=20 simply by taking the UR-500 ICBM first stage and putting a small = two-stage=20 UR-200 rocket on top of it (Hendrickx, 1997). In 1962 Khrushchev also = assigned=20 Chelomei's group to prepare for a manned spacecraft intended for = circumlunar=20 flight - the LK-1. At this time there was no stated goal of a Moon = landing=20 (Mishin,1990).
PROBLEMS WITH THE N1
Meanwhile, Korolev was busy working on his own carrier rocket = proposal - the N-series (Nositel=3D"Carrier"). A government resolution issued on 23 = July 1960=20 called for a family of rockets to launch payloads ranging from heavy = civilian=20 & military satellites to heavy unmanned & manned spacecraft to = the Moon,=20 Venus and Mars (Hendrickx, 1996). Late in 1961, Korolev's team was asked = to=20 develop the N1, which would insert a 40-50t into low Earth orbit with a development time frame from 1962 to 1965. A larger version called N2 = would launch heavier payloads in the 60-80t range, with a development period = from=20 1963 to 1970. However, work on the N-rockets were limited to a = conceptual design=20 only when Chelomei's LK-1 became the primary manned lunar program in = late 1961 (Mishin 1990, Landis 1992).
Later, Nikita Khrushchev wanted a larger uprated version capable of = launching=20 a 75t military space station called "Zvezda" or OS-1, armed with nuclear = weapons! The go-ahead for an uprated N1 carrier rocket was given on 24 = September=20 1962 with flight tests to begin in 1965 provided the necessary launch = site was=20 in service by that time. No other N1 payloads were authorized at this = stage=20 although Korolev probably had both Earth orbit as well as lunar / = interplanetary=20 uses in mind when the OS-1 was under consideration (Vick, 1994).
Korolev's falling-out with Glushko meant he had to find an = alternative source=20 of rocket engines. He turned to Nikolai D. Kuznetsov, who had developed = and=20 built only aircraft engines in the past such as those used in the = Tupolev Tu-144=20 supersonic transport. Kuznetsov's group had to begin its work on rocket propulsion systems basically from scratch. In the limited time = available, Kuznetsov was able to develop only a conventionally fueled engine of = rather little power. The final N1 version needed no fewer than 30 such engines = in its first stage to achieve sufficient power for a lunar mission (Harvey, = 1996).
THE SOYUZ SPACECRAFT
Korolev's third cornerstone project (after the N1 = heavy-lift/multipurpose=20 rocket and OS-1 space station) in his man-in-space program was a new, = advanced multipurpose spacecraft called 7K SOYUZ ("Union"). The older Vostok = manned=20 spacecraft was rather limited since it could not change orbits in space, rendezvous and dock with other spacecraft. Its lone cosmonaut was only = a passenger, and the spherical descent capsule would have been unsuitable = for lunar missions due to high G-forces during atmospheric reentry.
Although the future course of the Soviet space program was unclear = when the Soyuz was conceived in 1959-62 (space stations, lunar missions or even = a manned flight around Mars were considered), it was generally agreed on that = rendezvous & docking would play a major role. So this requirement was part of = the design right from the start. Like the US Apollo CSM, the new spacecraft (initially called "Sever" or South) would also be capable of flying = around the=20 Moon (Feoktistov, 1996). On 10 March 1962, actual work got underway when = Korolev=20 approved a document entitled 'Complex for the assembly of space vehicles = in=20 artificial satellite orbit (the Soyuz)'. This described a 3-man = spacecraft that=20 would dock in orbit with a stack of five separately launched solid = rocket motors=20 to boost 7K to the Moon, but other leading OKB-1 engineers convinced him = this=20 approach was not the right one. Korolev then turned to another system = consisting=20 of one manned spacecraft (Soyuz-A), a translunar injection stage = containing=20 automatic rendezvous and docking equipment (Soyuz-B) and three tanker = spacecraft=20 (Soyuz-V). The latter would refuel the Soyuz-B, which would dock with = Soyuz-A,=20 sending it on a circumlunar flyby. Initially, the "Soyuz complex" would = allow=20 the Soyuz to maneuver to high orbits and refuel the OS-1 space station. = This=20 plan was approved on May 10 1963 by Korolev, who already had = experimented with=20 launching two manned spacecraft at the same time during the Vostok 3,4 = mission=20 half a year earlier (Harvey, 1996). He also had plans for a manned = lunar-landing=20 craft that would have ferried cosmonauts between the lunar surface and a = Soyuz=20 craft in orbit around the Moon. But the Soviet leaders rejected both = plans and=20 continued to support Chelomei's LK-1 project.
NEW LEADERS, NEW LUNAR PLANS
After the Vostok 5,6 flight in June 1963 the Soviet manned space = program appeared to lay dormant to Western observers. But behind the scenes, = Korolev=20 was busy designing the N1 rocket, OS-1 space station (a full-scale 18.5m = high=20 mockup was constructed) and the Soyuz spacecraft that would transport = cosmonauts=20 to it. A new series of unmanned Luna probes attempting a soft landing on = the=20 Moon had been launched since January 1963, but so far without success. = He also continued to lobby hard for a manned circumlunar mission, this time = consisting of a Soyuz launched by a smaller N11 rocket (=3DN1 without the first = stage). This too was rejected, but on 3 August 1964, the Central Committee finally = passed a resolution (no. 655/268 'On work involving the study of the Moon and = outer space') to put a single cosmonaut on the Moon in 1967-68 before the US = Apollo flights. More than three years had passed since President Kennedy's = speech. On=20 3 August the Chelomei bureau also received final approval to build the = LK-1 spacecraft to send two cosnomauts on a circumlunar mission by October = 1967, the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. At last, the Soviet = effort appeared to gain momentum (Harvey,1996).
While all this was taking place, Korolev hurriedly designed a manned 'stopgap' program called Voskhod ('Sunrise') to satisfy Khrushchev's = apetite=20 for new space spectaculars. First proposed in February 1964 (Hedrickx, = 1997), Voskhod was basically a Vostok capable of carrying 2-3 cosmonauts into = low=20 Earth orbit to practise long duration spaceflight or (using additional=20 equipment) spacewalks and dockings in space before Soyuz became = available in=20 1966. But in order to accomodate more cosmonauts, Vostok's single = ejection seat=20 had to be removed, leaving the crew with no chance of survival if the R7 = carrier=20 rocket malfunctioned during the first 27 seconds of launch until the = upper stage=20 could fire (Harvey, 1996). Despite the huge risks, Voskhod 1 took off on = 12=20 October 1964 with three cosmonauts on board - then a new record. = Khrushchev was=20 removed from power by the Politburo later that day. The new leadership, = headed=20 by Leonid Brezhnev, was less interested in manned space 'firsts' than = Khrushchev=20 had been.
By late 1964, three design bureaus had submitted proposals for a = manned landing on the Moon. Chelomei's OKB-52 proposed a lunar landing = spaceship based on the LK-1 circumlunar spacecraft. It would be equipped with a new = high-energy deceleration rocket stage plus landing gear and could land two = cosmonauts on=20 the Moon with no need for rendezvous in Earth or lunar orbit. Chelomei = claimed=20 this would be simpler and quicker than assembling a vehicle in space = like the Americans (and Korolev-) were proposing. The drawback was that his = LK-700 spacecraft would have to be rather heavy since it would have to carry=20 additional fuel plus landing equipment for the return to Earth. A large=20 heavy-lift version of the Proton, called UR-700, would be required to = launch the=20 spacecraft. Chelomei had been working on this rocket since 1962 = (Newkirk, 1992)=20 and now proposed it as a more powerful alternative to the N1. Modular = blocks=20 from the Proton program would have been used to assemble a rocket as = powerful as=20 the American Saturn V, with a lifting capability of 130 tonnes to low = Earth=20 orbit (Clark, 1992).
Mikhail Yangel's OKB-5 design bureau in Ukraine proposed a project = called the R-56. It would have used a cluster of at least four long, pencil-like = first stages & second stages to create a heavy-lift lunar booster. It = would have used the same Glushko-produced engines as Chelomei's proposal, = including the giant 7000kN thrust RD-270 which was as powerful as the American F-1 = engine=20 used on the Saturn V first stage. Little is known of Yangel's proposal, = but it=20 does not appear to have been a serious contender despite being a paper = study=20 since April 1962 -originally as a manned circumlunar flight (Harvey, = 1996).
Finally, on Christmas Day in 1964, OKB-1 proposed a vehicle based on = the N1 launch vehicle -its maximum payload weight now uprated to 92t from 75t- = plus=20 two modified Soyuz spacecraft. Korolev's deputy Vasili Mishin suggested = that the Soviets use the same 'lunar orbit rendezvous' (LOR) technique as the = Americans (Feoktistov, 1994). To save weight, the heavy Soyuz mothercraft = (carrying fuel, parachutes and a heatshield for the return to Earth) would be left in = lunar orbit while a small 1-man lander would descend to the lunar surface. = The total weight of their L3 spacecraft complex would be only two-thirds of the = LK-700's. But other OKB-1 engineers were not convinced, noting that the L3 = already was dangerously close to the N1's maximum capability. One of the engineers=20 described the program as being 'on the edge of science fiction'. 26 = engines had=20 to be installed on the first stage, causing serious reliability = problems.=20 Despite this, Korolev turned down a proposal to build a test stand for = the N1 -=20 a decision that would later come back to haunt the Soviets. Korolev, now = suffering from serious health problems such as hearing loss and a heart=20 condition, gradually became more isolated from his former allies=20 (Hendrickx,1996).
THE SOVIET LUNAR PROGRAM TAKES SHAPE
The Soviet Union continued to stay ahead of the US in the space race = when, on=20 18 March 1965, Alexei Leonov became the first man to venture outside his = Voskhod=20 2 cabin and perform a 'spacewalk'. Leonov's spacesuit was a prototype = for the eventual 'moonsuit' and took place many months before the Americans = were ready to attempt a similar mission. But the mission was fraught with danger = and Voskhod was to be the last Soviet manned flight for almost two years. =
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had finally made preliminary decisions = how it would send men to the Moon:
a) MANNED LUNAR LANDING PROGRAM. Korolev's/Mishin's proposal = was recommended by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, but Mikhail Yangel's = design bureau would design the propulsion systems of the L3 craft. The other = main contender, the UR-700/LK-700 project, did not receive funding. In May = 1965, the Soviet government created the Ministry of General Machine Building to = oversee the nation's space program. The goal was now a first manned landing in = 1968,=20 and 22 new cosmonauts were recruited in October 1965 to fly the Soyuz = and L3 spacecraft (Harvey, 1996).
The L3 mission plan called for the development of two spacecraft that = would form the L3 Complex. A lunar orbiting spacecraft named LOK (Lunniy = Orbitalniy Korabl) would serve as the mothership during the trip to lunar orbit. = One cosmonaut would then perform a spacewalk and transfer to a small LK = "lunar cabin" (Lunniy Kabina) which would descend to the lunar surface. It = would also=20 be used to return the moonwalking cosmonaut to his waiting comrade = aboard LOK in=20 lunar orbit. Having docked, the LK pilot would transfer to LOK, the = empty LK=20 would be jettisoned and the two cosmonauts fire the LOK's engine to = accelerate=20 out of lunar orbit, returning to Earth three days later. In order to = increase=20 safety it was decided early on to launch an unmanned N1/L3 precursor = mission to=20 the proposed site of the first manned landing, leaving a backup LK on = the lunar=20 surface in case the moonwalking cosmonaut's own vehicle suffered damage = during=20 landing. The first Soviet moon landing would thus consist of two = launches - one=20 unmanned precursor flight and one manned mission to the same site (Hendrickx,1995).
b) MANNED CIRCUMLUNAR PROGRAM. Here the picture is less clear. = Chelomei only began construction of the LK-1 in early 1965 = (Pesavento,1994) and=20 it appears as if there were technical problems attributed to OKB-52's = lack of experience with manned spacecraft (Johnson, 1994). The Chelomei bureau = fell=20 from favor after Khrushchev was removed from power (Logsdon, 1994), and = its=20 contract for the circumlunar spacecraft was cancelled sometime in 1965=20 (Lebedev,1993), despite reports that ten LK-1 capsules were under = construction=20 by September of that year (Pesavento,1994). Korolev's opposition to the = LK-1=20 apparently played a crucial part when the Soviet leaders decided to = suspend the=20 project in August 1965 (apparently against the recommendations of = several=20 subcommittees). Work on the LK-1 was finally terminated on 27 April 1966 = and=20 none of the scheduled 12 unmanned and 10 manned flights ever took place. = The=20 Proton ICBM was also cancelled and the UR-500K launcher version almost = suffered=20 the same fate (Hendrickx,1997).
Korolev argued that the circumlunar spacecraft should test the same = systems and launchers as the primary lunar-landing program, to save time and = money. The Soyuz could be adapted for this, and Korolev's proposal to replace the = LK-1 was accepted. Chelomei's UR-500K was however retained because Korolev's = alternative proposal for a medium capability circumlunar booster ("N2" -- a scaled = down=20 version of the N1 without the large first stage) would not be ready in = time to=20 support a 1967 circumlunar flight (Hendrickx,1997). It appears that = Korolev and=20 Chelomei were ordered to design a new circumlunar mission in late 1965, = and that=20 the two chief designers agreed on the basic configuration of the new L1 = project=20 in September 1965. The plan would use the Chelomei's UR-500K booster, supplemented by a Korolev upper stage (Block-D) being developed for the = N1 rocket and a stripped-down version of the Soyuz spacecraft (7K-L1). = Korolev did not manage to wrest away control of the circumlunar project until 25 = December 1965 (Logsdon,1994).
c) UNMANNED SPACEPROBES TO THE MOON. The existing Luna E-6=20 soft-landing probes had encountered serious development problems and = Korolev had=20 to intervene personally to save the project from cancellation when Luna = 8 became=20 the eight straight failure of the series on 3 December 1965. Luna 8 was = the=20 first lunar probe constructed in the workshops of the Babakin OKB, which = had=20 been formed in 1965 to manage the robotic lunar program when Korolev was = too=20 busy overseeing it (Hendrickx,1996).
In May 1965 Babakin was also ordered to develop a new generation of = heavy spaceprobes called Ye-8 utilizing the UR-500K Proton/Block-D booster. = Like the L1, the Ye-8s were originally to be launched on the scaled down N1 = rocket described previously, but this plan was cancelled in late 1965 when it = became clear that the new N2 would not be ready in time (Hendrickx,1997). The = main payload was a remote-controlled lunar rover that would be used to = reconnoitre the landing sites of both the backup and prime lunar landers one month = before the manned L3 craft was launched. The rover would also carry landing = beacons to guide the LK craft during landing. As if that was not enough, the Ye-8 = rover=20 was also to be outfitted with oxygen tanks and a small platform for the=20 cosmonaut, transporting him from his own (damaged-) LK lander to the = backup=20 craft if necessary!
Finally a simplified version called Ye-8LS would be created by = removing the landing gear and wheels from the Ye-8 descent module/rover vehicle. It = would orbit the Moon and photograph the candidate landing sites before the = Ye-8s or LKs arrived on the scene (Hendrickx,1995). Before this, a modified = version of the older E-6 probe would be outfitted with cameras and perform similar activities from lunar orbit in 1966-68.
KOROLEV DIES
Just as the Soviet effort was picking up speed, disaster struck. On = 14=20 January 1966 Korolev died unexpectedly during surgery, robbing the = Soviet space=20 program of its main driving force. Korolev was succeeded by Vasili = Mishin, who=20 had worked alongside him since 1945. But Mishin was not confirmed in his = position until May 1967. An able designer, he had neither Korolev's = ability to=20 lead nor his political standing. Continuing struggles with various = government=20 ministeries and rival design bureaus slowed progress. Chelomei and = Glushko=20 continued to push the UR-700/LK-700 project, formally proposing it again = on 16=20 November 1966 when a 'Commission of Experts' led by Mstislav Keldysh = reviewed=20 the progress of the lunar program (Harvey,1996). But the L3 was = approved,=20 although its N1 rocket again had proved insufficiently powerful, so more = time=20 was lost in yet another redesign which increased its payload mass to 98 = tonnes.=20 Four more 1st stage engines were added, increasing the total to 30.
The Soviets still managed to score two more impressive 'firsts' = before the American moon program finally moved ahead in 1967. Two weeks after = Korolev's death, Luna 9 finally became the first spacecraft to manage a soft = landing on the Moon. Eight pictures were transmitted back before the batteries = became exhausted on 6 February. Once again, America's equivalent project = called Surveyor had managed to get itself two years behind schedule.
Two months later, Luna 10 became the first artificial lunar satellite = when it=20 swung around the Moon on 2 April. The probe (a modified E-6 with an = added Kosmos=20 particle fields satellite) was really a stopgap solution to prevent the = far more=20 advanced American Lunar Orbiter from getting there first. It carried no = cameras=20 but did broadcast the 'Internationale' to cheering Communist Party = delegates in=20 Moscow, who had assembled for the first congress under Brezhnev's leadership.
Slowly but surely, the Americans were catching up. Despite increased opposition in Congress and the Vietnam War, NASA spent a record $2,967 = million on the Apollo project in 1966 - far more than the Soviets could afford = to. The giant Saturn V rocket, its multibillion launch facilities and = supporting infrastructure were ready for ground-based tests in May 1966. The = Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter probes may have been second to the Moon, but they were = far more advanced than the Soviet Lunas and quickly completed ten successful = missions to the Moon in fifteen months. In manned spaceflight, the Gemini = spacecraft (a two-man precursor to Apollo) had been a splendid success. Gemini 8 = achieved the crucial first space docking in March 1966. The last for Geminis were = put up=20 only two months apart, practising long duration spaceflight, dockings = and=20 spacewalks.
The Soviets had to scramble to keep pace. A third two-week Voskhod = flight was=20 delayed for two months, then cancelled in within weeks of its planned = liftoff in=20 May 1966. The rest of the program was cancelled to save time and prepare = for the=20 first flight of new the Soyuz spacecraft (Harvey,1996). It also appears = as if=20 the giant OS-1 military space station - suspended since Khrushchev's = fall from=20 power two years earlier - was terminated the same year (Vick,1994), to = be=20 replaced by a much smaller Proton-launched version called Almaz. = Chelomei was=20 now in charge of the project and the LK-1 capsules would form part of = the new=20 space station instead, but he continued to propose his alternative Moon = plans.=20 In 1967 he began work on engineering mock-ups of the UR-700 engine bays = and=20 interstage areas (Vick,1996), challenging Mishin's authority as the = leader of=20 the lunar program.
DISASTER STRIKES
The crucial centrepiece of the Soviet space program was now clearly = the Soyuz spacecraft. Like its American Apollo counterpart, it was far more = advanced than anything attempted before. It could change orbits and dock with other spacecraft. It could fly missions lasting several weeks, and variants = of it would be used to fly around the Moon (the L1) and to be the mother = craft for=20 the manned lunar lander (LOK). The basic Soyuz would be launched on the = old R7 rocket and practise rendezvous techniques in Earth orbit. Like Apollo, = it suffered serious development problems and was behind schedule. The = first three unmanned test missions all failed in November 1966-February 1967. But = the Soviets could not afford to wait. Leonid Brezhnev demanded a first = flight in April involving Soyuz 1 and 2, to test the new lunar spacesuits during = a 'spacewalk' as well as perform the first-ever docking between two = Soviet spacecraft. Both feats would be absolutely essential for the L3 program = as=20 well.
Soyuz 1, with Voskhod veteran cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov on board, = blasted off on 15 April. An atmosphere of pessimism prevailed at the cosmodrome = since a record 203 faults in Soyuz had been detected during the final tests. = The Soyuz=20 1 flight was plagued by serious problems too, and Komarov was commanded = back=20 after just one day, and the launch of Soyuz 2 (carrying three more = cosmonauts)=20 was quickly cancelled. Komarov's spacecraft (tumbling wildly after one = solar=20 panel failed to deploy) miraculously survived the atmospheric re-entry = but then=20 the landing parachutes failed to deploy and the capsule impacted at = 600km/h.=20 Komarov was buried in the Kremlin wall two days later. The accident set = the=20 Soyuz program back two years (Harvey,1996).
THE L1 PROGRAM BEGINS
Meanwhile the L1 circumlunar version of Soyuz was also ready for = flight, a full-scale version of the four-stage UR-500K rocket and spacecraft had = been tested on the pad at Baikonur Cosmodrome in January 1967. The chief = designer of the L1 spacecraft was Yuri Semyonov -currently the General Director of=20 OKB-1/NPO Energia (Pirard,1993). In December 1966 the official schedule = called=20 for four unmanned tests in early 1967 followed by the first manned = circumlunar=20 flight in June 1967 (Hendrickx,1995). At least fifteen L1s had been = constructed=20 but only two of them were designed to carry humans, the rest carrying = various=20 experiments and biological samples to lunar distance. This suggests that = the few=20 planned manned missions were mostly for propaganda purposes. The main = internal=20 goal was to serve as a technology testbed, testing hardware = (communications,=20 navigation, descent systems etc.) that would be required later on, to = land men=20 on the Moon.
The UR-500 Proton had flown only four times before as a two stage = booster -essentially the original ICBM configuration- and there were doubts = about its reliability, so the Soviets planned to launch the L1 unmanned and send = up its two-man crew on a Soyuz spacecraft instead. Both spacecraft would have = docked=20 in Earth orbit, and the crew would have spacewalked to the L1. The Soyuz = would return to Earth unmanned while the L1 blasted toward the Moon. After = two partly successful unmanned L1 launches in March and April the Soviets decided = to abandon this plan, however (Hendrickx,1995).
The Soyuz accident appears to have delayed the L1 program as well and = tests did not resume until September and November 1967. Neither spacecraft = reached orbit due to problems with the UR-500K booster, however, and the = original goal of a manned circumlunar flight to comemorate the 50th anniversary of = the Bolshevik Revolution had to be abandoned. The best they could manage = was an unmanned repeat of the aborted Soyuz 1/2 mission on 27 October, when = ground controllers guided the Soyuz test vehicles Cosmos 186 and Cosmos 188 to = a perfect docking (another unmanned Soyuz docking test was performed in = April 1968). The Soviets pressed ahead and devoted most of their attention to = the L1 project in 1967 and 1968, knowing full well that the Americans probably = would achieve the first lunar landing. But a manned circumlunar flight before = the Americans would steal at least some of Apollo's thunder = (Harvey,1996).
THE COSMONAUTS MISS THE MOON
The L1 project became known to the world in March 1968 when a 7K-L1 = craft (called "Zond-4" by the Soviets to conceal its true purpose) was placed = into a=20 highly elliptical orbit 180 degrees away from the Moon. Zond-4 had to be = destroyed when a technical error shifted the landing point into the Gulf = of=20 Guinea. A new attempt in April did not even make it to Earth orbit and = on 15 July 1968, another L1 launch had to be cancelled when engineers = overpressurized the 4th stage oxidizer tank during testing. The resulting explosion = killed=20 three pad workers. Such accidents became increasingly common in 1967-69, = undoubtedly because overworked engineers were under great pressure to = catch up=20 with the Americans again. But the cosmonauts training for L1 flights = still=20 wanted to fly. They felt that engineers would take greater care in the = testing=20 of equipment for a crewed mission (Pesavento,1993).
Meanwhile in the United States, NASA had successfully managed to = overcome a severe crisis when astronauts Grissom, White and Chaffee were killed = during testing of the new Apollo spacecraft on 27 January 1967. The new = redesigned spacecraft and its giant Saturn V carrier rocket were now ready for = manned flight. On 19 August, NASA chocked the Russians by announcing a revised = Apollo schedule that included a manned flight to lunar orbit in December 1968, = provided the spacecraft's forthcoming maiden flight (Apollo 7) in Earth = orbit=20 was successful. Mishin & co. must have thought the Americans to be = out of=20 their minds to man-rate a spacecraft for a Moon flight on only its = second=20 mission. The Soviet goal was now two completely successful unmanned L1 = tests,=20 followed by a manned circumlunar flight in January 1969 at the earliest. = Now=20 they had little choice but to move the manned Zond-7 mission to December = 1968=20 instead.
The space race was finally decided in the autumn on 1968. First out = of the gate was the unmanned Zond-5 in September. It became the first L1 craft = to actually fly around the Moon and caused a sensation in the West when = Jordell Bank Observatory picked up a human voice from it! But it was only a tape-recorded experiment to test the communications system. The mission generally went well, although an operator error forced a landing in the = Indian Ocean. A ship from the Soviet Navy picked up the capsule the next day = and returned it to the USSR. The biological experiments contained on board = (turtles and banana flies) had survived. The relieved Russians released = information to the West which confirmed NASA's worst fears:'Zond flights are launched = for testing and development of an automatic version of a manned lunar = spaceship . . .'
The Americans struck back on 11 October, when Walter Schirra, Donn = Eisele and Walter Cunningham put the new Apollo 7 through its paces during an = 11-day mission in Earth orbit. The mission generally went well and Apollo 8 = soon received the final go-ahead for a circumlunar mission. But only a day = later the Soviets responded by flying their first manned Soyuz flight since the = Komarov accident, when Soyuz 3 (with cosmonaut Georgi Beregovoi on board) = practised docking maneuvers with the unmanned Soyuz 2.
Everything now depended on the Zond-6 flight in November. If it was a complete success there was still a small chance that the next flight in = December would be manned. The probe was launched safely on 10 November = and flew=20 past the Moon three days later, but the landing maneuver went totally = wrong.=20 First the spacecraft depressurized because of a faulty rubber gasket a = few hours=20 before reentry, killing all animals on board. The capsule descended = safely=20 through the atmosphere but then parachute deployment came too early and = it=20 crashed on Soviet soil. But the Soviets did not reveal the failure for=20 propaganda reasons, instead saying the mission had been a complete = success=20 (Harvey,1996). Consequently NASA was fearing the worst while preparing = the=20 Apollo 8 vehicle in December. Due to the pecularities of celestial = mechanics the=20 Soviets would have been able to launch a lunar spacecraft two weeks = before the=20 'launch window' opened in the US. The L1 cosmonauts did send a letter to = the=20 Politburo asking for permission to launch a manned mission. They even = travelled=20 to the Baikonur Cosmodrome in order to be ready to fly at a short = notice. But=20 the order never came and two weeks later, Apollo 8 astronauts Frank = Borman, Jim=20 Lovell and Bill Anders became the first men to fly around the Moon=20 (Pesavento,1993).
THE L1 PROGRAM TAPERS OFF
The L1 naturally ceased to be a high priority program after the = successful Apollo 8 flight and all manned flight were put on hold. It was instead = decided to fly a few more test missions in 1969-70. A probe launched in January = 1969 failed to reach orbit because of problems with the UR-500 carrier. In = August, Zond 7 became the only completely successful L1 mission, passing the = Moon at a distance of 1500km before safely landing in the USSR. Three months = later, one=20 of the two man-rated L1s was launched on an unmanned test flight to test = the Block-D systems in Earth orbit, but the launch ended in yet another = failure (Clark,1997). A second circumlunar test in December followed by a = manned voyage for Lenin's birthday celebration in April 1970 with the single = remaining crew-rated L1 was briefly considered but never approved -- possibly = because the program was delayed yet again (Hendrickx, 1997). Instead, the Soviets = launched=20 a final unmanned test in October 1970, but the mission was only a = partial=20 success. Zond 8 ended the lunar flyby program by making an unplanned = ballistic=20 reentry into the Indian Ocean after an attitude control sensor failed. = The final=20 L1 capsule (equipped for manned flight) was then launched unmanned as = Cosmos 382=20 in December 1970, successfully testing the Block-D stage in Earth orbit (Clark,1997).
PREPARING FOR THE FIRST MANNED LUNAR LANDING
As the L1 program was winding down in early 1969, the focus shifted = to the N1 program. The first flight-ready N1 carrier rocket had been installed on = the newly constructed launch pad as early as 7 May 1968, but had to be = returned for repair when cracks (possibly caused during installation of the payload) = were found in the first stage. It was rolled out again in the mid-January = 1969 after a brief test period on the pad in November 1968 (Lebedev, 1992).
The N1 rocket's path had been a long and difficult one. Mishin had to = wait until 4 February 1967 for the government to commit significant = resources to the project. A new resolution ('About the course of work in the creation of = the UR-500K-L1') specified test flights in September 1967 and a first = manned lunar landing in 1968. The latter was upgraded to 'an objective of national significance', and initial assembly of the first N1 boosters were = started at=20 the Baikonur Cosmodrome in late February (Harvey,1996). Work on two = launch pads=20 500 meters apart was also completed, and in November an N1 mockup was = placed on=20 pad 1 for three weeks of tests, checks & ground crew training. It = was=20 returned to the assembly building in mid-December (Lebedev, 1992).
In March 1968, the cosmonauts started training in preparation for a = Moon landing at Star City, Moscow. A moonwalk simulator was installed in the gymnasium, and the cosmonauts practised lunar landings with a modified = version of the Mi-8 helicopter (Pirard,1993). But they still had no L3 = spacecraft to=20 fly a year later - the constant Soyuz and L1 troubles in 1967-68 = apparently had prevented the Soviet engineers from devoting their attention to the = manned lunar-landing spacecraft. Consequently it was decided on 1 January 1969 = to test the N1 by launching an unmanned L1 craft, to perform high-resolution=20 photography of potential landing sites from lunar orbit. The L3 = spacecraft (LOK=20 and LK) would be tested later, for a first landing in 1970-71. The first = lunar-landing mission would be commanded by the Voskhod 2 veteran, = Alexei=20 Leonov, with Oleg Makarov serving as the LOK pilot in lunar orbit.
NEW OBJECTIVES
Although the Soviets were still hoping that an unplanned setback = might delay=20 the Apollo program long enough to permit a Soviet cosmonaut to get to = the Moon first, they were forced to prepare for the worst after Apollo 8. The = Babakin bureau had completed work on the new third generation Ye Luna series = (the older E-6 probes had performed three missions after Luna 10 in 1966, and Luna = 14 had mapped potential landing sites in 1968). To guard against the = (increasingly likely-) possibility of further failures in the manned program, the = government accepted Babakin's proposal from early 1967 to prepare an unmanned = sample=20 return probe (Hendrickx,1997). This would recover a few grams of lunar = soil and=20 return it to the USSR before the first American landing. This probe was = called=20 Ye-8-5 and used the same lunar descent propulsion module as the other Ye = probes,=20 but replaced the rover with an Earth return vehicle plus soil sample = capsule (Hendrickx,1995). Design work on the "standard" Ye-8 was finished in = late=20 1967.
The man-in-space program also got a new fallback option when = Chelomei's Almaz military space station was confirmed. Chelomei had also developed a = large cargo spacecraft called TKS using elements from the old LK-1 program, and we = also=20 know that he proposed a manned Mars flyby using an UR-700 heavy-lift = rocket with=20 a new nuclear upper stage (the LK-700 lunar landing project had been = cancelled a year earlier). Mishin also was proposing a similar manned flight to = Mars for=20 the early 1990s (Clark,1992). The MK-900 Mars mission finally died in = 1971 but=20 the Almaz/TKS program was eventually merged with the Soyuz program in = 1970,=20 becoming the civilian `DOS-1' Salyut space station that dominated the = Soviet=20 space scene well into the mid-1980s.
The next two manned Soyuz flights would practise spacewalks and = dockings, finally achieving the goals of the failed Soyuz 1/2 mission almost two = years earlier. Soyuz 4 was the first to go, launched on 14 January 1969 with = Vladimir Shalatov on board. On the 15th, Soyuz 5 carrying three more cosmonauts = (Boris Volynov, Yevgeni Khrunov and Alexei Yeliseyev) joined Shalatov in Earth = orbit. Following docking, Khrunov and Yeliseyev tested the new moonsuits by = performing a spacewalk to Soyuz 4. The Soviets claimed the Soyuz 4/5 linkup = represented 'the world's first space station' and denied they had plans to go to = the Moon=20 at the moment (Harvey,1996).
EXPLOSION ON THE N1 PAD
The Soviets were now ready to test their various lunar-landing = spacecraft for the first time. The first to go was an unmanned Ye-8 lunar rover which = would have landed on the Moon and relayed back TV pictures of the landing = site. But its UR-500 rocket exploded 40 seconds after launch on 19 February 1969. =
On 21 February the first N1 booster (number 3L) roared to life and = the giant rocket began to rise skyward. However, at 12:19:12 Moscow time (66s = after launch) a leaking oxidizer pipe started a fire at the rear of the first = stage and the unmanned L1 payload's escape system activated, pulling it away = from the booster. The N1 was destroyed by range safety while the L1 landed = safely. Heat and vibrations from the first stage's 30 engines had damaged the = rocket, it was later determined. The launch went virtually undetected in the West with = only a British observation team reporting it, although CIA dismissed the = report (Vick,1996).
The Soviets were now running out of time. The Apollo 9 astronauts successfully tested the Lunar Module in Earth orbit one month after the = N1 launch failure, and in May the crew of Apollo 10 ventured to within 15 kilometers of the lunar surface in a dress rehearsal of the Apollo 11 = mission. Only a miracle could save the Soviets, who nevertheless pressed ahead. = The=20 first two Ye-8-5 'Moonscopers' failed to reach Earth orbit in April and = June, respectively.
After some changes, a second N1 launch attempt using rocket number 5L = was made on July 3 at 23:18:32 Moscow time. Nine seconds after liftoff at = an altitude of 200 meters, disaster struck. A piece of debris entered the = oxidizer pump of one of the engines, causing it to explode. The explosion wiped = out=20 other engines and vital control systems, an the N1 engine control/thrust = coordination system shut down the remaining engines. The launch escape = tower=20 then activated and pulled the payload (an unmanned L1 spacecraft) away = from the=20 booster, which fell back towards the pad. The resulting giant explosion=20 completely destroyed pad 2 and also did significant damage to pad 1 and = an N1=20 mockup 500 meters away (Lebedev,1992). CIA quickly discovered the damage = when=20 scrutinizing spy satellite photos of the Baikonur Cosmodrome a few weeks = later.
The last Soviet hope was now the Ye-8-5 program and on 13 July 1969, = an UR-500 booster finally hurtled Luna 15 towards the Moon. Three days = later, Neil Armstrong, Edwin Aldrin and Michael Collins entered their Apollo 11 = spacecraft as millions of people all over the world were watching the event on TV. = But the Soviet probe's landing systems failed and it impacted on the Moon as = the=20 Western media was trying to figure out what its mission was. The same = day, on 21=20 July 1969, Neil Armstrong became the first man to walk on the Moon. The = Soviets=20 had lost.
PICKING UP THE PIECES
The triumphant return of Apollo 11 on 24 July marked the ultimate = humiliation for the Soviet space planners. Frustrated by one failure after another, = the=20 past two years had been marked by one misfortune after another. Beaten = in the around-the-Moon race, beaten in the on-the-Moon race; even the Ye-8-5 Moonscooper had failed. Nothing seemed to go right. It was a dramatic = contrast to the early 1960s when the Americans could do no right and the Soviets = could not go wrong.
When it was found out that it would take two years to repair the N1 = launch pads, rumors started to fly that the project might have to be cancelled altogether (Newkirk,1993). But Mishin still enjoyed enough support in = the Politburo to keep the N1 alive. While the launch complex was being = rebuilt, the N1 first stage engines were tested vigorously. Mishin was also ordered = to begin work a more advanced manned lunar-landing project called L3M. If they = could not be first, the Soviets reasoned, they could still be best. The program = would eventually be reorganized around the concept of extended stays on the = Moon that would be longer than the brief visits made by the American Apollo = astronauts (Logsdon,1994). Meanwhile the triple flight of the Soyuz 6,7 & 8 = spacecraft in November 1969 gave the Soviets something to cheer about, although = that mission was part of the forthcoming Almaz space station program.
UNMANNED TESTS AND LUNAR EXPLORATION
The Ye Luna program finally began to yield results. After three more = launch failures, Luna 16 finally became the first successful Ye-8-5 craft on = 12 September 1970, returning a few grams of soil from the Sea of = Fertility. It was a remarkable achievement by any standard. In October 1970, Luna 17 = landed the first successful Ye-8 rover on the Moon. The vehicle, called `Lunokhod = 1' by=20 the Soviets, lasted nine months on the lunar surface and travelled = almost 11 kilometers. The USSR now claimed the Lunas were ten times cheaper than = Apollo and far less risky than a manned mission.
Meanwhile the L3 spacecraft were finally ready for launch. The LOK = propulsion=20 systems were to be tested in orbit using a prototype named T1K while the = LK=20 lander systems would be tested on another vehicle named T2K. Lack of = funds (and=20 available Proton boosters-?) meant the T1K was never launched. But the = T2K flew=20 three times in Earth orbit because Mikhail Yangel insisted that his = propulsion=20 module be tested thoroughly before a manned landing was attempted = (Pirard,1993).=20 The vehicles were tested secretly under the Cosmos label, but Western = observers=20 monitoring them still suspected a link to the manned space program=20 (Harvey,1996).
The T2K tests took place in November 1970 (Cosmos 379), February 1971 = (Cosmos=20 398) and August 1971 (Cosmos 434). Various contingency modes and the = ascent from=20 lunar orbit were simulated successfully and the LK lander was declared = ready for=20 manned flight following the Cosmos 434 tests (Pirard,1993). In December = 1970,=20 Cosmos 382 successfully tested the operation of the Block-D rocket stage = in=20 space, which would be used by the L3 complex during lunar orbit = insertion and=20 descent to the surface. Cosmos 382 consisted of a modified L1 spacecraft = with=20 instruments installed to monitor the behavior of the Block-D propellants = under=20 weightless conditions. A second launch in November failed to reach = orbit.
At the same time, a manned test of the LOK/LK docking system in Earth = orbit was planned. Two Soyuz craft would be outfitted with the `Kontakt' = docking adaptor - a rather primitive system that permitted successful dockings = with=20 poor precision (van den Abeelen, 1994). The active crew, simulating the = LOK,=20 would be Anatoli Filipchenko and Georgi Grechko; the passive crew was = Georgi=20 Dobrovolski and Vitaly Sevastianov. However, it was eventually decided = to=20 replace the `Kontakt' system with a new one called `Igla' and the = mission was=20 cancelled in January 1971 (Harvey,1996).
PLANNING THE ADVANCED L-3M PROGRAM
The Soviets were now ready to fly the N1 again two years later. = Perhaps in=20 order to conceal the true purpose of the launch, the new N1 (number 6L) = was not=20 aimed at the Moon. The goal was simply to launch a dummy LOK into Earth = orbit.=20 This launch took place from pad number two on 27 June 1971 at 02:15:07 = Moscow=20 time as three cosmonauts flew overhead in the new Salyut 1 space = station. Soon=20 after liftoff at an altitude of about 250 meters an unplanned rotation = caused=20 breakup of the support structure between the second and third stages. = Moments=20 later the third stage and lunar complex toppled over, falling near the = launch=20 pad and causing damage. The rest of the N1 impacted 20km downrange.
Despite the failure the Soviets continued the N1 program, but it = appears as if plans for (L3-) lunar expeditions were abandoned for some time due = to the success of Apollo. (Lebedev,1992). Instead, Mishin presented his now = complete plan for the L-3M project to the Council of Chief Designers, which = formally approved it in the spring of 1972. The L-3M envisioned a manned lunar = mission=20 of two N1 rockets with new high-energy cryogenic upper stages to boost=20 performance. The first N1 would place a large 25t lunar lander descent = stage=20 (GB-1) in lunar orbit. The second N1 would deliver a three-man GB-2 = lunar=20 lander/Earth return vehicle weighing 24t. Both payloads would dock in = lunar=20 orbit and then descent together to the lunar surface. The GB-2 would = permit 2-3=20 cosmonauts to spend up to a month on the lunar surface, using a Soyuz = capsule=20 for the return to Earth (Vick 1996). Mishin envisaged the dual N1 = mission taking=20 place in the late 1970s (Harvey,1996). But it appears as if the Soviet=20 government never funded the construction of actual L-3M hardware and the = remaining unmanned test flights had to use existing L3 spacecraft in the = end.=20
MORE N1 FAILURES
The fourth and, as it turned out, final N1 rocket blasted off from = pad number two early in the morning on 23 November 1972 at 09:11:52 Moscow time. = The rocket had been extensively designed since the last failure. The 1st = stage engine bay had been redesigned and its diameter (originally 16.8 = meters) was reduced to 15.8 meters. Another visible change was that the kerosene = pipeline covers on the first three stages were sharpened at the top. The fourth = N1 booster (number 7L) was heavier than its predecessors but also designed = to be more reliable (Yasinsky,1993).
This time all went well until the 90s mark, when there was a failure = of a 250mm line from the liquid oxygen tank. A fire broke out, engines = started to explode and the entire 1st stage was shut down 107 seconds into the = flight a mere six seconds before second stage separation . . . The escape rocket = pulled the payload (an unmanned real LOK orbiter) away from the rocket, which = was then destroyed by range safety. Close, but still no cigar.
END OF THE ROAD
The lunar programs of both superpowers tapered off in 1973. Apollo 17 = had successfully concluded the American man-on-the-Moon program in December = 1972; future missions would be restricted to Earth orbit. The Soviet Luna = program was scaled back as well. In January 1973 Luna 21 landed another Ye-8 rover=20 (Lunokhod 2). In May the following year the last Ye-8LS lunar orbiter, = Luna 22,=20 was launched (Luna 19 had carried out a similar observation program from = lunar=20 orbit in 1971). Luna 19 managed to return soil samples to Earth in = February 1971=20 but two more Ye-8-5 probes had failed by the end of 1974.
Mishin still pressed on. Two new N1s were constructed (vehicle no. 8L = and 9L), the first set for launch in August 1974 and the second later that = year.=20 The purpose was now to fly the entire L3 mission in an unmanned mode, = including=20 a lunar landing. Engineers said that by 1976 the N1 may have become = operational (Lebedev,1992). If the missions had gone well, there were plans to use = the 10L vehicle to land the first Soviet cosmonaut on the Moon. An alternative = plan was to fly an Apollo 10 type dress rehearsal mission, practising spacewalks = between the LK and LOK in lunar orbit before the LK made an automatic landing = and=20 return to the manned LOK. The first manned landing would have been = performed by=20 the 11L vehicle in that case. At least four to five follow-up lunar = expeditions=20 (up to N1-15L or 16L) were originally planned (Hendrickx,1995). It would = seem=20 that the manned LK/backup LK launch scenario proposed in 1965 was = considered for=20 the first manned landing only.
That day never arrived, however. Mishin had came increasingly under = fire not=20 only for the failures of the L1/L3 programs but also for the problems of = the Salyut space station program. In May 1974, Mishin was dismissed and = replaced by Valentin Glushko - Korolev's old enemy. Within days, Glushko suspended = the=20 lunar program, instead presenting his own plans for a lunar colony. = During=20 1974-76 he worked on an entirely new heavy-lift rocket called Vulkan = that would=20 have used oxygen and hydrogen fuel just like Korolev had wanted in 1962! = Drawings were made of a large manned lunar rover that would have carried = cosmonauts across the lunar surface. His plans were opposed by Mstislav = Keldysh=20 and the Academy of Sciences, who regarded them as both expensive and = premature.=20 Neither the government nor the military were interested. Both regarded = the new=20 American Space Shuttle as a bigger (military-) threat so Glushko was = ordered to=20 plan a similar Soviet system. The N1 was finally terminated in March = 1976 when=20 Glushko began work the Soviet shuttle project. His Vulkan booster became = the=20 Energia booster and would instead be used to launch the Shuttle. The = remaining=20 six N1s were destroyed (Mishin, 1990; Harvey,1996). The last Soviet = lunar probe=20 (Luna 24) departed from the Moon in October 1976.
EPILOGUE
Had the N1 succeeded, it would have been called the `Lenin' or = `Kommunism' booster. Instead it disappeared almost without a trace. Scavenged = pieces of the superbooster were used as makeshift hangars and storage sheds at the = Baikonur Cosmodrome (Landis,1992). The launch pads and vehicle integration = buildings were converted to support Glushko's Energia program instead, and the = first of the new superboosters took off from the old N1's second pad in 1987. = Only the N1's NK-33 engines survived, being perfected by Kuznetsov at his own = expense after the N1 program ended. In 1996 they were sold to two American = companies to be used on the first stage of new reusable spacecraft! Four surviving = LK=20 landers and one LOK ended up in museums or space engineering institutes, = where=20 they are used for study today. Mishin was also sent to lecture at the = Moscow=20 Aviation Institute and, following Glushko's death in 1989 and = glasnost,=20 emerged to tell the story of the Soviet lunar program.
Writing about the N1 and L3/L1 projects years later, Mishin blamed underinvestment (only $4.5 billion compared to Apollo's $24 billion), = lack of cooperation between design bureaus, failure to grasp the significance = of President Kennedy's challenge as well as the technical difficulties of = sending humans to the Moon. They should also have done ground testing. Poor = management of the 500 enterprises and 26 government bureaus involved was also a = major problem (Harvey,1996).
The direct technical reason for the N1's failure was its inability to = achieve=20 reliability and thrust stability across the 30 NK-33 first stage engines (Landis,1992). But the real, principal reasons were that (1) the = Soviets=20 entered the Moon race far too late; (2) the lack of cooperation between = the=20 leading personalities such as Korolev/Mishin vs. Glushko/Chelomei. The = resulting duplication of effort was something the Soviets could afford even less = than the Americans. In the end, the USSR lost the race to the Moon because it = misjudged American intentions and resources, mobilized its own resources far too = late,=20 and failed to control its competing schools of rocket/spacecraft = designers (Harvey,1996).
REFERENCES
* Abeelen, Luc van den "Soviet Lunar Programme." Spaceflight vol.36:p.90 (1994)
* Clark, Phillip S. "The Soviet Manned Circumlunar Program." = Quest 1992:pp.17-20
* Clark, Phillip S. "Chelomei's Alternative Lunar Program." = Quest 1992:pp.31-34
* Feoktistov, Konstantin - Interview by Peter Smolders "It Made Sense = to Build a Space Station." Spaceflight vol.38:pp.113-115 (1996)
* Harvey, Brian "The New Russian Space Programme." John Wiley & = sons.,=20 1996 (ISBN 0-471-96014-4)
* Hendrickx, Bart "Soviet Lunar Dream that Faded." Spaceflight=20 vol.37:pp.135-137 (1995)
* Hendrickx, Bart "Korolev: Facts and Myths." Spaceflight vol.38:pp.44-48 (1996)
* Johnson, Nicholas "The Soviets Reach for the Moon." (1994)
* Landis, Rob R. "The N-1 and the Soviet Manned Lunar Landing = Program."=20 Quest 1992:pp.21-30 (1992)
* Lebedev, Daniel A. "The N1-L3 Programme," Spaceflight vol 34:p.288-290 (1992)
* Logsdon, John M. & Dupas, Alain "Was the Race to the Moon = Real?"=20 Scientific American June/1994: pp.16-23
* Mishin,Vasili [-Interview] "Designer Mishin Speaks on Early Soviet = Space Programmes and the Manned Lunar Project." Spaceflight = vol.32:pp.104-106=20 (1990)
* Newkirk, Dennis "More Data on the Soviet Manned Lunar Program."=20 Quest 1993: p.35
* Pesavento, Peter "Two Weeks that killed the Soviet dream." New Scientist 18 December 1993:pp.29-32
* Pesavento, Peter "Soviet Circumlunar Programme Hardware Revealed."=20 Spaceflight vol.36: p.390 (1994)
* Pirard,Theo "The Cosmonauts Missed the Moon!" Spaceflight = vol.35:=20 pp.410-413 (1993)
* Vick,Charles P. "Soviet Orbital Space Station-1 Designed in 1965."=20 Spaceflight vol.36:p.282 (1994)
* Vick, Charles P. "The Mishin Mission." JBIS September = 1994:p.357
* Vick, Charles P. "Launch Site Infrastructure:CIA/CIO Declassifies = N1-L3 Details." Spaceflight vol.38:p.28 (1996)
* Yasinsky, Alexander "The N-1 Rocket Programme." Spaceflight vol.35:pp.228-229 (1993)
* Personal correspondence with Phil Clark, Bart Hendrickx (late 1996,1997).
BY
ABSTRACT
Twenty years after the first American moon landing, on August = 18, 1989=20 the USSR officially acknowledged the existence of their manned lunar = program=20 with an initial release of information by the Soviet newspaper = Izvestija. An=20 increasing number of photographs and blueprints of Soviet lunar hardware = have=20 become available to Western analysts and space observers. It is now = clear that=20 personal rivalries, shifting political alliances and bureaucratic = inefficiencies=20 bred failure and delays within the moon program. There was strong = competition=20 between research teams and laboratories. This internal competition and = the low=20 budget for manned exploration of the Moon explains the failure of Soviet = technology against the successful American Apollo program.
This paper summarizes the Soviet manned lunar program in the = light of=20 the latest findings published in the West.
RED STAR IN ORBIT
Soviet capability in space became clear to the world in October 1957, = when=20 the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite. The = effect=20 it produced in the United States varied between shock and panic. A month = later,=20 the Soviets launched Sputnik 2 - a much heavier satellite carrying a = dog, Laika. Subsequent surveys revealed that within months nearly all Americans had = heard=20 of Sputnik. Press reaction discussed the Soviet satellites in terms of = American prestige, and its scientific and military reputation being at stake. = Watching for Sputnik was a world-wide event, and newspapers gave predictions on = its passes.
Two years later, the Soviets extended their early lead in space by = launching probes that hit the Moon (Luna 2) and returned the historic first = photograph of the far side of the Moon (Luna 3). Meanwhile, the unfortunate Americans = failed to launch far smaller satellites (Vanguard 1 in December 1957) and = lunar probes (Pioneer 1-4) during 1958-60. But on 31 January 1958, the US Army = finally managed to launch the first American satellite - a small 15kg cylinder = named Explorer 1. Since all the early satellites and lunar probes were = launched on converted intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Soviet advantage = underlined fears in the US that a "missile gap" existed between it and its Cold = War enemy,=20 an issue that Kennedy exploited to his advantage in the 1960 = presidential=20 campaign.
FIRST MAN IN SPACE
At first, the shape that a US-Soviet space race would take was = unclear. If President Dwight D. Eisenhower had had his way, there might never have = been one at all. He consistently refused to approve space programs justified on = purely political grounds, such as a $38 million manned circumlunar mission = proposed in December 1960. But Eisenhower did set up a civilian space agency to = plan ahead=20 - the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which was=20 inaugurated on 1 October 1958. Within seven days, NASA announced a = man-in-space=20 program called Project Mercury.
Politics affected the issue early in 1961, when John F.Kennedy became president. On 12 April 1961, Yuri Gagarin orbited the Earth in a Vostok spacecraft, Once again, the Soviets had beaten the Americans. Spurred = on by=20 this setback (and by the Bay of Pigs fiasco five days later), President = Kennedy=20 had the necessary base for a national commitment and, on 25 May 1961, = sent to Congress the message 'that this nation should commit itself to = achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the Moon and = returning him safely to the Earth.'
THE RACE BEGINS
Meanwhile, behind the scenes in the USSR, Sergei = Korolev was busy preparing a response to the American challenge. Korolev was the = top-secret "Chief Designer" who had developed the world's first intercontinental = ballistic=20 missile, the R-7 or "Zemyorka" (Little Seven). This rocket made a poor = ICBM but=20 an excellent launch vehicle; the R-7 had been used for all Soviet space = launches=20 to that point. Korolev was also a visionary and an excellent manager who = had=20 created & supervised most of the programs responsible for developing = the=20 rocket's payloads - Sputnik, Luna, Venera... His latest masterpiece, = Gagarin's=20 Vostok spacecraft, had been developed as a spy satellite but could also = serve as=20 a manned spacecraft.
Unlike the Americans, the Soviet space program had no centralized organization or long-term plan. Korolev realized early on, in 1959, = that the growing diversification of the space program would require a major = reform of=20 its organizational structure. Unfortunately for the Soviet space effort, = Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev ignored Korolev's proposal for reorganization = and the space program remained in the hands of mostly non-specialized design = bureaus, many of them working for different ministeries. Although Korolev = subsequently delegated most of the work on unmanned spacecraft to his associates, = overseeing so many projects must have placed a tremendous burden on him and may = have=20 slowed many of them down (Hendrickx, 1996).
DESIGNERS FALL OUT
Korolev was not the only designer of rockets and spacecraft, however. = Vladimir N. Chelomei had developed military missiles but = had no experience with space launchers. On the other hand, Chelomei had hired Khrushchev's son, Sergei. That family link offered a great advantage in = a political system where personal connections were often all-important. = With Khrushchev's blessing, he soon had the biggest project budget of all = bureaus in the USSR. Chelomei OKB-52 had ambitions to expand his works into what = had been Korolev's work (Harvey, 1996). In the USSR rival design bureaus not = only designed but built hardware. Decisions about which craft would fly were = taken much later by the Soviet leadership, based on recommendations from the = Soviet academy of sciences led by Mstislav Keldysh. As a result, the Soviet = space program contained several rival, parallel projects. This presented a = roadblock to establishing a single coordinated plan for reaching the Moon.
Chelomei soon got an extremely important ally when Valentin=20 Glushko, the primary designer of Soviet rocket engines, allied = his Gas=20 Dynamics Laboratory with OKB-52 following a strong disagreement with = Korolev.=20 Disputes between Glushko and Korolev dated to the 1930s, when Glushko's=20 testimony helped to send Korolev to a forced-labor camp (Logsdon,1994). = The two=20 men clashed over the new rocket engines for the next generation of = Soviet=20 launchers, but the conflict was also a question of authority. Korolev = had been a=20 former deputy of Glushko's before becoming chief designer, and both men=20 collaborated on the R-7 project in the 1950s. Korolev wanted to use new=20 high-energy cryogenic fuels such as liquid hydrogen. Glushko refused, = preferring=20 to design an engine fueled by storable but but highly toxic hypergolic = chemicals=20 that ignite on contact (Mishin, 1990). His new highly efficient RD-253 = rocket=20 engine was quickly adopted for use by Chelomei, who proposed a series of = "Universal Rockets" (Universalskaya Raketa - U.R.) derived from one of = his=20 designs for a giant intercontinental ballistic missile - the UR-500 = Proton=20 (Logsdon, 1994). The go-ahead for this program was given on 29 April = 1962 with=20 the initial goal being a 3-stage space launcher called UR-500K. This was = created=20 simply by taking the UR-500 ICBM first stage and putting a small = two-stage=20 UR-200 rocket on top of it (Hendrickx, 1997). In 1962 Khrushchev also = assigned=20 Chelomei's group to prepare for a manned spacecraft intended for = circumlunar=20 flight - the LK-1. At this time there was no stated goal of a Moon = landing=20 (Mishin,1990).
PROBLEMS WITH THE N1
Meanwhile, Korolev was busy working on his own carrier rocket = proposal - the N-series (Nositel=3D"Carrier"). A government resolution issued on 23 = July 1960=20 called for a family of rockets to launch payloads ranging from heavy = civilian=20 & military satellites to heavy unmanned & manned spacecraft to = the Moon,=20 Venus and Mars (Hendrickx, 1996). Late in 1961, Korolev's team was asked = to=20 develop the N1, which would insert a 40-50t into low Earth orbit with a development time frame from 1962 to 1965. A larger version called N2 = would launch heavier payloads in the 60-80t range, with a development period = from=20 1963 to 1970. However, work on the N-rockets were limited to a = conceptual design=20 only when Chelomei's LK-1 became the primary manned lunar program in = late 1961 (Mishin 1990, Landis 1992).
Later, Nikita Khrushchev wanted a larger uprated version capable of = launching=20 a 75t military space station called "Zvezda" or OS-1, armed with nuclear = weapons! The go-ahead for an uprated N1 carrier rocket was given on 24 = September=20 1962 with flight tests to begin in 1965 provided the necessary launch = site was=20 in service by that time. No other N1 payloads were authorized at this = stage=20 although Korolev probably had both Earth orbit as well as lunar / = interplanetary=20 uses in mind when the OS-1 was under consideration (Vick, 1994).
Korolev's falling-out with Glushko meant he had to find an = alternative source=20 of rocket engines. He turned to Nikolai D. Kuznetsov, who had developed = and=20 built only aircraft engines in the past such as those used in the = Tupolev Tu-144=20 supersonic transport. Kuznetsov's group had to begin its work on rocket propulsion systems basically from scratch. In the limited time = available, Kuznetsov was able to develop only a conventionally fueled engine of = rather little power. The final N1 version needed no fewer than 30 such engines = in its first stage to achieve sufficient power for a lunar mission (Harvey, = 1996).
THE SOYUZ SPACECRAFT
Korolev's third cornerstone project (after the N1 = heavy-lift/multipurpose=20 rocket and OS-1 space station) in his man-in-space program was a new, = advanced multipurpose spacecraft called 7K SOYUZ ("Union"). The older Vostok = manned=20 spacecraft was rather limited since it could not change orbits in space, rendezvous and dock with other spacecraft. Its lone cosmonaut was only = a passenger, and the spherical descent capsule would have been unsuitable = for lunar missions due to high G-forces during atmospheric reentry.
Although the future course of the Soviet space program was unclear = when the Soyuz was conceived in 1959-62 (space stations, lunar missions or even = a manned flight around Mars were considered), it was generally agreed on that = rendezvous & docking would play a major role. So this requirement was part of = the design right from the start. Like the US Apollo CSM, the new spacecraft (initially called "Sever" or South) would also be capable of flying = around the=20 Moon (Feoktistov, 1996). On 10 March 1962, actual work got underway when = Korolev=20 approved a document entitled 'Complex for the assembly of space vehicles = in=20 artificial satellite orbit (the Soyuz)'. This described a 3-man = spacecraft that=20 would dock in orbit with a stack of five separately launched solid = rocket motors=20 to boost 7K to the Moon, but other leading OKB-1 engineers convinced him = this=20 approach was not the right one. Korolev then turned to another system = consisting=20 of one manned spacecraft (Soyuz-A), a translunar injection stage = containing=20 automatic rendezvous and docking equipment (Soyuz-B) and three tanker = spacecraft=20 (Soyuz-V). The latter would refuel the Soyuz-B, which would dock with = Soyuz-A,=20 sending it on a circumlunar flyby. Initially, the "Soyuz complex" would = allow=20 the Soyuz to maneuver to high orbits and refuel the OS-1 space station. = This=20 plan was approved on May 10 1963 by Korolev, who already had = experimented with=20 launching two manned spacecraft at the same time during the Vostok 3,4 = mission=20 half a year earlier (Harvey, 1996). He also had plans for a manned = lunar-landing=20 craft that would have ferried cosmonauts between the lunar surface and a = Soyuz=20 craft in orbit around the Moon. But the Soviet leaders rejected both = plans and=20 continued to support Chelomei's LK-1 project.
NEW LEADERS, NEW LUNAR PLANS
After the Vostok 5,6 flight in June 1963 the Soviet manned space = program appeared to lay dormant to Western observers. But behind the scenes, = Korolev=20 was busy designing the N1 rocket, OS-1 space station (a full-scale 18.5m = high=20 mockup was constructed) and the Soyuz spacecraft that would transport = cosmonauts=20 to it. A new series of unmanned Luna probes attempting a soft landing on = the=20 Moon had been launched since January 1963, but so far without success. = He also continued to lobby hard for a manned circumlunar mission, this time = consisting of a Soyuz launched by a smaller N11 rocket (=3DN1 without the first = stage). This too was rejected, but on 3 August 1964, the Central Committee finally = passed a resolution (no. 655/268 'On work involving the study of the Moon and = outer space') to put a single cosmonaut on the Moon in 1967-68 before the US = Apollo flights. More than three years had passed since President Kennedy's = speech. On=20 3 August the Chelomei bureau also received final approval to build the = LK-1 spacecraft to send two cosnomauts on a circumlunar mission by October = 1967, the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. At last, the Soviet = effort appeared to gain momentum (Harvey,1996).
While all this was taking place, Korolev hurriedly designed a manned 'stopgap' program called Voskhod ('Sunrise') to satisfy Khrushchev's = apetite=20 for new space spectaculars. First proposed in February 1964 (Hedrickx, = 1997), Voskhod was basically a Vostok capable of carrying 2-3 cosmonauts into = low=20 Earth orbit to practise long duration spaceflight or (using additional=20 equipment) spacewalks and dockings in space before Soyuz became = available in=20 1966. But in order to accomodate more cosmonauts, Vostok's single = ejection seat=20 had to be removed, leaving the crew with no chance of survival if the R7 = carrier=20 rocket malfunctioned during the first 27 seconds of launch until the = upper stage=20 could fire (Harvey, 1996). Despite the huge risks, Voskhod 1 took off on = 12=20 October 1964 with three cosmonauts on board - then a new record. = Khrushchev was=20 removed from power by the Politburo later that day. The new leadership, = headed=20 by Leonid Brezhnev, was less interested in manned space 'firsts' than = Khrushchev=20 had been.
By late 1964, three design bureaus had submitted proposals for a = manned landing on the Moon. Chelomei's OKB-52 proposed a lunar landing = spaceship based on the LK-1 circumlunar spacecraft. It would be equipped with a new = high-energy deceleration rocket stage plus landing gear and could land two = cosmonauts on=20 the Moon with no need for rendezvous in Earth or lunar orbit. Chelomei = claimed=20 this would be simpler and quicker than assembling a vehicle in space = like the Americans (and Korolev-) were proposing. The drawback was that his = LK-700 spacecraft would have to be rather heavy since it would have to carry=20 additional fuel plus landing equipment for the return to Earth. A large=20 heavy-lift version of the Proton, called UR-700, would be required to = launch the=20 spacecraft. Chelomei had been working on this rocket since 1962 = (Newkirk, 1992)=20 and now proposed it as a more powerful alternative to the N1. Modular = blocks=20 from the Proton program would have been used to assemble a rocket as = powerful as=20 the American Saturn V, with a lifting capability of 130 tonnes to low = Earth=20 orbit (Clark, 1992).
Mikhail Yangel's OKB-5 design bureau in Ukraine proposed a project = called the R-56. It would have used a cluster of at least four long, pencil-like = first stages & second stages to create a heavy-lift lunar booster. It = would have used the same Glushko-produced engines as Chelomei's proposal, = including the giant 7000kN thrust RD-270 which was as powerful as the American F-1 = engine=20 used on the Saturn V first stage. Little is known of Yangel's proposal, = but it=20 does not appear to have been a serious contender despite being a paper = study=20 since April 1962 -originally as a manned circumlunar flight (Harvey, = 1996).
Finally, on Christmas Day in 1964, OKB-1 proposed a vehicle based on = the N1 launch vehicle -its maximum payload weight now uprated to 92t from 75t- = plus=20 two modified Soyuz spacecraft. Korolev's deputy Vasili Mishin suggested = that the Soviets use the same 'lunar orbit rendezvous' (LOR) technique as the = Americans (Feoktistov, 1994). To save weight, the heavy Soyuz mothercraft = (carrying fuel, parachutes and a heatshield for the return to Earth) would be left in = lunar orbit while a small 1-man lander would descend to the lunar surface. = The total weight of their L3 spacecraft complex would be only two-thirds of the = LK-700's. But other OKB-1 engineers were not convinced, noting that the L3 = already was dangerously close to the N1's maximum capability. One of the engineers=20 described the program as being 'on the edge of science fiction'. 26 = engines had=20 to be installed on the first stage, causing serious reliability = problems.=20 Despite this, Korolev turned down a proposal to build a test stand for = the N1 -=20 a decision that would later come back to haunt the Soviets. Korolev, now = suffering from serious health problems such as hearing loss and a heart=20 condition, gradually became more isolated from his former allies=20 (Hendrickx,1996).
THE SOVIET LUNAR PROGRAM TAKES SHAPE
The Soviet Union continued to stay ahead of the US in the space race = when, on=20 18 March 1965, Alexei Leonov became the first man to venture outside his = Voskhod=20 2 cabin and perform a 'spacewalk'. Leonov's spacesuit was a prototype = for the eventual 'moonsuit' and took place many months before the Americans = were ready to attempt a similar mission. But the mission was fraught with danger = and Voskhod was to be the last Soviet manned flight for almost two years. =
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had finally made preliminary decisions = how it would send men to the Moon:
a) MANNED LUNAR LANDING PROGRAM. Korolev's/Mishin's proposal = was recommended by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, but Mikhail Yangel's = design bureau would design the propulsion systems of the L3 craft. The other = main contender, the UR-700/LK-700 project, did not receive funding. In May = 1965, the Soviet government created the Ministry of General Machine Building to = oversee the nation's space program. The goal was now a first manned landing in = 1968,=20 and 22 new cosmonauts were recruited in October 1965 to fly the Soyuz = and L3 spacecraft (Harvey, 1996).
The L3 mission plan called for the development of two spacecraft that = would form the L3 Complex. A lunar orbiting spacecraft named LOK (Lunniy = Orbitalniy Korabl) would serve as the mothership during the trip to lunar orbit. = One cosmonaut would then perform a spacewalk and transfer to a small LK = "lunar cabin" (Lunniy Kabina) which would descend to the lunar surface. It = would also=20 be used to return the moonwalking cosmonaut to his waiting comrade = aboard LOK in=20 lunar orbit. Having docked, the LK pilot would transfer to LOK, the = empty LK=20 would be jettisoned and the two cosmonauts fire the LOK's engine to = accelerate=20 out of lunar orbit, returning to Earth three days later. In order to = increase=20 safety it was decided early on to launch an unmanned N1/L3 precursor = mission to=20 the proposed site of the first manned landing, leaving a backup LK on = the lunar=20 surface in case the moonwalking cosmonaut's own vehicle suffered damage = during=20 landing. The first Soviet moon landing would thus consist of two = launches - one=20 unmanned precursor flight and one manned mission to the same site (Hendrickx,1995).
b) MANNED CIRCUMLUNAR PROGRAM. Here the picture is less clear. = Chelomei only began construction of the LK-1 in early 1965 = (Pesavento,1994) and=20 it appears as if there were technical problems attributed to OKB-52's = lack of experience with manned spacecraft (Johnson, 1994). The Chelomei bureau = fell=20 from favor after Khrushchev was removed from power (Logsdon, 1994), and = its=20 contract for the circumlunar spacecraft was cancelled sometime in 1965=20 (Lebedev,1993), despite reports that ten LK-1 capsules were under = construction=20 by September of that year (Pesavento,1994). Korolev's opposition to the = LK-1=20 apparently played a crucial part when the Soviet leaders decided to = suspend the=20 project in August 1965 (apparently against the recommendations of = several=20 subcommittees). Work on the LK-1 was finally terminated on 27 April 1966 = and=20 none of the scheduled 12 unmanned and 10 manned flights ever took place. = The=20 Proton ICBM was also cancelled and the UR-500K launcher version almost = suffered=20 the same fate (Hendrickx,1997).
Korolev argued that the circumlunar spacecraft should test the same = systems and launchers as the primary lunar-landing program, to save time and = money. The Soyuz could be adapted for this, and Korolev's proposal to replace the = LK-1 was accepted. Chelomei's UR-500K was however retained because Korolev's = alternative proposal for a medium capability circumlunar booster ("N2" -- a scaled = down=20 version of the N1 without the large first stage) would not be ready in = time to=20 support a 1967 circumlunar flight (Hendrickx,1997). It appears that = Korolev and=20 Chelomei were ordered to design a new circumlunar mission in late 1965, = and that=20 the two chief designers agreed on the basic configuration of the new L1 = project=20 in September 1965. The plan would use the Chelomei's UR-500K booster, supplemented by a Korolev upper stage (Block-D) being developed for the = N1 rocket and a stripped-down version of the Soyuz spacecraft (7K-L1). = Korolev did not manage to wrest away control of the circumlunar project until 25 = December 1965 (Logsdon,1994).
c) UNMANNED SPACEPROBES TO THE MOON. The existing Luna E-6=20 soft-landing probes had encountered serious development problems and = Korolev had=20 to intervene personally to save the project from cancellation when Luna = 8 became=20 the eight straight failure of the series on 3 December 1965. Luna 8 was = the=20 first lunar probe constructed in the workshops of the Babakin OKB, which = had=20 been formed in 1965 to manage the robotic lunar program when Korolev was = too=20 busy overseeing it (Hendrickx,1996).
In May 1965 Babakin was also ordered to develop a new generation of = heavy spaceprobes called Ye-8 utilizing the UR-500K Proton/Block-D booster. = Like the L1, the Ye-8s were originally to be launched on the scaled down N1 = rocket described previously, but this plan was cancelled in late 1965 when it = became clear that the new N2 would not be ready in time (Hendrickx,1997). The = main payload was a remote-controlled lunar rover that would be used to = reconnoitre the landing sites of both the backup and prime lunar landers one month = before the manned L3 craft was launched. The rover would also carry landing = beacons to guide the LK craft during landing. As if that was not enough, the Ye-8 = rover=20 was also to be outfitted with oxygen tanks and a small platform for the=20 cosmonaut, transporting him from his own (damaged-) LK lander to the = backup=20 craft if necessary!
Finally a simplified version called Ye-8LS would be created by = removing the landing gear and wheels from the Ye-8 descent module/rover vehicle. It = would orbit the Moon and photograph the candidate landing sites before the = Ye-8s or LKs arrived on the scene (Hendrickx,1995). Before this, a modified = version of the older E-6 probe would be outfitted with cameras and perform similar activities from lunar orbit in 1966-68.
KOROLEV DIES
Just as the Soviet effort was picking up speed, disaster struck. On = 14=20 January 1966 Korolev died unexpectedly during surgery, robbing the = Soviet space=20 program of its main driving force. Korolev was succeeded by Vasili = Mishin, who=20 had worked alongside him since 1945. But Mishin was not confirmed in his = position until May 1967. An able designer, he had neither Korolev's = ability to=20 lead nor his political standing. Continuing struggles with various = government=20 ministeries and rival design bureaus slowed progress. Chelomei and = Glushko=20 continued to push the UR-700/LK-700 project, formally proposing it again = on 16=20 November 1966 when a 'Commission of Experts' led by Mstislav Keldysh = reviewed=20 the progress of the lunar program (Harvey,1996). But the L3 was = approved,=20 although its N1 rocket again had proved insufficiently powerful, so more = time=20 was lost in yet another redesign which increased its payload mass to 98 = tonnes.=20 Four more 1st stage engines were added, increasing the total to 30.
The Soviets still managed to score two more impressive 'firsts' = before the American moon program finally moved ahead in 1967. Two weeks after = Korolev's death, Luna 9 finally became the first spacecraft to manage a soft = landing on the Moon. Eight pictures were transmitted back before the batteries = became exhausted on 6 February. Once again, America's equivalent project = called Surveyor had managed to get itself two years behind schedule.
Two months later, Luna 10 became the first artificial lunar satellite = when it=20 swung around the Moon on 2 April. The probe (a modified E-6 with an = added Kosmos=20 particle fields satellite) was really a stopgap solution to prevent the = far more=20 advanced American Lunar Orbiter from getting there first. It carried no = cameras=20 but did broadcast the 'Internationale' to cheering Communist Party = delegates in=20 Moscow, who had assembled for the first congress under Brezhnev's leadership.
Slowly but surely, the Americans were catching up. Despite increased opposition in Congress and the Vietnam War, NASA spent a record $2,967 = million on the Apollo project in 1966 - far more than the Soviets could afford = to. The giant Saturn V rocket, its multibillion launch facilities and = supporting infrastructure were ready for ground-based tests in May 1966. The = Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter probes may have been second to the Moon, but they were = far more advanced than the Soviet Lunas and quickly completed ten successful = missions to the Moon in fifteen months. In manned spaceflight, the Gemini = spacecraft (a two-man precursor to Apollo) had been a splendid success. Gemini 8 = achieved the crucial first space docking in March 1966. The last for Geminis were = put up=20 only two months apart, practising long duration spaceflight, dockings = and=20 spacewalks.
The Soviets had to scramble to keep pace. A third two-week Voskhod = flight was=20 delayed for two months, then cancelled in within weeks of its planned = liftoff in=20 May 1966. The rest of the program was cancelled to save time and prepare = for the=20 first flight of new the Soyuz spacecraft (Harvey,1996). It also appears = as if=20 the giant OS-1 military space station - suspended since Khrushchev's = fall from=20 power two years earlier - was terminated the same year (Vick,1994), to = be=20 replaced by a much smaller Proton-launched version called Almaz. = Chelomei was=20 now in charge of the project and the LK-1 capsules would form part of = the new=20 space station instead, but he continued to propose his alternative Moon = plans.=20 In 1967 he began work on engineering mock-ups of the UR-700 engine bays = and=20 interstage areas (Vick,1996), challenging Mishin's authority as the = leader of=20 the lunar program.
DISASTER STRIKES
The crucial centrepiece of the Soviet space program was now clearly = the Soyuz spacecraft. Like its American Apollo counterpart, it was far more = advanced than anything attempted before. It could change orbits and dock with other spacecraft. It could fly missions lasting several weeks, and variants = of it would be used to fly around the Moon (the L1) and to be the mother = craft for=20 the manned lunar lander (LOK). The basic Soyuz would be launched on the = old R7 rocket and practise rendezvous techniques in Earth orbit. Like Apollo, = it suffered serious development problems and was behind schedule. The = first three unmanned test missions all failed in November 1966-February 1967. But = the Soviets could not afford to wait. Leonid Brezhnev demanded a first = flight in April involving Soyuz 1 and 2, to test the new lunar spacesuits during = a 'spacewalk' as well as perform the first-ever docking between two = Soviet spacecraft. Both feats would be absolutely essential for the L3 program = as=20 well.
Soyuz 1, with Voskhod veteran cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov on board, = blasted off on 15 April. An atmosphere of pessimism prevailed at the cosmodrome = since a record 203 faults in Soyuz had been detected during the final tests. = The Soyuz=20 1 flight was plagued by serious problems too, and Komarov was commanded = back=20 after just one day, and the launch of Soyuz 2 (carrying three more = cosmonauts)=20 was quickly cancelled. Komarov's spacecraft (tumbling wildly after one = solar=20 panel failed to deploy) miraculously survived the atmospheric re-entry = but then=20 the landing parachutes failed to deploy and the capsule impacted at = 600km/h.=20 Komarov was buried in the Kremlin wall two days later. The accident set = the=20 Soyuz program back two years (Harvey,1996).
THE L1 PROGRAM BEGINS
Meanwhile the L1 circumlunar version of Soyuz was also ready for = flight, a full-scale version of the four-stage UR-500K rocket and spacecraft had = been tested on the pad at Baikonur Cosmodrome in January 1967. The chief = designer of the L1 spacecraft was Yuri Semyonov -currently the General Director of=20 OKB-1/NPO Energia (Pirard,1993). In December 1966 the official schedule = called=20 for four unmanned tests in early 1967 followed by the first manned = circumlunar=20 flight in June 1967 (Hendrickx,1995). At least fifteen L1s had been = constructed=20 but only two of them were designed to carry humans, the rest carrying = various=20 experiments and biological samples to lunar distance. This suggests that = the few=20 planned manned missions were mostly for propaganda purposes. The main = internal=20 goal was to serve as a technology testbed, testing hardware = (communications,=20 navigation, descent systems etc.) that would be required later on, to = land men=20 on the Moon.
The UR-500 Proton had flown only four times before as a two stage = booster -essentially the original ICBM configuration- and there were doubts = about its reliability, so the Soviets planned to launch the L1 unmanned and send = up its two-man crew on a Soyuz spacecraft instead. Both spacecraft would have = docked=20 in Earth orbit, and the crew would have spacewalked to the L1. The Soyuz = would return to Earth unmanned while the L1 blasted toward the Moon. After = two partly successful unmanned L1 launches in March and April the Soviets decided = to abandon this plan, however (Hendrickx,1995).
The Soyuz accident appears to have delayed the L1 program as well and = tests did not resume until September and November 1967. Neither spacecraft = reached orbit due to problems with the UR-500K booster, however, and the = original goal of a manned circumlunar flight to comemorate the 50th anniversary of = the Bolshevik Revolution had to be abandoned. The best they could manage = was an unmanned repeat of the aborted Soyuz 1/2 mission on 27 October, when = ground controllers guided the Soyuz test vehicles Cosmos 186 and Cosmos 188 to = a perfect docking (another unmanned Soyuz docking test was performed in = April 1968). The Soviets pressed ahead and devoted most of their attention to = the L1 project in 1967 and 1968, knowing full well that the Americans probably = would achieve the first lunar landing. But a manned circumlunar flight before = the Americans would steal at least some of Apollo's thunder = (Harvey,1996).
THE COSMONAUTS MISS THE MOON
The L1 project became known to the world in March 1968 when a 7K-L1 = craft (called "Zond-4" by the Soviets to conceal its true purpose) was placed = into a=20 highly elliptical orbit 180 degrees away from the Moon. Zond-4 had to be = destroyed when a technical error shifted the landing point into the Gulf = of=20 Guinea. A new attempt in April did not even make it to Earth orbit and = on 15 July 1968, another L1 launch had to be cancelled when engineers = overpressurized the 4th stage oxidizer tank during testing. The resulting explosion = killed=20 three pad workers. Such accidents became increasingly common in 1967-69, = undoubtedly because overworked engineers were under great pressure to = catch up=20 with the Americans again. But the cosmonauts training for L1 flights = still=20 wanted to fly. They felt that engineers would take greater care in the = testing=20 of equipment for a crewed mission (Pesavento,1993).
Meanwhile in the United States, NASA had successfully managed to = overcome a severe crisis when astronauts Grissom, White and Chaffee were killed = during testing of the new Apollo spacecraft on 27 January 1967. The new = redesigned spacecraft and its giant Saturn V carrier rocket were now ready for = manned flight. On 19 August, NASA chocked the Russians by announcing a revised = Apollo schedule that included a manned flight to lunar orbit in December 1968, = provided the spacecraft's forthcoming maiden flight (Apollo 7) in Earth = orbit=20 was successful. Mishin & co. must have thought the Americans to be = out of=20 their minds to man-rate a spacecraft for a Moon flight on only its = second=20 mission. The Soviet goal was now two completely successful unmanned L1 = tests,=20 followed by a manned circumlunar flight in January 1969 at the earliest. = Now=20 they had little choice but to move the manned Zond-7 mission to December = 1968=20 instead.
The space race was finally decided in the autumn on 1968. First out = of the gate was the unmanned Zond-5 in September. It became the first L1 craft = to actually fly around the Moon and caused a sensation in the West when = Jordell Bank Observatory picked up a human voice from it! But it was only a tape-recorded experiment to test the communications system. The mission generally went well, although an operator error forced a landing in the = Indian Ocean. A ship from the Soviet Navy picked up the capsule the next day = and returned it to the USSR. The biological experiments contained on board = (turtles and banana flies) had survived. The relieved Russians released = information to the West which confirmed NASA's worst fears:'Zond flights are launched = for testing and development of an automatic version of a manned lunar = spaceship . . .'
The Americans struck back on 11 October, when Walter Schirra, Donn = Eisele and Walter Cunningham put the new Apollo 7 through its paces during an = 11-day mission in Earth orbit. The mission generally went well and Apollo 8 = soon received the final go-ahead for a circumlunar mission. But only a day = later the Soviets responded by flying their first manned Soyuz flight since the = Komarov accident, when Soyuz 3 (with cosmonaut Georgi Beregovoi on board) = practised docking maneuvers with the unmanned Soyuz 2.
Everything now depended on the Zond-6 flight in November. If it was a complete success there was still a small chance that the next flight in = December would be manned. The probe was launched safely on 10 November = and flew=20 past the Moon three days later, but the landing maneuver went totally = wrong.=20 First the spacecraft depressurized because of a faulty rubber gasket a = few hours=20 before reentry, killing all animals on board. The capsule descended = safely=20 through the atmosphere but then parachute deployment came too early and = it=20 crashed on Soviet soil. But the Soviets did not reveal the failure for=20 propaganda reasons, instead saying the mission had been a complete = success=20 (Harvey,1996). Consequently NASA was fearing the worst while preparing = the=20 Apollo 8 vehicle in December. Due to the pecularities of celestial = mechanics the=20 Soviets would have been able to launch a lunar spacecraft two weeks = before the=20 'launch window' opened in the US. The L1 cosmonauts did send a letter to = the=20 Politburo asking for permission to launch a manned mission. They even = travelled=20 to the Baikonur Cosmodrome in order to be ready to fly at a short = notice. But=20 the order never came and two weeks later, Apollo 8 astronauts Frank = Borman, Jim=20 Lovell and Bill Anders became the first men to fly around the Moon=20 (Pesavento,1993).
THE L1 PROGRAM TAPERS OFF
The L1 naturally ceased to be a high priority program after the = successful Apollo 8 flight and all manned flight were put on hold. It was instead = decided to fly a few more test missions in 1969-70. A probe launched in January = 1969 failed to reach orbit because of problems with the UR-500 carrier. In = August, Zond 7 became the only completely successful L1 mission, passing the = Moon at a distance of 1500km before safely landing in the USSR. Three months = later, one=20 of the two man-rated L1s was launched on an unmanned test flight to test = the Block-D systems in Earth orbit, but the launch ended in yet another = failure (Clark,1997). A second circumlunar test in December followed by a = manned voyage for Lenin's birthday celebration in April 1970 with the single = remaining crew-rated L1 was briefly considered but never approved -- possibly = because the program was delayed yet again (Hendrickx, 1997). Instead, the Soviets = launched=20 a final unmanned test in October 1970, but the mission was only a = partial=20 success. Zond 8 ended the lunar flyby program by making an unplanned = ballistic=20 reentry into the Indian Ocean after an attitude control sensor failed. = The final=20 L1 capsule (equipped for manned flight) was then launched unmanned as = Cosmos 382=20 in December 1970, successfully testing the Block-D stage in Earth orbit (Clark,1997).
PREPARING FOR THE FIRST MANNED LUNAR LANDING
As the L1 program was winding down in early 1969, the focus shifted = to the N1 program. The first flight-ready N1 carrier rocket had been installed on = the newly constructed launch pad as early as 7 May 1968, but had to be = returned for repair when cracks (possibly caused during installation of the payload) = were found in the first stage. It was rolled out again in the mid-January = 1969 after a brief test period on the pad in November 1968 (Lebedev, 1992).
The N1 rocket's path had been a long and difficult one. Mishin had to = wait until 4 February 1967 for the government to commit significant = resources to the project. A new resolution ('About the course of work in the creation of = the UR-500K-L1') specified test flights in September 1967 and a first = manned lunar landing in 1968. The latter was upgraded to 'an objective of national significance', and initial assembly of the first N1 boosters were = started at=20 the Baikonur Cosmodrome in late February (Harvey,1996). Work on two = launch pads=20 500 meters apart was also completed, and in November an N1 mockup was = placed on=20 pad 1 for three weeks of tests, checks & ground crew training. It = was=20 returned to the assembly building in mid-December (Lebedev, 1992).
In March 1968, the cosmonauts started training in preparation for a = Moon landing at Star City, Moscow. A moonwalk simulator was installed in the gymnasium, and the cosmonauts practised lunar landings with a modified = version of the Mi-8 helicopter (Pirard,1993). But they still had no L3 = spacecraft to=20 fly a year later - the constant Soyuz and L1 troubles in 1967-68 = apparently had prevented the Soviet engineers from devoting their attention to the = manned lunar-landing spacecraft. Consequently it was decided on 1 January 1969 = to test the N1 by launching an unmanned L1 craft, to perform high-resolution=20 photography of potential landing sites from lunar orbit. The L3 = spacecraft (LOK=20 and LK) would be tested later, for a first landing in 1970-71. The first = lunar-landing mission would be commanded by the Voskhod 2 veteran, = Alexei=20 Leonov, with Oleg Makarov serving as the LOK pilot in lunar orbit.
NEW OBJECTIVES
Although the Soviets were still hoping that an unplanned setback = might delay=20 the Apollo program long enough to permit a Soviet cosmonaut to get to = the Moon first, they were forced to prepare for the worst after Apollo 8. The = Babakin bureau had completed work on the new third generation Ye Luna series = (the older E-6 probes had performed three missions after Luna 10 in 1966, and Luna = 14 had mapped potential landing sites in 1968). To guard against the = (increasingly likely-) possibility of further failures in the manned program, the = government accepted Babakin's proposal from early 1967 to prepare an unmanned = sample=20 return probe (Hendrickx,1997). This would recover a few grams of lunar = soil and=20 return it to the USSR before the first American landing. This probe was = called=20 Ye-8-5 and used the same lunar descent propulsion module as the other Ye = probes,=20 but replaced the rover with an Earth return vehicle plus soil sample = capsule (Hendrickx,1995). Design work on the "standard" Ye-8 was finished in = late=20 1967.
The man-in-space program also got a new fallback option when = Chelomei's Almaz military space station was confirmed. Chelomei had also developed a = large cargo spacecraft called TKS using elements from the old LK-1 program, and we = also=20 know that he proposed a manned Mars flyby using an UR-700 heavy-lift = rocket with=20 a new nuclear upper stage (the LK-700 lunar landing project had been = cancelled a year earlier). Mishin also was proposing a similar manned flight to = Mars for=20 the early 1990s (Clark,1992). The MK-900 Mars mission finally died in = 1971 but=20 the Almaz/TKS program was eventually merged with the Soyuz program in = 1970,=20 becoming the civilian `DOS-1' Salyut space station that dominated the = Soviet=20 space scene well into the mid-1980s.
The next two manned Soyuz flights would practise spacewalks and = dockings, finally achieving the goals of the failed Soyuz 1/2 mission almost two = years earlier. Soyuz 4 was the first to go, launched on 14 January 1969 with = Vladimir Shalatov on board. On the 15th, Soyuz 5 carrying three more cosmonauts = (Boris Volynov, Yevgeni Khrunov and Alexei Yeliseyev) joined Shalatov in Earth = orbit. Following docking, Khrunov and Yeliseyev tested the new moonsuits by = performing a spacewalk to Soyuz 4. The Soviets claimed the Soyuz 4/5 linkup = represented 'the world's first space station' and denied they had plans to go to = the Moon=20 at the moment (Harvey,1996).
EXPLOSION ON THE N1 PAD
The Soviets were now ready to test their various lunar-landing = spacecraft for the first time. The first to go was an unmanned Ye-8 lunar rover which = would have landed on the Moon and relayed back TV pictures of the landing = site. But its UR-500 rocket exploded 40 seconds after launch on 19 February 1969. =
On 21 February the first N1 booster (number 3L) roared to life and = the giant rocket began to rise skyward. However, at 12:19:12 Moscow time (66s = after launch) a leaking oxidizer pipe started a fire at the rear of the first = stage and the unmanned L1 payload's escape system activated, pulling it away = from the booster. The N1 was destroyed by range safety while the L1 landed = safely. Heat and vibrations from the first stage's 30 engines had damaged the = rocket, it was later determined. The launch went virtually undetected in the West with = only a British observation team reporting it, although CIA dismissed the = report (Vick,1996).
The Soviets were now running out of time. The Apollo 9 astronauts successfully tested the Lunar Module in Earth orbit one month after the = N1 launch failure, and in May the crew of Apollo 10 ventured to within 15 kilometers of the lunar surface in a dress rehearsal of the Apollo 11 = mission. Only a miracle could save the Soviets, who nevertheless pressed ahead. = The=20 first two Ye-8-5 'Moonscopers' failed to reach Earth orbit in April and = June, respectively.
After some changes, a second N1 launch attempt using rocket number 5L = was made on July 3 at 23:18:32 Moscow time. Nine seconds after liftoff at = an altitude of 200 meters, disaster struck. A piece of debris entered the = oxidizer pump of one of the engines, causing it to explode. The explosion wiped = out=20 other engines and vital control systems, an the N1 engine control/thrust = coordination system shut down the remaining engines. The launch escape = tower=20 then activated and pulled the payload (an unmanned L1 spacecraft) away = from the=20 booster, which fell back towards the pad. The resulting giant explosion=20 completely destroyed pad 2 and also did significant damage to pad 1 and = an N1=20 mockup 500 meters away (Lebedev,1992). CIA quickly discovered the damage = when=20 scrutinizing spy satellite photos of the Baikonur Cosmodrome a few weeks = later.
The last Soviet hope was now the Ye-8-5 program and on 13 July 1969, = an UR-500 booster finally hurtled Luna 15 towards the Moon. Three days = later, Neil Armstrong, Edwin Aldrin and Michael Collins entered their Apollo 11 = spacecraft as millions of people all over the world were watching the event on TV. = But the Soviet probe's landing systems failed and it impacted on the Moon as = the=20 Western media was trying to figure out what its mission was. The same = day, on 21=20 July 1969, Neil Armstrong became the first man to walk on the Moon. The = Soviets=20 had lost.
PICKING UP THE PIECES
The triumphant return of Apollo 11 on 24 July marked the ultimate = humiliation for the Soviet space planners. Frustrated by one failure after another, = the=20 past two years had been marked by one misfortune after another. Beaten = in the around-the-Moon race, beaten in the on-the-Moon race; even the Ye-8-5 Moonscooper had failed. Nothing seemed to go right. It was a dramatic = contrast to the early 1960s when the Americans could do no right and the Soviets = could not go wrong.
When it was found out that it would take two years to repair the N1 = launch pads, rumors started to fly that the project might have to be cancelled altogether (Newkirk,1993). But Mishin still enjoyed enough support in = the Politburo to keep the N1 alive. While the launch complex was being = rebuilt, the N1 first stage engines were tested vigorously. Mishin was also ordered = to begin work a more advanced manned lunar-landing project called L3M. If they = could not be first, the Soviets reasoned, they could still be best. The program = would eventually be reorganized around the concept of extended stays on the = Moon that would be longer than the brief visits made by the American Apollo = astronauts (Logsdon,1994). Meanwhile the triple flight of the Soyuz 6,7 & 8 = spacecraft in November 1969 gave the Soviets something to cheer about, although = that mission was part of the forthcoming Almaz space station program.
UNMANNED TESTS AND LUNAR EXPLORATION
The Ye Luna program finally began to yield results. After three more = launch failures, Luna 16 finally became the first successful Ye-8-5 craft on = 12 September 1970, returning a few grams of soil from the Sea of = Fertility. It was a remarkable achievement by any standard. In October 1970, Luna 17 = landed the first successful Ye-8 rover on the Moon. The vehicle, called `Lunokhod = 1' by=20 the Soviets, lasted nine months on the lunar surface and travelled = almost 11 kilometers. The USSR now claimed the Lunas were ten times cheaper than = Apollo and far less risky than a manned mission.
Meanwhile the L3 spacecraft were finally ready for launch. The LOK = propulsion=20 systems were to be tested in orbit using a prototype named T1K while the = LK=20 lander systems would be tested on another vehicle named T2K. Lack of = funds (and=20 available Proton boosters-?) meant the T1K was never launched. But the = T2K flew=20 three times in Earth orbit because Mikhail Yangel insisted that his = propulsion=20 module be tested thoroughly before a manned landing was attempted = (Pirard,1993).=20 The vehicles were tested secretly under the Cosmos label, but Western = observers=20 monitoring them still suspected a link to the manned space program=20 (Harvey,1996).
The T2K tests took place in November 1970 (Cosmos 379), February 1971 = (Cosmos=20 398) and August 1971 (Cosmos 434). Various contingency modes and the = ascent from=20 lunar orbit were simulated successfully and the LK lander was declared = ready for=20 manned flight following the Cosmos 434 tests (Pirard,1993). In December = 1970,=20 Cosmos 382 successfully tested the operation of the Block-D rocket stage = in=20 space, which would be used by the L3 complex during lunar orbit = insertion and=20 descent to the surface. Cosmos 382 consisted of a modified L1 spacecraft = with=20 instruments installed to monitor the behavior of the Block-D propellants = under=20 weightless conditions. A second launch in November failed to reach = orbit.
At the same time, a manned test of the LOK/LK docking system in Earth = orbit was planned. Two Soyuz craft would be outfitted with the `Kontakt' = docking adaptor - a rather primitive system that permitted successful dockings = with=20 poor precision (van den Abeelen, 1994). The active crew, simulating the = LOK,=20 would be Anatoli Filipchenko and Georgi Grechko; the passive crew was = Georgi=20 Dobrovolski and Vitaly Sevastianov. However, it was eventually decided = to=20 replace the `Kontakt' system with a new one called `Igla' and the = mission was=20 cancelled in January 1971 (Harvey,1996).
PLANNING THE ADVANCED L-3M PROGRAM
The Soviets were now ready to fly the N1 again two years later. = Perhaps in=20 order to conceal the true purpose of the launch, the new N1 (number 6L) = was not=20 aimed at the Moon. The goal was simply to launch a dummy LOK into Earth = orbit.=20 This launch took place from pad number two on 27 June 1971 at 02:15:07 = Moscow=20 time as three cosmonauts flew overhead in the new Salyut 1 space = station. Soon=20 after liftoff at an altitude of about 250 meters an unplanned rotation = caused=20 breakup of the support structure between the second and third stages. = Moments=20 later the third stage and lunar complex toppled over, falling near the = launch=20 pad and causing damage. The rest of the N1 impacted 20km downrange.
Despite the failure the Soviets continued the N1 program, but it = appears as if plans for (L3-) lunar expeditions were abandoned for some time due = to the success of Apollo. (Lebedev,1992). Instead, Mishin presented his now = complete plan for the L-3M project to the Council of Chief Designers, which = formally approved it in the spring of 1972. The L-3M envisioned a manned lunar = mission=20 of two N1 rockets with new high-energy cryogenic upper stages to boost=20 performance. The first N1 would place a large 25t lunar lander descent = stage=20 (GB-1) in lunar orbit. The second N1 would deliver a three-man GB-2 = lunar=20 lander/Earth return vehicle weighing 24t. Both payloads would dock in = lunar=20 orbit and then descent together to the lunar surface. The GB-2 would = permit 2-3=20 cosmonauts to spend up to a month on the lunar surface, using a Soyuz = capsule=20 for the return to Earth (Vick 1996). Mishin envisaged the dual N1 = mission taking=20 place in the late 1970s (Harvey,1996). But it appears as if the Soviet=20 government never funded the construction of actual L-3M hardware and the = remaining unmanned test flights had to use existing L3 spacecraft in the = end.=20
MORE N1 FAILURES
The fourth and, as it turned out, final N1 rocket blasted off from = pad number two early in the morning on 23 November 1972 at 09:11:52 Moscow time. = The rocket had been extensively designed since the last failure. The 1st = stage engine bay had been redesigned and its diameter (originally 16.8 = meters) was reduced to 15.8 meters. Another visible change was that the kerosene = pipeline covers on the first three stages were sharpened at the top. The fourth = N1 booster (number 7L) was heavier than its predecessors but also designed = to be more reliable (Yasinsky,1993).
This time all went well until the 90s mark, when there was a failure = of a 250mm line from the liquid oxygen tank. A fire broke out, engines = started to explode and the entire 1st stage was shut down 107 seconds into the = flight a mere six seconds before second stage separation . . . The escape rocket = pulled the payload (an unmanned real LOK orbiter) away from the rocket, which = was then destroyed by range safety. Close, but still no cigar.
END OF THE ROAD
The lunar programs of both superpowers tapered off in 1973. Apollo 17 = had successfully concluded the American man-on-the-Moon program in December = 1972; future missions would be restricted to Earth orbit. The Soviet Luna = program was scaled back as well. In January 1973 Luna 21 landed another Ye-8 rover=20 (Lunokhod 2). In May the following year the last Ye-8LS lunar orbiter, = Luna 22,=20 was launched (Luna 19 had carried out a similar observation program from = lunar=20 orbit in 1971). Luna 19 managed to return soil samples to Earth in = February 1971=20 but two more Ye-8-5 probes had failed by the end of 1974.
Mishin still pressed on. Two new N1s were constructed (vehicle no. 8L = and 9L), the first set for launch in August 1974 and the second later that = year.=20 The purpose was now to fly the entire L3 mission in an unmanned mode, = including=20 a lunar landing. Engineers said that by 1976 the N1 may have become = operational (Lebedev,1992). If the missions had gone well, there were plans to use = the 10L vehicle to land the first Soviet cosmonaut on the Moon. An alternative = plan was to fly an Apollo 10 type dress rehearsal mission, practising spacewalks = between the LK and LOK in lunar orbit before the LK made an automatic landing = and=20 return to the manned LOK. The first manned landing would have been = performed by=20 the 11L vehicle in that case. At least four to five follow-up lunar = expeditions=20 (up to N1-15L or 16L) were originally planned (Hendrickx,1995). It would = seem=20 that the manned LK/backup LK launch scenario proposed in 1965 was = considered for=20 the first manned landing only.
That day never arrived, however. Mishin had came increasingly under = fire not=20 only for the failures of the L1/L3 programs but also for the problems of = the Salyut space station program. In May 1974, Mishin was dismissed and = replaced by Valentin Glushko - Korolev's old enemy. Within days, Glushko suspended = the=20 lunar program, instead presenting his own plans for a lunar colony. = During=20 1974-76 he worked on an entirely new heavy-lift rocket called Vulkan = that would=20 have used oxygen and hydrogen fuel just like Korolev had wanted in 1962! = Drawings were made of a large manned lunar rover that would have carried = cosmonauts across the lunar surface. His plans were opposed by Mstislav = Keldysh=20 and the Academy of Sciences, who regarded them as both expensive and = premature.=20 Neither the government nor the military were interested. Both regarded = the new=20 American Space Shuttle as a bigger (military-) threat so Glushko was = ordered to=20 plan a similar Soviet system. The N1 was finally terminated in March = 1976 when=20 Glushko began work the Soviet shuttle project. His Vulkan booster became = the=20 Energia booster and would instead be used to launch the Shuttle. The = remaining=20 six N1s were destroyed (Mishin, 1990; Harvey,1996). The last Soviet = lunar probe=20 (Luna 24) departed from the Moon in October 1976.
EPILOGUE
Had the N1 succeeded, it would have been called the `Lenin' or = `Kommunism' booster. Instead it disappeared almost without a trace. Scavenged = pieces of the superbooster were used as makeshift hangars and storage sheds at the = Baikonur Cosmodrome (Landis,1992). The launch pads and vehicle integration = buildings were converted to support Glushko's Energia program instead, and the = first of the new superboosters took off from the old N1's second pad in 1987. = Only the N1's NK-33 engines survived, being perfected by Kuznetsov at his own = expense after the N1 program ended. In 1996 they were sold to two American = companies to be used on the first stage of new reusable spacecraft! Four surviving = LK=20 landers and one LOK ended up in museums or space engineering institutes, = where=20 they are used for study today. Mishin was also sent to lecture at the = Moscow=20 Aviation Institute and, following Glushko's death in 1989 and = glasnost,=20 emerged to tell the story of the Soviet lunar program.
Writing about the N1 and L3/L1 projects years later, Mishin blamed underinvestment (only $4.5 billion compared to Apollo's $24 billion), = lack of cooperation between design bureaus, failure to grasp the significance = of President Kennedy's challenge as well as the technical difficulties of = sending humans to the Moon. They should also have done ground testing. Poor = management of the 500 enterprises and 26 government bureaus involved was also a = major problem (Harvey,1996).
The direct technical reason for the N1's failure was its inability to = achieve=20 reliability and thrust stability across the 30 NK-33 first stage engines (Landis,1992). But the real, principal reasons were that (1) the = Soviets=20 entered the Moon race far too late; (2) the lack of cooperation between = the=20 leading personalities such as Korolev/Mishin vs. Glushko/Chelomei. The = resulting duplication of effort was something the Soviets could afford even less = than the Americans. In the end, the USSR lost the race to the Moon because it = misjudged American intentions and resources, mobilized its own resources far too = late,=20 and failed to control its competing schools of rocket/spacecraft = designers (Harvey,1996).
REFERENCES
* Abeelen, Luc van den "Soviet Lunar Programme." Spaceflight vol.36:p.90 (1994)
* Clark, Phillip S. "The Soviet Manned Circumlunar Program." = Quest 1992:pp.17-20
* Clark, Phillip S. "Chelomei's Alternative Lunar Program." = Quest 1992:pp.31-34
* Feoktistov, Konstantin - Interview by Peter Smolders "It Made Sense = to Build a Space Station." Spaceflight vol.38:pp.113-115 (1996)
* Harvey, Brian "The New Russian Space Programme." John Wiley & = sons.,=20 1996 (ISBN 0-471-96014-4)
* Hendrickx, Bart "Soviet Lunar Dream that Faded." Spaceflight=20 vol.37:pp.135-137 (1995)
* Hendrickx, Bart "Korolev: Facts and Myths." Spaceflight vol.38:pp.44-48 (1996)
* Johnson, Nicholas "The Soviets Reach for the Moon." (1994)
* Landis, Rob R. "The N-1 and the Soviet Manned Lunar Landing = Program."=20 Quest 1992:pp.21-30 (1992)
* Lebedev, Daniel A. "The N1-L3 Programme," Spaceflight vol 34:p.288-290 (1992)
* Logsdon, John M. & Dupas, Alain "Was the Race to the Moon = Real?"=20 Scientific American June/1994: pp.16-23
* Mishin,Vasili [-Interview] "Designer Mishin Speaks on Early Soviet = Space Programmes and the Manned Lunar Project." Spaceflight = vol.32:pp.104-106=20 (1990)
* Newkirk, Dennis "More Data on the Soviet Manned Lunar Program."=20 Quest 1993: p.35
* Pesavento, Peter "Two Weeks that killed the Soviet dream." New Scientist 18 December 1993:pp.29-32
* Pesavento, Peter "Soviet Circumlunar Programme Hardware Revealed."=20 Spaceflight vol.36: p.390 (1994)
* Pirard,Theo "The Cosmonauts Missed the Moon!" Spaceflight = vol.35:=20 pp.410-413 (1993)
* Vick,Charles P. "Soviet Orbital Space Station-1 Designed in 1965."=20 Spaceflight vol.36:p.282 (1994)
* Vick, Charles P. "The Mishin Mission." JBIS September = 1994:p.357
* Vick, Charles P. "Launch Site Infrastructure:CIA/CIO Declassifies = N1-L3 Details." Spaceflight vol.38:p.28 (1996)
* Yasinsky, Alexander "The N-1 Rocket Programme." Spaceflight vol.35:pp.228-229 (1993)
* Personal correspondence with Phil Clark, Bart Hendrickx (late 1996,1997).