e-Printse-PrintsA Soviet space expert discusses how recently declassified material = confirms his painstaking discoveries over decades about why the Soviet = Union was=20 unable to win the space race.=20
EDITOR'S NOTE
Russia today is at a crossroads. If the current financial policies, = under=20 the heel of the International Monetary Fund, should continue, the = one-time=20 Soviet superpower will be relegated to Third World status, suffering = the=20 political and economic chaos that will result from such a devolution.=20
After his most recent trip to Russia in April 1997, during which he = traveled throughout the country to various space facilities, space = expert=20 Charles Vick commented that the IMF policies in Russia ``amount to = economic=20 tyranny.'' One result, he observed, has been the meteoric rise of = corruption=20 and criminality, and the corresponding lack of available resources for = basic=20 economic reconstruction, or the space program.=20
The Soviet Union was the only nation besides the United States that = ever=20 developed the ability to put man into space. The Soviets did it first. = But=20 they could not sustain an effort of such magnitude, because they were = not able=20 to transfer new technology from their civil and military space = programs to the=20 economy, as a whole. As Charles Vick explains, the pie was limited in = size by=20 this failure, and when the political situation changed, other programs = took=20 priority over sending men to the Moon. Today, the Russians will = doggedly try=20 to maintain their space capabilities, Vick states, but time is running = out.=20
Charles Vick, currently a senior research associate at the = Federation of=20 American Scientists, has more than 35 years of experience in assessing = Soviet=20 space technology. His technical drawings of Soviet launch and space = vehicles=20 are known worldwide. By applying his own creative powers to analyze = whatever=20 paltry data were available from the Soviets before 1989, Vick was the = first to publish a drawing that reconstructed the N-1/L-3 Soviet manned lunar = vehicle,=20 at a time when the Soviets were denying that they ever had a manned = lunar=20 program.=20
Vick is now working to develop the seventh N-1/L-3 book-length = study. He=20 was interviewed by 21st Century Associate Editor Marsha Freeman in = July.=20
Question: The Soviets were the first in space, with the launch = of=20 Sputnik 40 years ago. They had the first man in space, as well. So, one = of the=20 greatest mysteries of the Soviet space program is why the Soviets never = beat us=20 to the Moon, and why they still have not sent people there to explore. = When President Kennedy announced that the United States was making landing = on the=20 Moon its goal, it would seem to be undebatable that the Soviets were = likewise=20 planning to have a manned lunar mission. Were they planning it before = Kennedy's=20 announcement?=20
Charles P. Vick: They were in fact planning it ahead of time. = What is=20 even more interesting is that when Kennedy made his speech, the Russians = did not=20 completely understand what he was saying, and it took them some years = before=20 they actually completely understood. Once they did, then they said, = ``Oh. Wait a=20 minute. We've got to look at what we're doing.'' They were, however, = committed to other priorities.=20
Question: Let's go back further, to when the Soviets would = have been=20 first thinking about landing men on the Moon.=20
Charles P. Vick: Their plan is rather self-evident, when you = go back=20 and look at their open literature, even back into the 1950s. You have to = consider the fact that the Germans had the idea, and the Americans also = had the=20 thought. It was in the general, open literature going back before World = War II.=20 The Moon has always been an interesting subject.=20
Their lunar program was more evident once we started seeing the = Russians=20 flying unmanned lunar missions in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Plus = their=20 other public statements made it very clear that something was going on. = But not=20 until 1963 did we really have anything solid and official, built around = a series=20 of statements by Nikita Khrushchev that really revealed there was = something=20 going on. Ultimately you find that our side was looking for the evidence = and not=20 finding it until August 1963, and we were not really certain until the = fall of=20 1964.=20
Question: What was it that the United States saw in August = 1963?=20
Charles P. Vick: The beginning of the construction of the = Baikonur=20 Cosmodrome, of the TT-5, or what would become known as the J facilities. = That's=20 when the first road work and stakes in the ground were going into place. = The=20 National Intelligence Estimate of 1965, from the U.S. Central = Intelligence=20 Agency, which has not been released, reviews this. It is mentioned in = the 1967=20 National Intelligence Estimate on Russian space programs, which has been = released. This is confirmed by the now-declassified reconnaissance film = from the=20 Corona camera.=20
Even more interesting is the fact that when you compare their initial = dates=20 to what you see in the reconnaissance pictures, there can be a wide gap = between=20 when they say construction started and what the pictures show. This may = be due=20 to the fact that, of course, they have to prepare the ground and put the = roads=20 into the general area, and once they actually get the ground prepared, = then,=20 they say, ``Now we're really starting construction for real.'' But, in = fact,=20 construction had started much, much earlier.=20
Up to that point, frankly, America was looking for the evidence and = saying:=20 ``Are they going to give us a sporting race, or aren't they?'' We = weren't seeing=20 it in the literal sense. But Khrushchev tipped his hand about the same = time as=20 these thing were going on, so things had gotten started and we began to = see it.=20
NASA Administrator James Webb, made statements in April and May 1964 = in which=20 he said he was not certain that they were racing us at all. In a speech = to the=20 Missouri Cotton Producers Association in May 1964, Webb said, ``There is = some=20 evidence the Soviets are working on a larger rocket, but we cannot say = yet for=20 sure.'' But in an article on Oct. 14, Washington Post writer Howard = Simons reports Webb saying, ``there is increasing evidence'' that a new, super = rocket=20 was being readied for testing, in the 1967-1968 time frame.=20
Question: So we could see certain activity, and then later = Khrushchev=20 started making public statements saying they were going to try to land = men on=20 the Moon?=20
Charles P. Vick: His statements were very devious, and = occurred in the=20 fall of 1963, when there was discussion by President Kennedy about the = potential=20 for cooperative missions. In fact, Kennedy, in August 1963, mandated a = reduction=20 in the level of confrontation with the Russians, and looked more toward=20 cooperation with them. That was government policy.=20
Many people were circling the wagons to protect their projects, = including the=20 Apollo program at NASA at that time, because we had not seen evidence up = to then=20 that the Russians were undertaking a lunar program.=20
But then Khrushchev made some statements that were not direct, but = indirect,=20 and there were arguments about whether they were racing us to the Moon,=20 depending on how reporters interpreted what Khrushchev said. And he = twisted it=20 around and around.=20
Ultimately, we ended up finding out that you have to look at the = money:=20 Follow the money and that tells you the truth.=20
What was really startling to me, was the realization that the Russian = budget,=20 up through 1963-1964, continued to rise for the lunar program. Then it = became=20 almost flat, through to about 1970, when they added about another 600 = million=20 rubles to it. And then, it dropped off from there slowly, = systematically, until=20 1974, when the program was cancelled, although remnants of the program = continued=20 through March 1976 for a manned circumnavigation, and manned lunar = landing=20 program. It's just amazing to realize that the budget went up to a = certain=20 point, then went flat.=20
Whereas, if you look at the strategic rocket area, the budget just = kept right=20 on skyrocketing, much above that of the United States. When you realize = that the=20 Soviets put the money into that program, and not into the space effort, = you say,=20 ``Wait a minute. It this a commitment by the government, or isn't it?''=20
In retrospect, the 1962-1964 period was critical to the events and = decisions=20 in the Soviet lunar program, as well as to commitments to the strategic = rocket=20 program. The advent of the U.S. Minuteman missile and Corona = reconnaissance=20 programs, forced the Soviets to make still larger outlays to create = silo-based=20 strategic ballistic missiles, with the ability to stay fueled in the = ground, for=20 a long time, in a ready state and with a quick reaction time. The=20 second-generation missile systems, for which they had appropriated = money, were=20 already outdated before they were deployed, and the Soviets had to = develop a=20 third-generation system, which we would see deployed in the latter part = of the=20 1960s.=20
As a result of the Cuban missile crisis, the legitimacy of the Soviet = regime=20 and the credibility of its strategic forces were being questioned. U.S. = Defense=20 Secretary and geopolitican Robert McNamara stated, after the Apollo=20 announcement, that the Russians would have to choose between strategic = systems=20 and the space race. Our policy people hoped they would choose the space = race,=20 but they did not.=20
Question: Right after the war, the Soviets made the decision = that they=20 would be developing rocket technology for military purposes. In August = 1957,=20 there was the first successful test of their ICBM, and then Sputnik, in = October=20 1957. What were they doing on a lunar program in that early period, and = what=20 approach were they taking to land a man on the Moon?=20
Charles P. Vick: From 1957, and even earlier, as far back as = 1955,=20 Sergei Korolev [the chief designer of the N-1 booster and the manned = lunar=20 program] was doing design studies on a heavier-lift launch vehicle than = the=20 Sputnik R-7 booster, and the derivative forms of the R-7 booster evolved = as the=20 N-1 Moon rocket. A number of variations were also developed. The initial = designs=20 that Korolev developed were a multi-block vehicle, meaning multiple = modules,=20 much like the Sputnik booster. It has multiple parallel blocks. The N-1 = had six=20 parallel blocks and one sustainer block, and then booster stages on top = of that.=20
Question: What do you mean by blocks? Is that stages?=20
Charles P. Vick: Yes. It was a multiple-stage vehicle, and = then they=20 added upper stages to it. That was while they were doing design studies, = until=20 about the 1961-1962 time frame. They were looking at the rocket engines = they=20 were thinking about using. Those early rocket engines were open-cycle = engines,=20 which are not as efficient as closed-cycle engines.=20
Question: Can you explain the difference?=20
Charles P. Vick: In the open-cycle engines the actuation gas = used to=20 run the turbo-pump, the substance that actually makes the pump spin, is = dumped=20 overboard. It's wasted energy. In the closed-cycle engine, that gas is = dumped=20 into the oxygen-rich thrust chamber and burned with the rest of the = fuel. The=20 Soviets suddenly realized in 1960-1961 that they could develop those=20 high-pressure, closed-cycle engines and get a better launch vehicle. = Using=20 engines with increased efficiency led to a dramatic change in the design = of the=20 N-1.=20
When they compared the two different launch vehicles, using one = engine type=20 versus another, they went to a different structural type all together. = They=20 finished those design studies officially in the July-Sept 1962 time = frame. There=20 are quite vivid descriptions of that in the open literature, published = at the=20 time. They were fascinating. They were arguing about the logistics of = the=20 vehicle, and how you get it to the Cosmodrome, and how you manufacture = it,=20 transport it, and so on.=20
Question: And that was published in the open literature?=20
Charles P. Vick: It was indeed. Part of it was published in = The New=20 York Times, and was very revealing. It described a booster that was 55.8 = feet=20 across its base, with the first stage 150 feet long, in one design they = were=20 looking at. But they ended up breaking that up into three separate = stages, because a vehicle that size would be exceptionally difficult to = transport, in=20 land-locked Russia.=20
Question: Similar to the Saturn V?=20
Charles P. Vick: In some respects, but the shape and design of = N-1 is=20 dramatically different from the Saturn V. The first three stages of the = N-1=20 actually constitute the first two stages of the Saturn V. The first = stage in N-1=20 has a Nova, or super-Saturn/Nova-class launch vehicle written all over = it,=20 because its thrust was 10 million pounds-plus. There were 30 engines in = its=20 first stage, at 150-154 metric tons thrust each, giving it more than 10 = million=20 pounds of thrust at launch. By comparison, the Saturn V first stage had = five=20 engines, producing 7.6 million pounds of thrust.=20
The original N-1 design was of a somewhat smaller vehicle. The N-2 = derivative=20 of N-1 would have used the upper second stage of the N-1 for its first = stage,=20 then N-3 would have used the third stage of the N-1 as its first stage. = That=20 development was dropped, but should have been followed through; they = could have=20 finished development of the upper stages a lot sooner, having already=20 successfully static-test-fired those in the late 1960s for the N-1. They = were=20 not able, ever, to static-test-fire the N-1 first stage. They did not = have the=20 facilities for that. They do not have them even today.=20
That is one of the major reasons that the first stage repeatedly = failed in=20 flight tests. It is a more catastrophic failure in flight than on a test = stand,=20 if it fails the wrong way, and there is no inflight destruction system, = which=20 the Russians, as a general rule, do not have. Their philosophy for = inflight safety and destruction of the booster if it fails is very different = from ours.=20
Until after the second flight test of N-1, which took place on July = 3, 1969,=20 the Soviets did not have a procedure whereby they could keep the engines = running, just to clear the facility, before they allowed the booster to = go on=20 and fail. They wiped out an entire launch facility when they let a = failing vehicle collapse on the launch pad in July 1969. The engines were on = automatic=20 command to be cut off=20
if there were a problem, just as it cleared the turning tower gantry. = When=20 the booster fell back on the ground, it cratered the launch pad, as well = as the=20 underground, multiple-story building that was the support facility for = the=20 vehicle.=20
Question: How could have they avoided doing that?=20
Charles P. Vick: They could have avoided that by keeping the = engines=20 on, in spite of the engines' failing. If the computer is programmed = right, and=20 it considers things in a certain way, it will not shut down the engines, = for=20 safety reasons, until the booster gains enough altitude and clears the = launch facility. In this case, the Soviets did not have that built into the = program.=20 They do now in all their launch vehicles, but they learned the hard way. = Your=20 heart just drops, when you watch that thing lift off, during the July 3. = 1969,=20 test launch. The N-1 rises up and clears the tower, and then all the = engines but=20 one shut off and it just starts dropping back on to the launch pad. = Those=20 engines were shut off automatically because a fire had developed in the = engine=20 bay from the explosion of one engine at lift-off. It's unbelievable to = see the=20 films of that.=20
Question: I was unaware that they were not able to static-test = those=20 engines.=20
Charles P. Vick: They did static-test-fire a selected few of = the=20 engines. They had a batch-production capability. They'd produce so many = engines,=20 and take X number of them and test fire them. If they worked, they'd = install the=20 rest of the engines. That's the way they did it with the first stage. = The first stage was originally designed for 24 engines, but had 6 additional = engines=20 added to it and then 4 additional Vernier engines, for a total of 34 = engines in=20 the final design for the first stage.=20
Question: Didn't they look into using more efficient liquid = hydrogen=20 engines?=20
Charles P. Vick: They were looking at it and developing the=20 technology, but they were way behind the United States. Some papers were = just=20 released in Moscow on that, but I do not have them yet. We do know that = Nikolai=20 Kuznetsov, at his design bureau in Kyubyshev (now, Samara), was working = on a=20 hydrogen engine concept. M.A. Lyulka Engine Design Bureau, did = successfully develop an engine, known as the D-57, D-57M, which was one of the many = engines=20 that have been proposed. It was designed to be applied to an upper stage = for=20 N-1. But the engines they actually tested all used kerosene for fuel, = and liquid=20 oxygen.=20
The Soviets developed whole families of engines for the N-1, and = other=20 programs. Many other engines were actually involved, wholly separate of = the=20 manned spacecraft.=20
The first three stages of the booster are known as N-1. When you get = into the=20 fourth and fifth stage, and then the lunar module and the lunar orbiting = spacecraft, and the big, huge shroud that goes over that, that's known = as L-3.=20
So it's called N-1/L-3, for lunar missions. The lunar part was a = separate=20 package and, in fact, they parallel-processed both vehicles, the L-3 and = N-1, as=20 separate packages, in order to process the vehicle.=20
From 1962 through 1967, the design underwent repeated changes. N-1 = was=20 intially designed to deliver 45 metric tons of payload to low-Earth = orbit. Then=20 it was redesigned for 75 metric tons, and then it edged up to about 92 = metric=20 tons, and, ultimately, 100 metric tons, by 1972.=20
Question: That would make it comparable to the Saturn V?=20
Charles P. Vick: Close to it. Saturn had a capability of = delivering=20 between 130 to 140 metric tons of payload to low-Earth orbit, and N-1 = was=20 comparable, but not as capable. This difference in payload capability = meant that=20 the Soviets would have been able to place only one man on the lunar = surface, not=20 two men, as we did in each Apollo mission. Their lunar module was = designed for merely one man, not two; it was very tight inside. It was designed as a = one-man=20 lunar excursion module to go to the surface, and the vehicle was = different from=20 the way we did it.=20
In addition, the Soviets were launching at 50 to 51 degrees = inclination to=20 the equator out of the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, going north to = skirt=20 the Chinese border, not going due east as we do from the Kennedy Space = Center at=20 28 degrees. That really cuts into the launch vehicle's optimum = performance=20 capability. Because they launch at such a high inclination, they have to = also do=20 a plane change in order to go to the Moon, and it takes a lot of energy = to do=20 that.=20
The Soviet lunar-orbiting spacecraft was a two-man spacecraft. What = would=20 have been the third man's seat was to be taken up by the lunar samples. = The=20 lunar cabin, or module, involved the Block D rocket stage--which on = Proton is=20 its fourth stage, and on the N-1 is the fifth stage. Block D was = designed to use=20 a kerosene and liquid oxygen engine, RD-58M, to break the spacecraft = into lunar orbit, and to refine that orbit, down to about 10 km above the lunar = surface.=20 Then, the Block D engine, with the lunar lander on top, would fire for = the last=20 time, to start the direct powered descent to the lunar surface. For the = last 1.5=20 to 2 km prior to landing, the lunar cabin would have separated from the = lunar=20 braking module, Block D, and do the final powered descent and = maneuvering to landing, from about 1.5 km altitude, down to the lunar surface.=20
Question: We had a lot of discussion in this country of how to = do the=20 Apollo landings. We considered Earth-orbit rendezvous, direct descent, = and=20 lunar-orbit rendezvous. We decided on lunar-orbit rendezvous.=20
Charles P. Vick: A Soviet technique, at that. Ultimately = theirs would=20 have been lunar-orbit rendevous, but it was also lunar-surface = rendezvous. As we=20 understand it today, Korolev's last directions before he died in January = 1966,=20 would have involved at least two N-1 launches and several unmanned = Lunakhod=20 launches also. Lunakhod, meaning ``Moon walker,'' was a rover that the = Soviets=20 used, designed to accompany cosmonauts on exploring the Moon. Korolev's = program required multiple-launches, and had backups all the way around for the = entire=20 mission.=20
The Americans did their own separate studies of Earth-orbital = rendezvous,=20 direct, and lunar-orbital rendezvous. Lunar-orbital rendezvous utimately = turned=20 out to be the best option. The Soviets themselves had done lunar surface = rendezvous, direct descent, Earth-orbital rendezvous, and lunar-orbital=20 rendezvous studies.=20
But when the United States actually did it, and the Soviets sat down = and=20 looked at the figures, they considered our concept of lunar-orbital = rendezvous=20 to be particularly brilliant, to quote Alexei Leonov. Only later did = they--and=20 we--discover that a Russian had presented the concept many years before, = and=20 done the mathematics. They backed away from the Earth-orbital rendezvous = and=20 direct concepts, and went instead to what became lunar-orbital = rendezvous and=20 lunar-surface rendezvous, for themselves.=20
That would have involved two different kinds of launches vehicles. = Prior to=20 the N-1 launches, they would have launched at least one or two Lunakhod = unmanned=20 precursor surface-exploration vehicles on the Proton rocket, and landed = in the=20 general areas where they planned to do the manned lunar landing. The = unmanned=20 Lunakhods would have acted as radio beacons for targetting the landing = area.=20 Then, the Soviets would have launched an umannned N-1, with full lunar=20 equipment, and land a lunar module, or cabin, in that preselected area = for=20 landing. That would have effectively provided an unmanned vehicle, = approximately=20 28 days before the next mission, and the Lunakhods would have been able = to=20 inspect the lunar module to see that it was OK. The Lunakhods would then = back off from the site, in order to get pictures of the areas.=20
In the manned lunar mission itself, which was planned to be launched = 28 days=20 later, the Soviets would have done a powered descent with the Block D. = That is,=20 a constant burn, constant thrust descent, in which very quickly, all of = your=20 forward velocity is lost and you come down almost vertically. This = allows you to=20 see your landing point very precisely, and to maneuver to see the = target, very=20 early on.=20
Question: Because it's right underneath you?=20
Charles P. Vick: Right. It's a near-vertical landing = procedure. In the=20 Apollo program, we used a gradual, throttled powered descent to the = landing=20 point, which is an elliptical approach. The Soviet constant-burn = approach is a=20 vertical landing profile that requires less energy, but can be far more dangerous. But they felt that they could do this, and had demonstrated = the=20 lunar module in Earth-orbit in 1971 and 1972 quite successfully, through = three=20 flight tests. The Block D was tested at least once in a flight test, = besides its=20 unmanned lunar missions, and Zond circumnavigation precursor missions.=20
Question: Was this a direct descent, or would they have gone = into=20 lunar orbit first?=20
Charles P. Vick: They would have gone into lunar orbit first, = and the=20 lunar orbiter would have been there along with the other [back-up] one, = the=20 unmanned one, in the same general vicinity. Rendezvous was required. = Cosmonuat=20 Alexei Leonov has said there was an incredible series of rendezvous = required for=20 the lunar mission. There are two vehicles, and two rendezvous--one on = the lunar=20 surface and one in lunar orbit--as well as one coming back from the = lunar=20 surface to rendezvous and dock with the spacecraft that is in lunar = orbit. It's=20 very complicated in that respect.=20
But as far back as 1965, the Soviets knew from their guidance people = that=20 they could land them within a 5-km ellipse of the landing point on the = lunar=20 surface. That was the guidance parameter they had to work with. By 1969, = they=20 had reduced that down to 2.5-km guidance quality. The cosmonauts were = required=20 to be able to walk across the lunar surface with their lunar suits on, = over to=20 the back-up lunar module if the first lunar module failed. They also = looked into=20 using a Lunokhod rover, which would carry a man across the lunar surface = to the=20 back-up lunar module. So it wasn't exactly like landing one lunar module = on top=20 of another one, so to speak; there was some distance between them.=20
Question: Is the reason this is so much more complicated than = what we=20 did in the Apollo program, the fact that their launch capability would = not have=20 allowed them take as much payload along in one launch?=20
Charles P. Vick: It's more the safety factor, in every sense = of the=20 word. They really did not trust their equipment that much. Rendezvous in = lunar=20 orbit really scared the heck out of them. They did a lot of revisions = and=20 avionics work, as well as forward vision capability systems for doing = that. They would have the unmanned orbiting spacecraft as a back-up. It's the = standard=20 package that they had developed, crazy at it may seem.=20
The question becomes, once they had actually successfully launched an = N-1,=20 would Soviet First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev have given the orders to go = with=20 the manned lunar landing, regardless of whether everything else was in = place?=20 The bottom line is that, for political reasons, the mission would have = been=20 conducted with one single launch, with no lunar surface rendezvous = available to it.=20
Question: As the time got shorter, and they wanted to see = results,=20 they would have gone ahead and done it, without the redundancy?=20
Charles P. Vick: Right. That is what is indicated. Brezhnev = was making=20 demands, and then, after a certain point, the doctrinal policies changed = in=20 Russia; as detente developed, in the early 1970s, the lunar program = really lost=20 favor. One, the Soviet Union had lost the race, and two, the program was = way=20 behind schedule, so since it couldn't come off, it wasn't worthwhile. = Also,=20 there were other programs that could be done that were already flying, = such as=20 the Salyut space station, which evolved into today's Mir space station.=20
Question: You've described a very expensive scenario for how = the=20 Soviets were planning to do their manned lunar program, having double = vehicles=20 and unmanned launches before they would send people. How did that = change?=20
Charles P. Vick: It changed because of economics and the = limits of the=20 program, and the problems they were having with the booster itself. The = Soviets=20 actually had five flight test vehicles, the first one of which was = expected to=20 be flight-tested in the August-October 1968 time frame. As they built up = to that=20 flight test, in June 1968, hairline cracks developed in the huge = first-stage=20 liquid oxygen tank, and that first stage had to be cannibalized. So = everything=20 was delayed until Feb. 21, 1969, when they finally flew the first = vehicle. The=20 United States did not understand, or successfully interpret and detect, = that=20 launch. The British did, through national security facilities, but it = was never=20 accepted by the intelligence community on this side. So, in effect, the = Soviets=20 did a flight test, and we didn't know it.=20
Question: Was that first flight test successful?=20
Charles P. Vick: It lasted through 40,000 feet before the = first stage=20 failed, because of engine vibration and the rupture of some propellant = lines,=20 which created a fire. A false signal was then given by the KORD [Engine=20 Operation Control System] system, shutting off the engines. One engine = had failed, and the control system was supposed to shut off two opposite = pairs of=20 engines to maintain balance. This was an aerospike design. If you shut = off an=20 engine on one side, you have to shut off the exact opposite engine on = the other=20 side. But when the KORD instrumentation failed, it shut all the engines = off. The=20 booster began to break up from the tail end. Then the launch escape = system pulled the spacecraft free at the top of the stack, away from the rest = of the=20 L-3 portion of the vehicle, which started breaking up.=20
But the first stage kept right on burning for some time, until it = went=20 ballistic. I think the first and second stages kept right on going for a = little=20 while, until it didn't have any guidance system to guide it. The rest of = it had=20 all broken off. It's very dramatic to watch that arching failure. You = see it=20 going fine, and then, oof! The launch escape tower pulls away from the = booster,=20 and everything just starts coming apart. Then you finally see range = safety blow=20 it up, several minutes later.=20
Question: What is an aerospike engine?=20
Charles P. Vick: The N-1 first stage was a very advanced = propulsion=20 concept. In its original design, when it had 24 engines, they were=20 atmosphere-adapting aerospike engines, much like that being considered = for the=20 Space lifter X-33 concept that NASA is looking at, even though it has = some technical problems--a lot more than NASA understands at this point, I = think.=20 The aerospike atmospherically adapts and increases thrust as the = atmosphere gets=20 thinner.=20
There is an achilles heel to the aerospike design, and the Russians = learned=20 this the hard way, with N-1, in two ways. One is the thermal load = required to=20 create a nozzle in which you have multiple rocket engines burning on the = outside. You have a long nozzle that the expanding gas goes against, to = create=20 the thrust that you want. That nozzle has to be cooled. The thermal = loads, the=20 energy loss from that cooling in the aerospike design, veto any = possibility of=20 acquiring a better performance capability out of the N-1 booster, = compared to=20 using six additional engines with standard nozzles on them. The Soviets = learned=20 the hard way, that if you have too much surface area for that nozzle, = the energy=20 lost in cooling actually vetoes the performance.=20
There's also another aspect.=20
When the Russians transitioned to the 6 additional engines in the = center,=20 within the 24 engines, they didn't make all the revisions required to = preclude=20 the entire engine boat-tail operating as an aerospike. That produced the = aerodynamic effects with the third flight test that were the = hair-trigger that=20 created that failure. The gas was coming in from the sides of the = booster, as it=20 rose up from the launch pad, and from the shock wave coming up from the = bottom=20 of it.=20
During the second flight test, some debris--bolts, nuts, or whatever = from=20 manufacturing--got into one or two of the engines and caused a fire to = break out=20 in the first stage. This happened to a Space Shuttle main engine that = blew up on=20 a test stand in the late 1970s, and that's what happened in the N-1 = engine bay,=20 when the oxgygen line ruptured and fuel dumped all over everything. = Because everything was hot, the engine exploded into fire.=20
You can see the fire developing as the N-1 lifted off and cleared the = tower.=20 Soon after, the automatic control system shut off all but one engine. = That=20 explosion had, in fact, cut the lines that would have shut off that = engine, so=20 the engine couldn't be cut off. That one engine tipped the N-1 over on = its side,=20 and it collapsed sideways and fishtailed, dropping back on the facility = and=20 doing the tremendous damage that we have seen in the declassified Corona = photo=20 reconnaissance pictures.=20
The third flight test was on June 27, 1971. It lifted off and failed = almost=20 immediately, when an aftereffect, a shock wave produced by the acoustic = gas=20 pressure, travelled back up the vehicle--much as we have with the = Shuttle--and=20 sent the centerline of the booster spinning. The interstage between the = second-=20 and third-stage structure actually broke, and the top of the booster = started=20 falling off. As the booster continued to climb out, it gained some = stability,=20 but the whole L-3 unit started flipping over. Ultimately, the front end = broke=20 off and the booster broke up at that time.=20
Apparently all the launch escape systems did work as they should, and = it is=20 certainly very dramatic. Thank goodness that it did work that way, = because you=20 wouldn't have wanted to be around when that thing collapsed on the pad: = It=20 gouged out a 90-foot crater, about 20 km downrange.=20
I think the most dramatic pictures I have ever seen are the pictures = I saw in=20 Russia when I was there in April 1997, of the fourth, and final, flight = test of=20 N-1, on Nov. 23, 1972. It had almost worked through the entire first = stage burn;=20 it failed in the last few seconds, about 10 seconds after completing its = first=20 stage burn and going to the second stage. The programming was such that = it could=20 not start the second stage, in spite of the first stage having failed at = the=20 last minute, during the center engine shut-down procedure. There are 6 = center=20 engines and 24 outer engines, plus four Vernier engines on this fourth = version=20 of the vehicle.=20
You watch the vehicle lift off; it's clean, it's beautiful, and you = can't=20 believe how much fire and intensity of energy there is in the flame = trench. The=20 vehicle completely clears the facility and the flame trench; the = concrete is=20 still glowing yellow, well after the vehicle has cleared the facility. I = have=20 never, ever, seen aything like that before. That had to play hell with = the=20 concrete ... just the very energy involved in that blast furnace.=20
When they shut down the center six engines, there was a propellant = line that=20 fed some of the gas generator systems on the engines which ruptured. It = started=20 a fire that spread very rapidly. The severe pogo vibrations broke up = everything=20 at that point. The vehicle failed, and the engines were shut down by the = KORD=20 engine control system again. The second stage was not started. They = never blew the booster up. They let it go completely ballistic downrange, some 200 = to 500=20 km, and crash there. I'm sure some parts broke off, but a large portion = of the=20 vehicle went all the way downrange, crashed, and exploded.=20
Question: This answers the question of why the Soviets were = never able=20 to send people to the Moon. What was the reason that in the mid-1960s = the money=20 was not available for this program?=20
Charles P. Vick: You end up saying to yourself, ``Was the = lunar race=20 real?'' Yes, and no. It's a very ambiguous answer. There was clearly a = greater=20 priority than the lunar mission, and perhaps the Russian leadership felt = that=20 they had to keep the Americans in the lunar race to keep them away from = the=20 strategic rocket game. If they could keep us occupied with the lunar = effort, it=20 would make us divert a lot of funds that would have gone, perhaps, into = more=20 strategic rocket or military programs.=20
Question: But by that time didn't the United States have an=20 overwhelming military superiority?=20
Charles P. Vick: We had the superiority and the capability, = and they=20 didn't. To a degree, they wanted to slow us down, stop us, and keep us = occupied.=20 At the same time, there was no separation between their military and = space=20 programs. Their whole space program was based on the surge capacity = boosters=20 that they produced for the military. They were made available for the = space=20 program because they were excess production. A number of boosters was = made=20 available every year, and the space program grew over and beyond the = already=20 committed military programs through those years.=20
It's amazing they were able to do what they did. To a large degree, = when you=20 look at the appropriations level, you realize that Korolev had = challenged the=20 leadership in Russia well before he died in January 1966, even before = Khrushchev=20 went out of office. He said, ``Are we going to do this, or aren't we = going to do=20 this?'' The ultimate answer was, ``Yes, we're going to do this, but this = is all=20 the money you're going to get. And you're going to have to make do with = that.''=20 That's the way it was done. They went on to do the work, and I'd have to = say=20 that, so far as the government was really concerned, for all practical = purposes,=20 there was no lunar race.=20
But the scientists themselves with the tremendous effort that they = put out,=20 at what became the Energia Company of today, actually turned it into a = lunar=20 race--a very close one, in a lot of respects. ``They had all the wrong = failures=20 at the wrong time, and we had all the right ones,'' to quote Dr. Charles = Sheldon, former chief of the Science Policy Research division, of the=20 Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress. If the = opposite had=20 been the case, it may have been a very different picture.=20
Question: Were our failures early enough in the program so = that we=20 still had enough time to correct them?=20
Charles P. Vick: That's right, and we did thorough ground = testing,=20 which the Russians were not able to do. They were able to test fire all = the=20 upper stages of N-1 and all the payloads, and flight test all that = equipment, as=20 a general rule. But they did not have the test stands for the entire = launch=20 vehicle stack to be dynamically tested, although they did it in subscale = form.=20 They did all the testing in Korolev, formerly known as Kaliningrad, in = the=20 Moscow area. They did test firings of the first stage at Zagorsk, = outside of=20 Moscow, and then did other tests at Baikonur, which is where they ended = up building the boosters' first two or three stages.=20
The rest of it was built elsewhere in Russia, primarily Samara, and = shipped=20 by either air or railroad to the launch site. The first and second = stages were=20 built off site at the Cosmodrome inside the N-1/Energia assembly = building. In=20 fact, the facilities are still there and are available for use for the = Energia=20 booster.=20
In Samara, the Soviets destroyed a total of seven boosters. At = Baikonur, they=20 destroyed six boosters, over and above the four flight test vehicles, = plus the=20 scrapped first stage of a flight test vehicle. They had ground-test = vehicles and=20 dynamic-test vehicles. They broke three dynamic test stages at the = Cosmodrome.=20 They are very proud of that. They broke them during structural dynamic = testing,=20 to find the limit. And they broke the flight test vehicles, too.=20
Question: One of the incidents that it is said had an impact = on the=20 lunar program, was the death of Korolev in early 1966.=20
Charles P. Vick: If Korolev had lived, it would not have made = any=20 difference in the lunar effort. The Soviets were two and a half to five = years=20 behind U.S. developments, which we had already started in the 1950s. = Khrushchev=20 started the space race, but one would have to legitimately say that he = also ended the space race, when the decision was made to put the = appropriations into=20 the strategic rocket programs.=20
But it is amazing what the Academy of Sciences and the Russians = managed to=20 accomplish--the sheer momentum of what Kolorlev and the Academy of = Sciences had=20 started. By the time Korolev died in January 1966, things were beginning = to come=20 apart for him. Even if he had lived, they would not have beaten us to = the Moon.=20 N-1 would not have been ready on time.=20
In terms of propulsion, the United States was already working on the=20 F-1-class engine and hydrogen/oxygen engines, which were used on the = Saturn V,=20 back in the 1950s. The hydrogen work was done by Aerojet initially, and = other=20 work was done by Pratt and Whitney. This work led to the J-2 engine, = which was=20 used on the second and third stages of the Saturn V. Rocketdyne did the = work on=20 the E-1 engine, which was a buildup to the F-1, at a half-million pounds = of=20 thrust.=20
Both countries had considerable problems with rocket engines, = kerosene/liquid=20 oxygen, or LOX engines, because of rough combustion. We took quite a few = years--until the late 1960s, early 1970s--to learn what is known as the = ``rough=20 combustion curve.'' If certain parameters of design are outside this = curve, you=20 won't get rough combustion in the thrust chamber; if the design = parameters are=20 inside, you will have rough combustion. It took a long time to learn = that. But=20 the Soviets developed a very robust engine that is being applied to = American=20 commercial launch vehicles today--NK-33 and the NK-43--which could even = stand=20 rough combustion.=20
You might ask, why so many engines? It was what was possible to be = developed=20 in the time frame required. There was also a very severe argument = between=20 Valentin Glushko and Korolev. Glushko, who headed the Soviets' = prestigious Gas=20 Dynamics Laboratory, refused to build kerosene/LOX engines, and would = only build=20 storable propellant engines for Korolev's launch vehicle for the lunar = effort.=20 There were discretionary funds available for storable propellant = engines, for=20 the military, which was using storage propellants.=20
Question: What are storable propellants?=20
Charles P. Vick: I'm thinking about UDMH [unsymmetrical=20 dimethylmethylhydrazine] and nitrogen tetroxide, storable hypergolics. = They can=20 be stored in a normal environment chamber, but they're highly toxic and = very=20 harmful to human beings; they can kill you, if breathed in. When UDMH = and nitric=20 acid come together, they explode instantly into flames.=20
The other approach uses kerosene and liquid oxygen, LOX. The LOX is=20 cryogenically cooled, and the kerosene is storable and can be = super-cooled to a=20 degree. The kerosene the Soviets use, which they still use today, is = actually a=20 derivative of gasoline. It's more gummy than our kerosene. Kerosene = works quite=20 well with those engines. The differences are really very small, as has = been demonstrated in test firings in the United States. Glushko refused to = develop=20 kerosene engines because he didn't think that that a 150-metric-ton = thrust=20 engine using kerosene/LOX could be developed. He essentially refused to = do it.=20
Question: It seems that an important factor in the Soviet = lunar=20 program was the competition that was maintained and fostered by the = government=20 between the different design bureaus. How did this affect the progress = of the=20 lunar program?=20
Charles P. Vick: Few people realize that Stalin, a long time = ago, gave=20 the chief designers the right to refuse to do a project or be a part of = a=20 project, without penalty. When a General-Designer is appointed, it is a = rank, a=20 military rank, quite literally. And when they're appointed, they are = appointed for life. They are gods. There were the various aircraft design = bureaus.=20 Korolev was a General-Designer. The person who succeeded him, Vasily = Mishin, was=20 a General-Designer. Glushko became a General-Designer of rocket engines. = Vladimir Chelomei was a General-Designer, who also had the UR-700/LK-1=20 competetive design to Korolev's lunar design. Mikhail Yangel was also a=20 General-Designer with his design bureau in Ukraine; he had the R-56, = based on=20 the R-46 super-ICBM concept, another competitive design to Korolev's = N-1.=20
Yangel was initially developing the R-46 super-ICBM, as Chelomei was=20 developing the UR-500 super-ICBM ``city buster,'' as vehicles this size = used to=20 be called. They were designed for a 150-megaton warhead that was = doctrinally in=20 favor in the early 1960s. Chelomei's UR-500, later the Proton, won the = contract;=20 the R-46 was dropped.=20
But then, the lunar contract came along. Khrushchev had developed = this=20 technique of having competetive contracts, supposedly to get better = designs.=20 Intially, looking at the lunar booster, they had selected a booster for = the=20 program, but then the competetive boosters were presented midstream, = when N-1=20 was already under development and facilities were being built.=20
At the same time, money was being spent on those competing programs, = and=20 wasted. The chief designers were literally out of control at that point, = and the=20 government did not rein them in, except that the R-56 was dropped when = Mishin,=20 Korolev's successor, wrote letters complaining about it to the Ministry = of=20 General Machine Building, which ran the space program starting in = 1965-1966,=20 with the new Five Year Plan.=20
This so-called competition was very destructive, because people were = not=20 working as a single team, for a single goal, on a single vehicle. They = were=20 saying: ``I'm going to work on this. He's going to work on that. Mishin = can do=20 what he wants to do, but we're going to do our thing.''=20
There also were the unmanned lunar programs, including the automatic = sample=20 programs, the Lunakhod program, plus the Zond circumnavigation program, = so there=20 were more than half a dozen manned and unmanned lunar programs in = progress at=20 the same time, in very intensely competing organizations. Pure chaos. It = made it=20 very difficult for Mishin, who succeeded Korolev as General-Designer of = what=20 eventually became Energia, because he had all these competitors to the = N-1, and he didn't have the money he needed.=20
Mishin would make recommendations that they build test stands for the = first=20 stage, or do testing, or put on certain kinds of instrumentation to be = certain=20 that the engines were performing. Some of the instrumentation he was = suggesting=20 was very advanced for rocket engine performance observation--much of = which we=20 still do not have perfected, even today. Their computer technology was = not the best in the world. Their instrument control technology for N-1 was very = advanced thinking, but it just was not right. It would have been = perfected over=20 time. I think with the fifth flight test, they would have finally = successfully=20 flight-tested the booster. But Mishin never got the support he needed = for these=20 efforts.=20
A lot of people said Mishin messed up the managenment and everything = else.=20 You have to realize that he had 25-plus programs dumped on him when = Korolev=20 died. And he had a lot of people reporting to him, directly. It took him = a while=20 before he began to delegate authority, and he got reprimanded by the = Ministry of=20 General Machine Building for it. The actual development of N-1 was going = about=20 the pace you would expect for development of a booster, looking at the=20 limitations of the ground testing that was permitted by the Ministry and = the=20 government.=20
So you end up saying to yourself, ``Hey, the government, the = Ministries, and=20 the political leadership are not putting the money in there, so they're = getting=20 what they're asking for, as a result.'' But Mishin became the fall guy, = and by=20 1974, when the doctrinal change in detente was beginning, the lunar = program no=20 longer had its place--as was the case geopolitically and in terms of = policy in=20 the United States. Mishin was relieved of his job in March 1974, fired, = in=20 effect, in a hostile corporate takeover, sanctioned by the Russian = leadership.=20 Quite brutal.=20
For a long time, Mishin has been very much criticized, and has been = accused=20 of being responsible for the failure of the lunar program. In reality, = he was an=20 exceptionally intelligent deputy General-Designer to Korolev. One reason = that=20 Mishin was not very popular, is that he tried to prevent others from = working on=20 their own hidden agendas, and to get all of them working on the assigned = task.=20
Glushko continued to fight Korolev even after his death. He fought = Mishin,=20 looking over his shoulder. Roald Sagdeev, former head of the Russian = Space=20 Science Institute, has a lot to say about that in his book, The Makings = of a=20 Soviet Scientist. Glushko was an utter zealot, egoist, demagogue, and = very=20 destructive. He ultimately brought down Mishin and the lunar program. = And he=20 even went so far as to write the manned lunar program out of history, = never=20 acknowledging it--ignoring it, as if it didn't exist.=20
Soon after Glushko died in 1988, and when perestroika came along, = guess what?=20 Mishin began to talk about the lunar effort.=20
That's not all. As far back as 1981, I did a lot of publishing in the = Illustrated Encyclopedia of Space Technology. One drawing that I did = there is=20 infamous with the Soviets, because it effectively showed N-1 and said to = Glushko: ``Ha, ha. You want to rewrite history, but this is what = existed.'' That drawing was published in the Soviet newspapers Pravda and in Izvestia. = It's not=20 a perfect drawing; it's not dead right, but it actually shows the N-1. = It was=20 close enough to shake them up, because the book was at a big British and = American book show, held in Moscow once a year. All the chief designers, = including Mishin and Glushko, went out and looked in this encyclopedia. = ``They declassified it!'' It wasn't exactly right, but it really shook them = up, no=20 end.=20
Question: During the period of the Nixon/Brezhnev detente, the = planning began for the joint 1975 Apollo/Soyuz mission. But before that, = there=20 was a decision by the Soviets, in the early 1970s, to develop a series = of space=20 stations, largely for military reasons. Didn't that become the focus of = their manned activities?=20
Charles P. Vick: The first Salyut station was launched in = 1971. That=20 decision was made in the fall of 1969, after the July 1969 launch = failure.=20
Question: And of course, in 1969, the Americans landed on the = Moon, so=20 the race was over for all intents and purposes, because getting there = second was=20 like not getting their at all.=20
Charles P. Vick: Right, and with a program that was not as = good, with=20 not as many people on the lunar surface.=20
Question: That's why I was suprised to see that even after our = lunar=20 landing, the Soviets continued to test the N-1.=20
Charles P. Vick: They continued to test it well after we had = nearly=20 finished flying Apollo. Starting in 1970, they committed 600 million = additional=20 rubles to the lunar program, over and above the appropriations level, = which was=20 a total of 4.5 billion rubles from 1960 through 1974. They were looking = at an=20 advanced lunar booster that would use hydrogen upper stages--a = derivative N-1=20 design, that is in some of my illustrations. It was going to be used to = create a=20 lunar base, which could provide 30 to 120 days on the lunar surface. = That would=20 have been possible by 1980 or so, but the program was never committed.=20
If the Soviets had continued N-1 development, I doubt that the = Shuttle would=20 have ever completed development. That would have changed the entire = direction of=20 our space efforts, both Russian and U.S. I doubt that Saturn V would = have=20 totally gone out of production.=20
Question: Because we would have continued the lunar program?=20
Charles P. Vick: The White House was very concerned about the=20 continuing of the N-1 program. The Nixon White House knew about the = fourth N-1=20 launch vehicle failure before the Kremlin did. I know that. The White = House was=20 clearly very concerned, because it would affect our space policy and = what we=20 were doing. The Air Force and other factions wanted to go to a = Shuttle-class=20 vehicle, which the aerospace industry wanted. Industry wasn't getting a = lot of=20 new, lucrative research and development contracts out of continuing = Apollo. But=20 if the Soviets had been able to launch their lunar program in the 1970s, = we=20 would have probably continued Apollo.=20
Question: What was mosty striking to you in your trip to = Russia and=20 the Baikonur Cosmodrome last April?=20
Charles P. Vick: The trip was an eye-opener for me. It's the = second=20 one I've taken with the Friends and Partners in Space. The Baikonur = Cosmodrome=20 is being consolidated, and the older facilities, which are 40-plus years = old,=20 are being abandoned. There is a lot that is deteriorated; entire = apartment complexes have been abandoned in place. But people are coming back to = the=20 Cosmodrome. You don't see much out-of-control military. Discipline is = being=20 maintained.=20
Two years ago, there was almost no activity inside the N-1/Energia = and Buran=20 assembly buildings, but now they're moving in commercial activity, and = the Soyuz=20 and future Rus booster. The Rus booster is a derivative of the Soyuz = booster,=20 called Soyuz-2, in fact. It is an improved, upgraded version of it that = will be=20 used in space station.=20
They are refurbishing areas and consolidating into the newest and the = best,=20 which is the N-1/Energia/Buran facility. They have not gotten rid of the = Buran=20 orbiters, or the Energia boosters. There are two flight boosters = available,=20 although they need engines for the strap-on boosters. There are other=20 ground-test elements associated with it there. They have a complete = dynamic test=20 tower. It's practically brand new. The N-1 facilities and the Energia = facilities=20 can eventually be refined to accommodate the Rus booster and possibly,=20 Energia/Buran.=20
The Russians feel that nobody is going to abandon those vehicles = totally and=20 not utilize them. They don't want to lose the capability, because = they're=20 looking toward the future and, I'm sure, not merely in Earth-orbit, but = in lunar=20 and planetary participation, way down the road, when their economy gets = better.=20 I respect that completely. Even the Russian Space Agency has tried to = develop an=20 all new launch-vehicle family of improved vehicles, as well as new ones, = utilizing old ICBMs or newer ICBMs for space boosters instead of = throwing them=20 away. They are offering them both commercially and for their own = military and=20 civilian space programs.=20
I saw some of the other facilities, including hardware that you had = never=20 hoped to see in your lifetime, military rocketry hardware. I saw the = competitor=20 to Chelomei's SS-9 ICBM, the UR200. I saw the R-26, which used to be one = of the=20 parade missiles, known as Sasin. I saw the R-7 ICBM, the old Sputnik = booster.=20 You could see it even inside--the details, and the guidance packages. We = went to=20 mission control. It was a beehive of activity.=20
We went to TsNIImash, the Central Specialized Design Bureau of the = Institute=20 of Machine Building. This is an awesome facility that is roughly = equivalent to=20 the Tullahoma Air Force facility, Marshall Space Flight Center, Lewis = Research=20 Center, and more, combined in one place. It's unbelievable to look at = this, how=20 spread out it is, and what that facility does for their strategic as = well as=20 space programs. They do primarily dynamic acoustic, environmental, wind = tunnel=20 testing--full-scale testing. That's where all stages of the N-1 were = tested, not=20 only in a scaled version, but with full-sized hardware. Each stage was=20 dynamically tested. They never dynamically tested the full stack, unless = they=20 did on the launch pad.=20
Question: What did you see of the N-1?=20
Charles P. Vick: I saw N-1's interstage, between the first and = second=20 stage, in photographic form, undergoing dynamic testing. I also saw = photographs.=20 I wasn't able to see the model, but I saw two different versions of = N-1's=20 design--quarter-scale dynamic models, full-up vehicles--on which they = did the=20 dynamic testing. They were very confident in their dynamic testing = techniques;=20 they did not worry about doing a full stacked vehicle under dynamic = testing,=20 which we did with Saturn V.=20
Question: Did you see any N-1 hardware?=20
Charles P. Vick: Yes, I did. I saw some of the interstage = truss=20 structures. I saw many of the kerosene tanks for the first second, = third, and=20 fourth stages. I saw some additional structure where the six engines = would sit=20 on the engine boat-tail--the actual plate that sits there and is the end = plate=20 of the vehicle, where those six engines sit. I saw the erector = transporter that=20 was used, although it was revised to handle the Energia. I saw the = launch pad at=20 a distance, several thousand feet away. We were inside the N-1 assembly=20 building, which is being used for Energia/Buran. As I said before, they = are=20 consolidating facilities in support of the space station, and are = putting the=20 Soyuz booster in there. They will be handling the Rus booster, and = eventually,=20 the N-1 pad is going to be handling the Rus booster, too. All the Soyuz = pads and=20 the assembly building are going to be shut down. It is fascinating that = they are=20 looking at the future and combining it all in one place.=20
Question: One major part of their activity today is commercial = operations, and the other is the international space station, and, = parallel to=20 that, keeping the Mir operational as long as possible. How are the = Russians=20 positioned to carry out the space program they have going on now?=20
Charles P. Vick: They're not in the best of shape; that's for = sure.=20 But they are systematically consolidating in such a way as to be able to = definitely support the international space station. The funding and the=20 facilities will be ready for that. I saw a lot of feverish work going on = to=20 support that, at Baikonur as well as in Moscow, where work is being done = on the=20 Service Module. Proton launch vehicles are going to be available to = launch=20 various elements of the station. They have more than enough of those, = and their=20 commercial launches are being sold quite rapidly for Proton. They're = selling the=20 Proton booster like crazy for commercial communication satellite = launches and=20 things of that kind.=20
The Soyuz booster is also going to be used for that. The development = of the=20 Rus booster will almost certainly be guaranteed because of that. So, = Samara will=20 get the advanced Soyuz booster and its Molinya derivatives with various = upper=20 stages.=20
The international space station work, the development and = construction of the=20 individual modules, is continuing. We saw that very clearly in Moscow, = now that=20 they are apparently resolving the appropriations problems, or at least=20 prioritizing that. The Russian budget is actually falling, with tax = collections=20 some 45 percent short of the revenue needed for financing the entire = government,=20 but the space program is a protected budget. It will get at least as = much as it=20 got last year. With the consolidation going on that I've seen, I think = they will=20 be able--or are positioning themselves to be able--with the help of the=20 commercial launches and the money they're earning from that, to = accomplish what=20 they say they are going to do. It's going to be tight, though, because = some of=20 the commercial activity is independent companies that are not paying the = Russian=20 government, but may be contributing to the programs.=20
There are some direct contracts that are being paid from the United = States to=20 the companies, which is really the only way to do things. Don't go = through the=20 Russian government to give appropriations, as the United States learned = the hard=20 way this last spring and fall, because that money might get diverted to=20 something else and never get to the Russian Space Agency. That is = literally what happened in relation to the Service Module, as I understand it, at = least.=20 Something has been done to address that issue and resolve it, and work = is moving=20 forward.=20
Question: What reflection of their heritage from the Soviet = lunar=20 program do you see in the way the Russians have tried to deal with the = June 25=20 accident aboard the Mir space station?=20
Charles P. Vick: In a lot of respects, we are very lucky that = they had=20 the accident on Mir recently, because of what we can learn in order to = be ready=20 for similar problems on the international space station. I feel = reasonably sure=20 the Russians are going to resolve that, solve it, and get it back on = line.=20
Their tenacity is unbelievable. You fix it. That's what we do also, =
whether=20
we want to admit it or not. And Mir is a major, major technological=20
accomplishment on the part of the Russians. Credit needs to be given=20
accordingly. Even their lunar program, which failed and was ultimately =
scrapped,=20
has much to teach us, and was a major accomplishment.=20
=20
e-PrintsA Soviet space expert discusses how recently declassified material = confirms his painstaking discoveries over decades about why the Soviet = Union was=20 unable to win the space race.=20
EDITOR'S NOTE
Russia today is at a crossroads. If the current financial policies, = under=20 the heel of the International Monetary Fund, should continue, the = one-time=20 Soviet superpower will be relegated to Third World status, suffering = the=20 political and economic chaos that will result from such a devolution.=20
After his most recent trip to Russia in April 1997, during which he = traveled throughout the country to various space facilities, space = expert=20 Charles Vick commented that the IMF policies in Russia ``amount to = economic=20 tyranny.'' One result, he observed, has been the meteoric rise of = corruption=20 and criminality, and the corresponding lack of available resources for = basic=20 economic reconstruction, or the space program.=20
The Soviet Union was the only nation besides the United States that = ever=20 developed the ability to put man into space. The Soviets did it first. = But=20 they could not sustain an effort of such magnitude, because they were = not able=20 to transfer new technology from their civil and military space = programs to the=20 economy, as a whole. As Charles Vick explains, the pie was limited in = size by=20 this failure, and when the political situation changed, other programs = took=20 priority over sending men to the Moon. Today, the Russians will = doggedly try=20 to maintain their space capabilities, Vick states, but time is running = out.=20
Charles Vick, currently a senior research associate at the = Federation of=20 American Scientists, has more than 35 years of experience in assessing = Soviet=20 space technology. His technical drawings of Soviet launch and space = vehicles=20 are known worldwide. By applying his own creative powers to analyze = whatever=20 paltry data were available from the Soviets before 1989, Vick was the = first to publish a drawing that reconstructed the N-1/L-3 Soviet manned lunar = vehicle,=20 at a time when the Soviets were denying that they ever had a manned = lunar=20 program.=20
Vick is now working to develop the seventh N-1/L-3 book-length = study. He=20 was interviewed by 21st Century Associate Editor Marsha Freeman in = July.=20
Question: The Soviets were the first in space, with the launch = of=20 Sputnik 40 years ago. They had the first man in space, as well. So, one = of the=20 greatest mysteries of the Soviet space program is why the Soviets never = beat us=20 to the Moon, and why they still have not sent people there to explore. = When President Kennedy announced that the United States was making landing = on the=20 Moon its goal, it would seem to be undebatable that the Soviets were = likewise=20 planning to have a manned lunar mission. Were they planning it before = Kennedy's=20 announcement?=20
Charles P. Vick: They were in fact planning it ahead of time. = What is=20 even more interesting is that when Kennedy made his speech, the Russians = did not=20 completely understand what he was saying, and it took them some years = before=20 they actually completely understood. Once they did, then they said, = ``Oh. Wait a=20 minute. We've got to look at what we're doing.'' They were, however, = committed to other priorities.=20
Question: Let's go back further, to when the Soviets would = have been=20 first thinking about landing men on the Moon.=20
Charles P. Vick: Their plan is rather self-evident, when you = go back=20 and look at their open literature, even back into the 1950s. You have to = consider the fact that the Germans had the idea, and the Americans also = had the=20 thought. It was in the general, open literature going back before World = War II.=20 The Moon has always been an interesting subject.=20
Their lunar program was more evident once we started seeing the = Russians=20 flying unmanned lunar missions in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Plus = their=20 other public statements made it very clear that something was going on. = But not=20 until 1963 did we really have anything solid and official, built around = a series=20 of statements by Nikita Khrushchev that really revealed there was = something=20 going on. Ultimately you find that our side was looking for the evidence = and not=20 finding it until August 1963, and we were not really certain until the = fall of=20 1964.=20
Question: What was it that the United States saw in August = 1963?=20
Charles P. Vick: The beginning of the construction of the = Baikonur=20 Cosmodrome, of the TT-5, or what would become known as the J facilities. = That's=20 when the first road work and stakes in the ground were going into place. = The=20 National Intelligence Estimate of 1965, from the U.S. Central = Intelligence=20 Agency, which has not been released, reviews this. It is mentioned in = the 1967=20 National Intelligence Estimate on Russian space programs, which has been = released. This is confirmed by the now-declassified reconnaissance film = from the=20 Corona camera.=20
Even more interesting is the fact that when you compare their initial = dates=20 to what you see in the reconnaissance pictures, there can be a wide gap = between=20 when they say construction started and what the pictures show. This may = be due=20 to the fact that, of course, they have to prepare the ground and put the = roads=20 into the general area, and once they actually get the ground prepared, = then,=20 they say, ``Now we're really starting construction for real.'' But, in = fact,=20 construction had started much, much earlier.=20
Up to that point, frankly, America was looking for the evidence and = saying:=20 ``Are they going to give us a sporting race, or aren't they?'' We = weren't seeing=20 it in the literal sense. But Khrushchev tipped his hand about the same = time as=20 these thing were going on, so things had gotten started and we began to = see it.=20
NASA Administrator James Webb, made statements in April and May 1964 = in which=20 he said he was not certain that they were racing us at all. In a speech = to the=20 Missouri Cotton Producers Association in May 1964, Webb said, ``There is = some=20 evidence the Soviets are working on a larger rocket, but we cannot say = yet for=20 sure.'' But in an article on Oct. 14, Washington Post writer Howard = Simons reports Webb saying, ``there is increasing evidence'' that a new, super = rocket=20 was being readied for testing, in the 1967-1968 time frame.=20
Question: So we could see certain activity, and then later = Khrushchev=20 started making public statements saying they were going to try to land = men on=20 the Moon?=20
Charles P. Vick: His statements were very devious, and = occurred in the=20 fall of 1963, when there was discussion by President Kennedy about the = potential=20 for cooperative missions. In fact, Kennedy, in August 1963, mandated a = reduction=20 in the level of confrontation with the Russians, and looked more toward=20 cooperation with them. That was government policy.=20
Many people were circling the wagons to protect their projects, = including the=20 Apollo program at NASA at that time, because we had not seen evidence up = to then=20 that the Russians were undertaking a lunar program.=20
But then Khrushchev made some statements that were not direct, but = indirect,=20 and there were arguments about whether they were racing us to the Moon,=20 depending on how reporters interpreted what Khrushchev said. And he = twisted it=20 around and around.=20
Ultimately, we ended up finding out that you have to look at the = money:=20 Follow the money and that tells you the truth.=20
What was really startling to me, was the realization that the Russian = budget,=20 up through 1963-1964, continued to rise for the lunar program. Then it = became=20 almost flat, through to about 1970, when they added about another 600 = million=20 rubles to it. And then, it dropped off from there slowly, = systematically, until=20 1974, when the program was cancelled, although remnants of the program = continued=20 through March 1976 for a manned circumnavigation, and manned lunar = landing=20 program. It's just amazing to realize that the budget went up to a = certain=20 point, then went flat.=20
Whereas, if you look at the strategic rocket area, the budget just = kept right=20 on skyrocketing, much above that of the United States. When you realize = that the=20 Soviets put the money into that program, and not into the space effort, = you say,=20 ``Wait a minute. It this a commitment by the government, or isn't it?''=20
In retrospect, the 1962-1964 period was critical to the events and = decisions=20 in the Soviet lunar program, as well as to commitments to the strategic = rocket=20 program. The advent of the U.S. Minuteman missile and Corona = reconnaissance=20 programs, forced the Soviets to make still larger outlays to create = silo-based=20 strategic ballistic missiles, with the ability to stay fueled in the = ground, for=20 a long time, in a ready state and with a quick reaction time. The=20 second-generation missile systems, for which they had appropriated = money, were=20 already outdated before they were deployed, and the Soviets had to = develop a=20 third-generation system, which we would see deployed in the latter part = of the=20 1960s.=20
As a result of the Cuban missile crisis, the legitimacy of the Soviet = regime=20 and the credibility of its strategic forces were being questioned. U.S. = Defense=20 Secretary and geopolitican Robert McNamara stated, after the Apollo=20 announcement, that the Russians would have to choose between strategic = systems=20 and the space race. Our policy people hoped they would choose the space = race,=20 but they did not.=20
Question: Right after the war, the Soviets made the decision = that they=20 would be developing rocket technology for military purposes. In August = 1957,=20 there was the first successful test of their ICBM, and then Sputnik, in = October=20 1957. What were they doing on a lunar program in that early period, and = what=20 approach were they taking to land a man on the Moon?=20
Charles P. Vick: From 1957, and even earlier, as far back as = 1955,=20 Sergei Korolev [the chief designer of the N-1 booster and the manned = lunar=20 program] was doing design studies on a heavier-lift launch vehicle than = the=20 Sputnik R-7 booster, and the derivative forms of the R-7 booster evolved = as the=20 N-1 Moon rocket. A number of variations were also developed. The initial = designs=20 that Korolev developed were a multi-block vehicle, meaning multiple = modules,=20 much like the Sputnik booster. It has multiple parallel blocks. The N-1 = had six=20 parallel blocks and one sustainer block, and then booster stages on top = of that.=20
Question: What do you mean by blocks? Is that stages?=20
Charles P. Vick: Yes. It was a multiple-stage vehicle, and = then they=20 added upper stages to it. That was while they were doing design studies, = until=20 about the 1961-1962 time frame. They were looking at the rocket engines = they=20 were thinking about using. Those early rocket engines were open-cycle = engines,=20 which are not as efficient as closed-cycle engines.=20
Question: Can you explain the difference?=20
Charles P. Vick: In the open-cycle engines the actuation gas = used to=20 run the turbo-pump, the substance that actually makes the pump spin, is = dumped=20 overboard. It's wasted energy. In the closed-cycle engine, that gas is = dumped=20 into the oxygen-rich thrust chamber and burned with the rest of the = fuel. The=20 Soviets suddenly realized in 1960-1961 that they could develop those=20 high-pressure, closed-cycle engines and get a better launch vehicle. = Using=20 engines with increased efficiency led to a dramatic change in the design = of the=20 N-1.=20
When they compared the two different launch vehicles, using one = engine type=20 versus another, they went to a different structural type all together. = They=20 finished those design studies officially in the July-Sept 1962 time = frame. There=20 are quite vivid descriptions of that in the open literature, published = at the=20 time. They were fascinating. They were arguing about the logistics of = the=20 vehicle, and how you get it to the Cosmodrome, and how you manufacture = it,=20 transport it, and so on.=20
Question: And that was published in the open literature?=20
Charles P. Vick: It was indeed. Part of it was published in = The New=20 York Times, and was very revealing. It described a booster that was 55.8 = feet=20 across its base, with the first stage 150 feet long, in one design they = were=20 looking at. But they ended up breaking that up into three separate = stages, because a vehicle that size would be exceptionally difficult to = transport, in=20 land-locked Russia.=20
Question: Similar to the Saturn V?=20
Charles P. Vick: In some respects, but the shape and design of = N-1 is=20 dramatically different from the Saturn V. The first three stages of the = N-1=20 actually constitute the first two stages of the Saturn V. The first = stage in N-1=20 has a Nova, or super-Saturn/Nova-class launch vehicle written all over = it,=20 because its thrust was 10 million pounds-plus. There were 30 engines in = its=20 first stage, at 150-154 metric tons thrust each, giving it more than 10 = million=20 pounds of thrust at launch. By comparison, the Saturn V first stage had = five=20 engines, producing 7.6 million pounds of thrust.=20
The original N-1 design was of a somewhat smaller vehicle. The N-2 = derivative=20 of N-1 would have used the upper second stage of the N-1 for its first = stage,=20 then N-3 would have used the third stage of the N-1 as its first stage. = That=20 development was dropped, but should have been followed through; they = could have=20 finished development of the upper stages a lot sooner, having already=20 successfully static-test-fired those in the late 1960s for the N-1. They = were=20 not able, ever, to static-test-fire the N-1 first stage. They did not = have the=20 facilities for that. They do not have them even today.=20
That is one of the major reasons that the first stage repeatedly = failed in=20 flight tests. It is a more catastrophic failure in flight than on a test = stand,=20 if it fails the wrong way, and there is no inflight destruction system, = which=20 the Russians, as a general rule, do not have. Their philosophy for = inflight safety and destruction of the booster if it fails is very different = from ours.=20
Until after the second flight test of N-1, which took place on July = 3, 1969,=20 the Soviets did not have a procedure whereby they could keep the engines = running, just to clear the facility, before they allowed the booster to = go on=20 and fail. They wiped out an entire launch facility when they let a = failing vehicle collapse on the launch pad in July 1969. The engines were on = automatic=20 command to be cut off=20
if there were a problem, just as it cleared the turning tower gantry. = When=20 the booster fell back on the ground, it cratered the launch pad, as well = as the=20 underground, multiple-story building that was the support facility for = the=20 vehicle.=20
Question: How could have they avoided doing that?=20
Charles P. Vick: They could have avoided that by keeping the = engines=20 on, in spite of the engines' failing. If the computer is programmed = right, and=20 it considers things in a certain way, it will not shut down the engines, = for=20 safety reasons, until the booster gains enough altitude and clears the = launch facility. In this case, the Soviets did not have that built into the = program.=20 They do now in all their launch vehicles, but they learned the hard way. = Your=20 heart just drops, when you watch that thing lift off, during the July 3. = 1969,=20 test launch. The N-1 rises up and clears the tower, and then all the = engines but=20 one shut off and it just starts dropping back on to the launch pad. = Those=20 engines were shut off automatically because a fire had developed in the = engine=20 bay from the explosion of one engine at lift-off. It's unbelievable to = see the=20 films of that.=20
Question: I was unaware that they were not able to static-test = those=20 engines.=20
Charles P. Vick: They did static-test-fire a selected few of = the=20 engines. They had a batch-production capability. They'd produce so many = engines,=20 and take X number of them and test fire them. If they worked, they'd = install the=20 rest of the engines. That's the way they did it with the first stage. = The first stage was originally designed for 24 engines, but had 6 additional = engines=20 added to it and then 4 additional Vernier engines, for a total of 34 = engines in=20 the final design for the first stage.=20
Question: Didn't they look into using more efficient liquid = hydrogen=20 engines?=20
Charles P. Vick: They were looking at it and developing the=20 technology, but they were way behind the United States. Some papers were = just=20 released in Moscow on that, but I do not have them yet. We do know that = Nikolai=20 Kuznetsov, at his design bureau in Kyubyshev (now, Samara), was working = on a=20 hydrogen engine concept. M.A. Lyulka Engine Design Bureau, did = successfully develop an engine, known as the D-57, D-57M, which was one of the many = engines=20 that have been proposed. It was designed to be applied to an upper stage = for=20 N-1. But the engines they actually tested all used kerosene for fuel, = and liquid=20 oxygen.=20
The Soviets developed whole families of engines for the N-1, and = other=20 programs. Many other engines were actually involved, wholly separate of = the=20 manned spacecraft.=20
The first three stages of the booster are known as N-1. When you get = into the=20 fourth and fifth stage, and then the lunar module and the lunar orbiting = spacecraft, and the big, huge shroud that goes over that, that's known = as L-3.=20
So it's called N-1/L-3, for lunar missions. The lunar part was a = separate=20 package and, in fact, they parallel-processed both vehicles, the L-3 and = N-1, as=20 separate packages, in order to process the vehicle.=20
From 1962 through 1967, the design underwent repeated changes. N-1 = was=20 intially designed to deliver 45 metric tons of payload to low-Earth = orbit. Then=20 it was redesigned for 75 metric tons, and then it edged up to about 92 = metric=20 tons, and, ultimately, 100 metric tons, by 1972.=20
Question: That would make it comparable to the Saturn V?=20
Charles P. Vick: Close to it. Saturn had a capability of = delivering=20 between 130 to 140 metric tons of payload to low-Earth orbit, and N-1 = was=20 comparable, but not as capable. This difference in payload capability = meant that=20 the Soviets would have been able to place only one man on the lunar = surface, not=20 two men, as we did in each Apollo mission. Their lunar module was = designed for merely one man, not two; it was very tight inside. It was designed as a = one-man=20 lunar excursion module to go to the surface, and the vehicle was = different from=20 the way we did it.=20
In addition, the Soviets were launching at 50 to 51 degrees = inclination to=20 the equator out of the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, going north to = skirt=20 the Chinese border, not going due east as we do from the Kennedy Space = Center at=20 28 degrees. That really cuts into the launch vehicle's optimum = performance=20 capability. Because they launch at such a high inclination, they have to = also do=20 a plane change in order to go to the Moon, and it takes a lot of energy = to do=20 that.=20
The Soviet lunar-orbiting spacecraft was a two-man spacecraft. What = would=20 have been the third man's seat was to be taken up by the lunar samples. = The=20 lunar cabin, or module, involved the Block D rocket stage--which on = Proton is=20 its fourth stage, and on the N-1 is the fifth stage. Block D was = designed to use=20 a kerosene and liquid oxygen engine, RD-58M, to break the spacecraft = into lunar orbit, and to refine that orbit, down to about 10 km above the lunar = surface.=20 Then, the Block D engine, with the lunar lander on top, would fire for = the last=20 time, to start the direct powered descent to the lunar surface. For the = last 1.5=20 to 2 km prior to landing, the lunar cabin would have separated from the = lunar=20 braking module, Block D, and do the final powered descent and = maneuvering to landing, from about 1.5 km altitude, down to the lunar surface.=20
Question: We had a lot of discussion in this country of how to = do the=20 Apollo landings. We considered Earth-orbit rendezvous, direct descent, = and=20 lunar-orbit rendezvous. We decided on lunar-orbit rendezvous.=20
Charles P. Vick: A Soviet technique, at that. Ultimately = theirs would=20 have been lunar-orbit rendevous, but it was also lunar-surface = rendezvous. As we=20 understand it today, Korolev's last directions before he died in January = 1966,=20 would have involved at least two N-1 launches and several unmanned = Lunakhod=20 launches also. Lunakhod, meaning ``Moon walker,'' was a rover that the = Soviets=20 used, designed to accompany cosmonauts on exploring the Moon. Korolev's = program required multiple-launches, and had backups all the way around for the = entire=20 mission.=20
The Americans did their own separate studies of Earth-orbital = rendezvous,=20 direct, and lunar-orbital rendezvous. Lunar-orbital rendezvous utimately = turned=20 out to be the best option. The Soviets themselves had done lunar surface = rendezvous, direct descent, Earth-orbital rendezvous, and lunar-orbital=20 rendezvous studies.=20
But when the United States actually did it, and the Soviets sat down = and=20 looked at the figures, they considered our concept of lunar-orbital = rendezvous=20 to be particularly brilliant, to quote Alexei Leonov. Only later did = they--and=20 we--discover that a Russian had presented the concept many years before, = and=20 done the mathematics. They backed away from the Earth-orbital rendezvous = and=20 direct concepts, and went instead to what became lunar-orbital = rendezvous and=20 lunar-surface rendezvous, for themselves.=20
That would have involved two different kinds of launches vehicles. = Prior to=20 the N-1 launches, they would have launched at least one or two Lunakhod = unmanned=20 precursor surface-exploration vehicles on the Proton rocket, and landed = in the=20 general areas where they planned to do the manned lunar landing. The = unmanned=20 Lunakhods would have acted as radio beacons for targetting the landing = area.=20 Then, the Soviets would have launched an umannned N-1, with full lunar=20 equipment, and land a lunar module, or cabin, in that preselected area = for=20 landing. That would have effectively provided an unmanned vehicle, = approximately=20 28 days before the next mission, and the Lunakhods would have been able = to=20 inspect the lunar module to see that it was OK. The Lunakhods would then = back off from the site, in order to get pictures of the areas.=20
In the manned lunar mission itself, which was planned to be launched = 28 days=20 later, the Soviets would have done a powered descent with the Block D. = That is,=20 a constant burn, constant thrust descent, in which very quickly, all of = your=20 forward velocity is lost and you come down almost vertically. This = allows you to=20 see your landing point very precisely, and to maneuver to see the = target, very=20 early on.=20
Question: Because it's right underneath you?=20
Charles P. Vick: Right. It's a near-vertical landing = procedure. In the=20 Apollo program, we used a gradual, throttled powered descent to the = landing=20 point, which is an elliptical approach. The Soviet constant-burn = approach is a=20 vertical landing profile that requires less energy, but can be far more dangerous. But they felt that they could do this, and had demonstrated = the=20 lunar module in Earth-orbit in 1971 and 1972 quite successfully, through = three=20 flight tests. The Block D was tested at least once in a flight test, = besides its=20 unmanned lunar missions, and Zond circumnavigation precursor missions.=20
Question: Was this a direct descent, or would they have gone = into=20 lunar orbit first?=20
Charles P. Vick: They would have gone into lunar orbit first, = and the=20 lunar orbiter would have been there along with the other [back-up] one, = the=20 unmanned one, in the same general vicinity. Rendezvous was required. = Cosmonuat=20 Alexei Leonov has said there was an incredible series of rendezvous = required for=20 the lunar mission. There are two vehicles, and two rendezvous--one on = the lunar=20 surface and one in lunar orbit--as well as one coming back from the = lunar=20 surface to rendezvous and dock with the spacecraft that is in lunar = orbit. It's=20 very complicated in that respect.=20
But as far back as 1965, the Soviets knew from their guidance people = that=20 they could land them within a 5-km ellipse of the landing point on the = lunar=20 surface. That was the guidance parameter they had to work with. By 1969, = they=20 had reduced that down to 2.5-km guidance quality. The cosmonauts were = required=20 to be able to walk across the lunar surface with their lunar suits on, = over to=20 the back-up lunar module if the first lunar module failed. They also = looked into=20 using a Lunokhod rover, which would carry a man across the lunar surface = to the=20 back-up lunar module. So it wasn't exactly like landing one lunar module = on top=20 of another one, so to speak; there was some distance between them.=20
Question: Is the reason this is so much more complicated than = what we=20 did in the Apollo program, the fact that their launch capability would = not have=20 allowed them take as much payload along in one launch?=20
Charles P. Vick: It's more the safety factor, in every sense = of the=20 word. They really did not trust their equipment that much. Rendezvous in = lunar=20 orbit really scared the heck out of them. They did a lot of revisions = and=20 avionics work, as well as forward vision capability systems for doing = that. They would have the unmanned orbiting spacecraft as a back-up. It's the = standard=20 package that they had developed, crazy at it may seem.=20
The question becomes, once they had actually successfully launched an = N-1,=20 would Soviet First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev have given the orders to go = with=20 the manned lunar landing, regardless of whether everything else was in = place?=20 The bottom line is that, for political reasons, the mission would have = been=20 conducted with one single launch, with no lunar surface rendezvous = available to it.=20
Question: As the time got shorter, and they wanted to see = results,=20 they would have gone ahead and done it, without the redundancy?=20
Charles P. Vick: Right. That is what is indicated. Brezhnev = was making=20 demands, and then, after a certain point, the doctrinal policies changed = in=20 Russia; as detente developed, in the early 1970s, the lunar program = really lost=20 favor. One, the Soviet Union had lost the race, and two, the program was = way=20 behind schedule, so since it couldn't come off, it wasn't worthwhile. = Also,=20 there were other programs that could be done that were already flying, = such as=20 the Salyut space station, which evolved into today's Mir space station.=20
Question: You've described a very expensive scenario for how = the=20 Soviets were planning to do their manned lunar program, having double = vehicles=20 and unmanned launches before they would send people. How did that = change?=20
Charles P. Vick: It changed because of economics and the = limits of the=20 program, and the problems they were having with the booster itself. The = Soviets=20 actually had five flight test vehicles, the first one of which was = expected to=20 be flight-tested in the August-October 1968 time frame. As they built up = to that=20 flight test, in June 1968, hairline cracks developed in the huge = first-stage=20 liquid oxygen tank, and that first stage had to be cannibalized. So = everything=20 was delayed until Feb. 21, 1969, when they finally flew the first = vehicle. The=20 United States did not understand, or successfully interpret and detect, = that=20 launch. The British did, through national security facilities, but it = was never=20 accepted by the intelligence community on this side. So, in effect, the = Soviets=20 did a flight test, and we didn't know it.=20
Question: Was that first flight test successful?=20
Charles P. Vick: It lasted through 40,000 feet before the = first stage=20 failed, because of engine vibration and the rupture of some propellant = lines,=20 which created a fire. A false signal was then given by the KORD [Engine=20 Operation Control System] system, shutting off the engines. One engine = had failed, and the control system was supposed to shut off two opposite = pairs of=20 engines to maintain balance. This was an aerospike design. If you shut = off an=20 engine on one side, you have to shut off the exact opposite engine on = the other=20 side. But when the KORD instrumentation failed, it shut all the engines = off. The=20 booster began to break up from the tail end. Then the launch escape = system pulled the spacecraft free at the top of the stack, away from the rest = of the=20 L-3 portion of the vehicle, which started breaking up.=20
But the first stage kept right on burning for some time, until it = went=20 ballistic. I think the first and second stages kept right on going for a = little=20 while, until it didn't have any guidance system to guide it. The rest of = it had=20 all broken off. It's very dramatic to watch that arching failure. You = see it=20 going fine, and then, oof! The launch escape tower pulls away from the = booster,=20 and everything just starts coming apart. Then you finally see range = safety blow=20 it up, several minutes later.=20
Question: What is an aerospike engine?=20
Charles P. Vick: The N-1 first stage was a very advanced = propulsion=20 concept. In its original design, when it had 24 engines, they were=20 atmosphere-adapting aerospike engines, much like that being considered = for the=20 Space lifter X-33 concept that NASA is looking at, even though it has = some technical problems--a lot more than NASA understands at this point, I = think.=20 The aerospike atmospherically adapts and increases thrust as the = atmosphere gets=20 thinner.=20
There is an achilles heel to the aerospike design, and the Russians = learned=20 this the hard way, with N-1, in two ways. One is the thermal load = required to=20 create a nozzle in which you have multiple rocket engines burning on the = outside. You have a long nozzle that the expanding gas goes against, to = create=20 the thrust that you want. That nozzle has to be cooled. The thermal = loads, the=20 energy loss from that cooling in the aerospike design, veto any = possibility of=20 acquiring a better performance capability out of the N-1 booster, = compared to=20 using six additional engines with standard nozzles on them. The Soviets = learned=20 the hard way, that if you have too much surface area for that nozzle, = the energy=20 lost in cooling actually vetoes the performance.=20
There's also another aspect.=20
When the Russians transitioned to the 6 additional engines in the = center,=20 within the 24 engines, they didn't make all the revisions required to = preclude=20 the entire engine boat-tail operating as an aerospike. That produced the = aerodynamic effects with the third flight test that were the = hair-trigger that=20 created that failure. The gas was coming in from the sides of the = booster, as it=20 rose up from the launch pad, and from the shock wave coming up from the = bottom=20 of it.=20
During the second flight test, some debris--bolts, nuts, or whatever = from=20 manufacturing--got into one or two of the engines and caused a fire to = break out=20 in the first stage. This happened to a Space Shuttle main engine that = blew up on=20 a test stand in the late 1970s, and that's what happened in the N-1 = engine bay,=20 when the oxgygen line ruptured and fuel dumped all over everything. = Because everything was hot, the engine exploded into fire.=20
You can see the fire developing as the N-1 lifted off and cleared the = tower.=20 Soon after, the automatic control system shut off all but one engine. = That=20 explosion had, in fact, cut the lines that would have shut off that = engine, so=20 the engine couldn't be cut off. That one engine tipped the N-1 over on = its side,=20 and it collapsed sideways and fishtailed, dropping back on the facility = and=20 doing the tremendous damage that we have seen in the declassified Corona = photo=20 reconnaissance pictures.=20
The third flight test was on June 27, 1971. It lifted off and failed = almost=20 immediately, when an aftereffect, a shock wave produced by the acoustic = gas=20 pressure, travelled back up the vehicle--much as we have with the = Shuttle--and=20 sent the centerline of the booster spinning. The interstage between the = second-=20 and third-stage structure actually broke, and the top of the booster = started=20 falling off. As the booster continued to climb out, it gained some = stability,=20 but the whole L-3 unit started flipping over. Ultimately, the front end = broke=20 off and the booster broke up at that time.=20
Apparently all the launch escape systems did work as they should, and = it is=20 certainly very dramatic. Thank goodness that it did work that way, = because you=20 wouldn't have wanted to be around when that thing collapsed on the pad: = It=20 gouged out a 90-foot crater, about 20 km downrange.=20
I think the most dramatic pictures I have ever seen are the pictures = I saw in=20 Russia when I was there in April 1997, of the fourth, and final, flight = test of=20 N-1, on Nov. 23, 1972. It had almost worked through the entire first = stage burn;=20 it failed in the last few seconds, about 10 seconds after completing its = first=20 stage burn and going to the second stage. The programming was such that = it could=20 not start the second stage, in spite of the first stage having failed at = the=20 last minute, during the center engine shut-down procedure. There are 6 = center=20 engines and 24 outer engines, plus four Vernier engines on this fourth = version=20 of the vehicle.=20
You watch the vehicle lift off; it's clean, it's beautiful, and you = can't=20 believe how much fire and intensity of energy there is in the flame = trench. The=20 vehicle completely clears the facility and the flame trench; the = concrete is=20 still glowing yellow, well after the vehicle has cleared the facility. I = have=20 never, ever, seen aything like that before. That had to play hell with = the=20 concrete ... just the very energy involved in that blast furnace.=20
When they shut down the center six engines, there was a propellant = line that=20 fed some of the gas generator systems on the engines which ruptured. It = started=20 a fire that spread very rapidly. The severe pogo vibrations broke up = everything=20 at that point. The vehicle failed, and the engines were shut down by the = KORD=20 engine control system again. The second stage was not started. They = never blew the booster up. They let it go completely ballistic downrange, some 200 = to 500=20 km, and crash there. I'm sure some parts broke off, but a large portion = of the=20 vehicle went all the way downrange, crashed, and exploded.=20
Question: This answers the question of why the Soviets were = never able=20 to send people to the Moon. What was the reason that in the mid-1960s = the money=20 was not available for this program?=20
Charles P. Vick: You end up saying to yourself, ``Was the = lunar race=20 real?'' Yes, and no. It's a very ambiguous answer. There was clearly a = greater=20 priority than the lunar mission, and perhaps the Russian leadership felt = that=20 they had to keep the Americans in the lunar race to keep them away from = the=20 strategic rocket game. If they could keep us occupied with the lunar = effort, it=20 would make us divert a lot of funds that would have gone, perhaps, into = more=20 strategic rocket or military programs.=20
Question: But by that time didn't the United States have an=20 overwhelming military superiority?=20
Charles P. Vick: We had the superiority and the capability, = and they=20 didn't. To a degree, they wanted to slow us down, stop us, and keep us = occupied.=20 At the same time, there was no separation between their military and = space=20 programs. Their whole space program was based on the surge capacity = boosters=20 that they produced for the military. They were made available for the = space=20 program because they were excess production. A number of boosters was = made=20 available every year, and the space program grew over and beyond the = already=20 committed military programs through those years.=20
It's amazing they were able to do what they did. To a large degree, = when you=20 look at the appropriations level, you realize that Korolev had = challenged the=20 leadership in Russia well before he died in January 1966, even before = Khrushchev=20 went out of office. He said, ``Are we going to do this, or aren't we = going to do=20 this?'' The ultimate answer was, ``Yes, we're going to do this, but this = is all=20 the money you're going to get. And you're going to have to make do with = that.''=20 That's the way it was done. They went on to do the work, and I'd have to = say=20 that, so far as the government was really concerned, for all practical = purposes,=20 there was no lunar race.=20
But the scientists themselves with the tremendous effort that they = put out,=20 at what became the Energia Company of today, actually turned it into a = lunar=20 race--a very close one, in a lot of respects. ``They had all the wrong = failures=20 at the wrong time, and we had all the right ones,'' to quote Dr. Charles = Sheldon, former chief of the Science Policy Research division, of the=20 Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress. If the = opposite had=20 been the case, it may have been a very different picture.=20
Question: Were our failures early enough in the program so = that we=20 still had enough time to correct them?=20
Charles P. Vick: That's right, and we did thorough ground = testing,=20 which the Russians were not able to do. They were able to test fire all = the=20 upper stages of N-1 and all the payloads, and flight test all that = equipment, as=20 a general rule. But they did not have the test stands for the entire = launch=20 vehicle stack to be dynamically tested, although they did it in subscale = form.=20 They did all the testing in Korolev, formerly known as Kaliningrad, in = the=20 Moscow area. They did test firings of the first stage at Zagorsk, = outside of=20 Moscow, and then did other tests at Baikonur, which is where they ended = up building the boosters' first two or three stages.=20
The rest of it was built elsewhere in Russia, primarily Samara, and = shipped=20 by either air or railroad to the launch site. The first and second = stages were=20 built off site at the Cosmodrome inside the N-1/Energia assembly = building. In=20 fact, the facilities are still there and are available for use for the = Energia=20 booster.=20
In Samara, the Soviets destroyed a total of seven boosters. At = Baikonur, they=20 destroyed six boosters, over and above the four flight test vehicles, = plus the=20 scrapped first stage of a flight test vehicle. They had ground-test = vehicles and=20 dynamic-test vehicles. They broke three dynamic test stages at the = Cosmodrome.=20 They are very proud of that. They broke them during structural dynamic = testing,=20 to find the limit. And they broke the flight test vehicles, too.=20
Question: One of the incidents that it is said had an impact = on the=20 lunar program, was the death of Korolev in early 1966.=20
Charles P. Vick: If Korolev had lived, it would not have made = any=20 difference in the lunar effort. The Soviets were two and a half to five = years=20 behind U.S. developments, which we had already started in the 1950s. = Khrushchev=20 started the space race, but one would have to legitimately say that he = also ended the space race, when the decision was made to put the = appropriations into=20 the strategic rocket programs.=20
But it is amazing what the Academy of Sciences and the Russians = managed to=20 accomplish--the sheer momentum of what Kolorlev and the Academy of = Sciences had=20 started. By the time Korolev died in January 1966, things were beginning = to come=20 apart for him. Even if he had lived, they would not have beaten us to = the Moon.=20 N-1 would not have been ready on time.=20
In terms of propulsion, the United States was already working on the=20 F-1-class engine and hydrogen/oxygen engines, which were used on the = Saturn V,=20 back in the 1950s. The hydrogen work was done by Aerojet initially, and = other=20 work was done by Pratt and Whitney. This work led to the J-2 engine, = which was=20 used on the second and third stages of the Saturn V. Rocketdyne did the = work on=20 the E-1 engine, which was a buildup to the F-1, at a half-million pounds = of=20 thrust.=20
Both countries had considerable problems with rocket engines, = kerosene/liquid=20 oxygen, or LOX engines, because of rough combustion. We took quite a few = years--until the late 1960s, early 1970s--to learn what is known as the = ``rough=20 combustion curve.'' If certain parameters of design are outside this = curve, you=20 won't get rough combustion in the thrust chamber; if the design = parameters are=20 inside, you will have rough combustion. It took a long time to learn = that. But=20 the Soviets developed a very robust engine that is being applied to = American=20 commercial launch vehicles today--NK-33 and the NK-43--which could even = stand=20 rough combustion.=20
You might ask, why so many engines? It was what was possible to be = developed=20 in the time frame required. There was also a very severe argument = between=20 Valentin Glushko and Korolev. Glushko, who headed the Soviets' = prestigious Gas=20 Dynamics Laboratory, refused to build kerosene/LOX engines, and would = only build=20 storable propellant engines for Korolev's launch vehicle for the lunar = effort.=20 There were discretionary funds available for storable propellant = engines, for=20 the military, which was using storage propellants.=20
Question: What are storable propellants?=20
Charles P. Vick: I'm thinking about UDMH [unsymmetrical=20 dimethylmethylhydrazine] and nitrogen tetroxide, storable hypergolics. = They can=20 be stored in a normal environment chamber, but they're highly toxic and = very=20 harmful to human beings; they can kill you, if breathed in. When UDMH = and nitric=20 acid come together, they explode instantly into flames.=20
The other approach uses kerosene and liquid oxygen, LOX. The LOX is=20 cryogenically cooled, and the kerosene is storable and can be = super-cooled to a=20 degree. The kerosene the Soviets use, which they still use today, is = actually a=20 derivative of gasoline. It's more gummy than our kerosene. Kerosene = works quite=20 well with those engines. The differences are really very small, as has = been demonstrated in test firings in the United States. Glushko refused to = develop=20 kerosene engines because he didn't think that that a 150-metric-ton = thrust=20 engine using kerosene/LOX could be developed. He essentially refused to = do it.=20
Question: It seems that an important factor in the Soviet = lunar=20 program was the competition that was maintained and fostered by the = government=20 between the different design bureaus. How did this affect the progress = of the=20 lunar program?=20
Charles P. Vick: Few people realize that Stalin, a long time = ago, gave=20 the chief designers the right to refuse to do a project or be a part of = a=20 project, without penalty. When a General-Designer is appointed, it is a = rank, a=20 military rank, quite literally. And when they're appointed, they are = appointed for life. They are gods. There were the various aircraft design = bureaus.=20 Korolev was a General-Designer. The person who succeeded him, Vasily = Mishin, was=20 a General-Designer. Glushko became a General-Designer of rocket engines. = Vladimir Chelomei was a General-Designer, who also had the UR-700/LK-1=20 competetive design to Korolev's lunar design. Mikhail Yangel was also a=20 General-Designer with his design bureau in Ukraine; he had the R-56, = based on=20 the R-46 super-ICBM concept, another competitive design to Korolev's = N-1.=20
Yangel was initially developing the R-46 super-ICBM, as Chelomei was=20 developing the UR-500 super-ICBM ``city buster,'' as vehicles this size = used to=20 be called. They were designed for a 150-megaton warhead that was = doctrinally in=20 favor in the early 1960s. Chelomei's UR-500, later the Proton, won the = contract;=20 the R-46 was dropped.=20
But then, the lunar contract came along. Khrushchev had developed = this=20 technique of having competetive contracts, supposedly to get better = designs.=20 Intially, looking at the lunar booster, they had selected a booster for = the=20 program, but then the competetive boosters were presented midstream, = when N-1=20 was already under development and facilities were being built.=20
At the same time, money was being spent on those competing programs, = and=20 wasted. The chief designers were literally out of control at that point, = and the=20 government did not rein them in, except that the R-56 was dropped when = Mishin,=20 Korolev's successor, wrote letters complaining about it to the Ministry = of=20 General Machine Building, which ran the space program starting in = 1965-1966,=20 with the new Five Year Plan.=20
This so-called competition was very destructive, because people were = not=20 working as a single team, for a single goal, on a single vehicle. They = were=20 saying: ``I'm going to work on this. He's going to work on that. Mishin = can do=20 what he wants to do, but we're going to do our thing.''=20
There also were the unmanned lunar programs, including the automatic = sample=20 programs, the Lunakhod program, plus the Zond circumnavigation program, = so there=20 were more than half a dozen manned and unmanned lunar programs in = progress at=20 the same time, in very intensely competing organizations. Pure chaos. It = made it=20 very difficult for Mishin, who succeeded Korolev as General-Designer of = what=20 eventually became Energia, because he had all these competitors to the = N-1, and he didn't have the money he needed.=20
Mishin would make recommendations that they build test stands for the = first=20 stage, or do testing, or put on certain kinds of instrumentation to be = certain=20 that the engines were performing. Some of the instrumentation he was = suggesting=20 was very advanced for rocket engine performance observation--much of = which we=20 still do not have perfected, even today. Their computer technology was = not the best in the world. Their instrument control technology for N-1 was very = advanced thinking, but it just was not right. It would have been = perfected over=20 time. I think with the fifth flight test, they would have finally = successfully=20 flight-tested the booster. But Mishin never got the support he needed = for these=20 efforts.=20
A lot of people said Mishin messed up the managenment and everything = else.=20 You have to realize that he had 25-plus programs dumped on him when = Korolev=20 died. And he had a lot of people reporting to him, directly. It took him = a while=20 before he began to delegate authority, and he got reprimanded by the = Ministry of=20 General Machine Building for it. The actual development of N-1 was going = about=20 the pace you would expect for development of a booster, looking at the=20 limitations of the ground testing that was permitted by the Ministry and = the=20 government.=20
So you end up saying to yourself, ``Hey, the government, the = Ministries, and=20 the political leadership are not putting the money in there, so they're = getting=20 what they're asking for, as a result.'' But Mishin became the fall guy, = and by=20 1974, when the doctrinal change in detente was beginning, the lunar = program no=20 longer had its place--as was the case geopolitically and in terms of = policy in=20 the United States. Mishin was relieved of his job in March 1974, fired, = in=20 effect, in a hostile corporate takeover, sanctioned by the Russian = leadership.=20 Quite brutal.=20
For a long time, Mishin has been very much criticized, and has been = accused=20 of being responsible for the failure of the lunar program. In reality, = he was an=20 exceptionally intelligent deputy General-Designer to Korolev. One reason = that=20 Mishin was not very popular, is that he tried to prevent others from = working on=20 their own hidden agendas, and to get all of them working on the assigned = task.=20
Glushko continued to fight Korolev even after his death. He fought = Mishin,=20 looking over his shoulder. Roald Sagdeev, former head of the Russian = Space=20 Science Institute, has a lot to say about that in his book, The Makings = of a=20 Soviet Scientist. Glushko was an utter zealot, egoist, demagogue, and = very=20 destructive. He ultimately brought down Mishin and the lunar program. = And he=20 even went so far as to write the manned lunar program out of history, = never=20 acknowledging it--ignoring it, as if it didn't exist.=20
Soon after Glushko died in 1988, and when perestroika came along, = guess what?=20 Mishin began to talk about the lunar effort.=20
That's not all. As far back as 1981, I did a lot of publishing in the = Illustrated Encyclopedia of Space Technology. One drawing that I did = there is=20 infamous with the Soviets, because it effectively showed N-1 and said to = Glushko: ``Ha, ha. You want to rewrite history, but this is what = existed.'' That drawing was published in the Soviet newspapers Pravda and in Izvestia. = It's not=20 a perfect drawing; it's not dead right, but it actually shows the N-1. = It was=20 close enough to shake them up, because the book was at a big British and = American book show, held in Moscow once a year. All the chief designers, = including Mishin and Glushko, went out and looked in this encyclopedia. = ``They declassified it!'' It wasn't exactly right, but it really shook them = up, no=20 end.=20
Question: During the period of the Nixon/Brezhnev detente, the = planning began for the joint 1975 Apollo/Soyuz mission. But before that, = there=20 was a decision by the Soviets, in the early 1970s, to develop a series = of space=20 stations, largely for military reasons. Didn't that become the focus of = their manned activities?=20
Charles P. Vick: The first Salyut station was launched in = 1971. That=20 decision was made in the fall of 1969, after the July 1969 launch = failure.=20
Question: And of course, in 1969, the Americans landed on the = Moon, so=20 the race was over for all intents and purposes, because getting there = second was=20 like not getting their at all.=20
Charles P. Vick: Right, and with a program that was not as = good, with=20 not as many people on the lunar surface.=20
Question: That's why I was suprised to see that even after our = lunar=20 landing, the Soviets continued to test the N-1.=20
Charles P. Vick: They continued to test it well after we had = nearly=20 finished flying Apollo. Starting in 1970, they committed 600 million = additional=20 rubles to the lunar program, over and above the appropriations level, = which was=20 a total of 4.5 billion rubles from 1960 through 1974. They were looking = at an=20 advanced lunar booster that would use hydrogen upper stages--a = derivative N-1=20 design, that is in some of my illustrations. It was going to be used to = create a=20 lunar base, which could provide 30 to 120 days on the lunar surface. = That would=20 have been possible by 1980 or so, but the program was never committed.=20
If the Soviets had continued N-1 development, I doubt that the = Shuttle would=20 have ever completed development. That would have changed the entire = direction of=20 our space efforts, both Russian and U.S. I doubt that Saturn V would = have=20 totally gone out of production.=20
Question: Because we would have continued the lunar program?=20
Charles P. Vick: The White House was very concerned about the=20 continuing of the N-1 program. The Nixon White House knew about the = fourth N-1=20 launch vehicle failure before the Kremlin did. I know that. The White = House was=20 clearly very concerned, because it would affect our space policy and = what we=20 were doing. The Air Force and other factions wanted to go to a = Shuttle-class=20 vehicle, which the aerospace industry wanted. Industry wasn't getting a = lot of=20 new, lucrative research and development contracts out of continuing = Apollo. But=20 if the Soviets had been able to launch their lunar program in the 1970s, = we=20 would have probably continued Apollo.=20
Question: What was mosty striking to you in your trip to = Russia and=20 the Baikonur Cosmodrome last April?=20
Charles P. Vick: The trip was an eye-opener for me. It's the = second=20 one I've taken with the Friends and Partners in Space. The Baikonur = Cosmodrome=20 is being consolidated, and the older facilities, which are 40-plus years = old,=20 are being abandoned. There is a lot that is deteriorated; entire = apartment complexes have been abandoned in place. But people are coming back to = the=20 Cosmodrome. You don't see much out-of-control military. Discipline is = being=20 maintained.=20
Two years ago, there was almost no activity inside the N-1/Energia = and Buran=20 assembly buildings, but now they're moving in commercial activity, and = the Soyuz=20 and future Rus booster. The Rus booster is a derivative of the Soyuz = booster,=20 called Soyuz-2, in fact. It is an improved, upgraded version of it that = will be=20 used in space station.=20
They are refurbishing areas and consolidating into the newest and the = best,=20 which is the N-1/Energia/Buran facility. They have not gotten rid of the = Buran=20 orbiters, or the Energia boosters. There are two flight boosters = available,=20 although they need engines for the strap-on boosters. There are other=20 ground-test elements associated with it there. They have a complete = dynamic test=20 tower. It's practically brand new. The N-1 facilities and the Energia = facilities=20 can eventually be refined to accommodate the Rus booster and possibly,=20 Energia/Buran.=20
The Russians feel that nobody is going to abandon those vehicles = totally and=20 not utilize them. They don't want to lose the capability, because = they're=20 looking toward the future and, I'm sure, not merely in Earth-orbit, but = in lunar=20 and planetary participation, way down the road, when their economy gets = better.=20 I respect that completely. Even the Russian Space Agency has tried to = develop an=20 all new launch-vehicle family of improved vehicles, as well as new ones, = utilizing old ICBMs or newer ICBMs for space boosters instead of = throwing them=20 away. They are offering them both commercially and for their own = military and=20 civilian space programs.=20
I saw some of the other facilities, including hardware that you had = never=20 hoped to see in your lifetime, military rocketry hardware. I saw the = competitor=20 to Chelomei's SS-9 ICBM, the UR200. I saw the R-26, which used to be one = of the=20 parade missiles, known as Sasin. I saw the R-7 ICBM, the old Sputnik = booster.=20 You could see it even inside--the details, and the guidance packages. We = went to=20 mission control. It was a beehive of activity.=20
We went to TsNIImash, the Central Specialized Design Bureau of the = Institute=20 of Machine Building. This is an awesome facility that is roughly = equivalent to=20 the Tullahoma Air Force facility, Marshall Space Flight Center, Lewis = Research=20 Center, and more, combined in one place. It's unbelievable to look at = this, how=20 spread out it is, and what that facility does for their strategic as = well as=20 space programs. They do primarily dynamic acoustic, environmental, wind = tunnel=20 testing--full-scale testing. That's where all stages of the N-1 were = tested, not=20 only in a scaled version, but with full-sized hardware. Each stage was=20 dynamically tested. They never dynamically tested the full stack, unless = they=20 did on the launch pad.=20
Question: What did you see of the N-1?=20
Charles P. Vick: I saw N-1's interstage, between the first and = second=20 stage, in photographic form, undergoing dynamic testing. I also saw = photographs.=20 I wasn't able to see the model, but I saw two different versions of = N-1's=20 design--quarter-scale dynamic models, full-up vehicles--on which they = did the=20 dynamic testing. They were very confident in their dynamic testing = techniques;=20 they did not worry about doing a full stacked vehicle under dynamic = testing,=20 which we did with Saturn V.=20
Question: Did you see any N-1 hardware?=20
Charles P. Vick: Yes, I did. I saw some of the interstage = truss=20 structures. I saw many of the kerosene tanks for the first second, = third, and=20 fourth stages. I saw some additional structure where the six engines = would sit=20 on the engine boat-tail--the actual plate that sits there and is the end = plate=20 of the vehicle, where those six engines sit. I saw the erector = transporter that=20 was used, although it was revised to handle the Energia. I saw the = launch pad at=20 a distance, several thousand feet away. We were inside the N-1 assembly=20 building, which is being used for Energia/Buran. As I said before, they = are=20 consolidating facilities in support of the space station, and are = putting the=20 Soyuz booster in there. They will be handling the Rus booster, and = eventually,=20 the N-1 pad is going to be handling the Rus booster, too. All the Soyuz = pads and=20 the assembly building are going to be shut down. It is fascinating that = they are=20 looking at the future and combining it all in one place.=20
Question: One major part of their activity today is commercial = operations, and the other is the international space station, and, = parallel to=20 that, keeping the Mir operational as long as possible. How are the = Russians=20 positioned to carry out the space program they have going on now?=20
Charles P. Vick: They're not in the best of shape; that's for = sure.=20 But they are systematically consolidating in such a way as to be able to = definitely support the international space station. The funding and the=20 facilities will be ready for that. I saw a lot of feverish work going on = to=20 support that, at Baikonur as well as in Moscow, where work is being done = on the=20 Service Module. Proton launch vehicles are going to be available to = launch=20 various elements of the station. They have more than enough of those, = and their=20 commercial launches are being sold quite rapidly for Proton. They're = selling the=20 Proton booster like crazy for commercial communication satellite = launches and=20 things of that kind.=20
The Soyuz booster is also going to be used for that. The development = of the=20 Rus booster will almost certainly be guaranteed because of that. So, = Samara will=20 get the advanced Soyuz booster and its Molinya derivatives with various = upper=20 stages.=20
The international space station work, the development and = construction of the=20 individual modules, is continuing. We saw that very clearly in Moscow, = now that=20 they are apparently resolving the appropriations problems, or at least=20 prioritizing that. The Russian budget is actually falling, with tax = collections=20 some 45 percent short of the revenue needed for financing the entire = government,=20 but the space program is a protected budget. It will get at least as = much as it=20 got last year. With the consolidation going on that I've seen, I think = they will=20 be able--or are positioning themselves to be able--with the help of the=20 commercial launches and the money they're earning from that, to = accomplish what=20 they say they are going to do. It's going to be tight, though, because = some of=20 the commercial activity is independent companies that are not paying the = Russian=20 government, but may be contributing to the programs.=20
There are some direct contracts that are being paid from the United = States to=20 the companies, which is really the only way to do things. Don't go = through the=20 Russian government to give appropriations, as the United States learned = the hard=20 way this last spring and fall, because that money might get diverted to=20 something else and never get to the Russian Space Agency. That is = literally what happened in relation to the Service Module, as I understand it, at = least.=20 Something has been done to address that issue and resolve it, and work = is moving=20 forward.=20
Question: What reflection of their heritage from the Soviet = lunar=20 program do you see in the way the Russians have tried to deal with the = June 25=20 accident aboard the Mir space station?=20
Charles P. Vick: In a lot of respects, we are very lucky that = they had=20 the accident on Mir recently, because of what we can learn in order to = be ready=20 for similar problems on the international space station. I feel = reasonably sure=20 the Russians are going to resolve that, solve it, and get it back on = line.=20
Their tenacity is unbelievable. You fix it. That's what we do also, =
whether=20
we want to admit it or not. And Mir is a major, major technological=20
accomplishment on the part of the Russians. Credit needs to be given=20
accordingly. Even their lunar program, which failed and was ultimately =
scrapped,=20
has much to teach us, and was a major accomplishment.=20
=20