GLASNOST Berlin - A 1935 US Plan for Invasion of Canada

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Geschichte

Date: Wed, 1 Feb 1995 11:35:53 EST<=
/o:p>

From: FLOYD RUDMIN

Newsgroups: soc.culture.canada 
 
   =
        A 1935 US Plan for Invasi=
on of Canada
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;  Submitted by F.W. Rudmin
   =
      &nbs=
p;           =
Queen's University
   =
            &nb=
sp;  Kingston, Ontario Canada
 
   =
           Email: =
rudminf@qucdn.queensu.ca
   =
            &nb=
sp;    FAX: (613) 545-6611

   =
   The following is a full-text reproduction of the 1935

 plan for a US invasion of Canada prepared at the U=
S Army

 War College, G-2 intelligence division, and submit=
ted on

 December 18, 1935.  This is the most recent declassified

 invasion plan available from the US archival sourc=
es.

 Centered pagination is that of the original docume=
nt.  The spelling and punctuation of the original document =
are
 reproduced as in the original document, even when =
in error
 by present-day norms.
=
 
   =
   This document was first identified by Richard Preston
 in his 1977 book, "The Defence of the Undefen=
ded Border:
 Planning for War in North America 1867-1939" =
(Montreal:
 McGill-Queen's University Press.)  Preston's reference
 citation (p. 277) identified this to be archived a=
t the US

 Military History Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Pa=
., coded

 AWC 2-1936-8, G2, no. 19A.  It was located by the US

National Archives and supplied on microfilm.<= /o:p>

   =
   The military planning context of this document is War

 Plan Red, which was approved in May 1930 by the Se=
cretary

 of War and the Secretary of Navy.  War Plan Red and

=
 supporting documents are available from the US Nat=
ional

 Archives on microfilm, in the Records of the Joint=
 Board,

 1903-1947, Roll 10, J.B. 325, Serial 435 through S=
erial

 641.  In War Plan Red, the US Army's theatre of operations is defined to be: "All CRIMSON territory"=
; (p.80), and the
 US Army's mission, in bold type: ULTIMATELY, TO GA=
IN
 COMPLETE CONTROL OF CRIMSON (p. 84).  CRIMSON is the
 colour code for Canada.  In 1934, War Plan Red was amended to authorize the immediate first use of poison gas=
 against
 Canadians and to use strategic bombing to destroy =
Halifax
 if it could not be captured. 
   =
   In February 1935, the War Department arranged a
 Congressional appropriation of $57 million dollars=
 to
 build three border air bases for the purposes of
 pre-emptive surprise attacks on Canadian air field=
s.  The base in the Great Lakes region was to be camouflag=
ed as a
 civilian airport and was to "be capable of do=
minating the
 industrial heart of Canada, the Ontario Peninsula&=
quot; from p.
 61 of the February 11-13, 1935, hearings of the Co=
mmittee
 on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, on =
Air
 Defense Bases (H.R. 6621 and H.R. 4130).  This testimony=
 was to have been secret but was published by mista=
ke.  See the New York Times, May 1, 1935, p. 1.<=
/span>
 
      In August 1935,=
 the US held its largest peacetime
 military manoeuvres in history, with 36,000 troops=
 converging at the Canadian border south of Ottawa,=
 and
 another 15,000 held in reserve in Pennsylvania.  The war=
 game scenario was a US motorized invasion of Canad=
a, with
 the defending forces initially repulsing the invad=
ing Blue
 forces, but eventually to lose "outnumbered a=
nd outgunned"
 when Blue reinforcements arrive.  This according to the<=
pre> Army's pamphlet "Souvenir of of the First Arm=
y Maneuvers:
 The Greatest Peace Time Event in US History" =
(p.2).
 
   =
   The following document is a declassified public
 domain document and may be freely reproduced.  This should be of particular interest to people in the Halifx =
and
 Quebec City regions, then considered to be the mos=
t
 strategic cities in Canada. 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            -40-
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;      SUPPLEMENT NO. 3=
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
 TO
 
   =
            &nb=
sp; REPORT OF COMMITTEE NO. 8
 
   =
                   &=
nbsp;   SUBJECT:
 
   =
   CRITICAL AREAS OF CANADA AND APPROACHES THERETO
   =
   _______________________________________________
 .
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;        Prepared by:
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;     SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 3 
   =
            M=
ajor Charles H. Jones, Infantry, Chairman.
   =
            L=
t. Col. H.W. Crawford, Engineers.
 
  I. P=
apers Accompanying.
   =
  ___________________
  1. B=
ibliography.     =
            &nb=
sp;    (Omitted, filed in Rec.Sec.)=
  2. L=
ist of Slides.    &nbs=
p;            &=
nbsp;      =
;        "
  3. A=
ppendices (1 and 2).   &nbs=
p;            &=
nbsp;         "
  4. A=
nnexes. (Incl. A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,K, and L)&n=
bsp;     "
 
  II. =
The Study Presented.
   =
   ___________________
   =
    Determine under the geographical factor, the crit=
ical areas in
 Crimson (Canada) and the best approaches thereto f=
or Blue.  A critical
 area is assumed to be any area of such strategic i=
mportance to either
 belligerent that control thereof may have a materi=
al bearing on the out-
 come of the war.
 
 III. Facts bearing on the study.=
   =
   __________________________
=
   1. General Considerations:
   =
    An area in Crimson territory may be of strategic =
importance from
 the viewpoint of tactical, economic, or political =
considerations.  In the
 final analysis, however, critical areas must be la=
rgely determined in the
 light of Red's probable line of action and Crimson=
's contribution to that
 effort.
   2. Geographical Features of Canada.
   a. Location and extent.  The=
 location and extent of the Dominion of
   _
 Canada is shown on the Map herewith (see Exhibit A=
).  It comprises the
 entire northern half of the the North American con=
tinent, excepting only
 Alaska and the coast of Labrador, a dependency of =
the colony of New-
 foundland.
   =
    The principal political subdivisions are those lo=
cated along the
 border of the United States.  These from east to west are:   =
    (1) The Maritime Provinces:   =
         Prince Edward Islan=
d.
   =
         Nova Scotia.
   =
         New Brunswick.=
   =
    (2) Quebec.
   =
    (3) Ontario.
   =
    (4) The Prairie Provinces:   =
         Manitoba.
   =
         Saskatchewan.<=
/o:p>
   =
         Alberta.=
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
       -41-
 
   =
    (5) British Columbia.
   =
    Newfoundland, while not a part of the Dominion of=
 Canada, would
 undoubtedly collaborate in any Crimson effort.
   b. Topography. (Slide 14852)
   _
   =
   The great area in eastern Canada underlain by rocks of =
Precambrian
 age is known as the Canadian Shield.  Its northern boundary crosses the
 Arctic archipelago; the eastern boundary lies beyo=
nd Baffin Island and
 Labrador, and reaches the depressed area occupied =
by the St. Lawrence, a
 short spur crossing this valley east of Lake Ontar=
io to join the Adirondack
 Mountains of New York.  The southern boundary runs from this spur west to
 Georgian Bay thence along the north shore of Lake =
Huron and Lake Superior,
 thence northwest from the Lake of the Woods to the=
 western end of Lake
 Athabaska.  =
Its average elevation does not exceed 1500 feet.  The greatest
 known elevations are in the eastern part of Baffin=
 Island and along the
 coast of northern Labrador.  Peaks of the Torngat Mountains of Labrador
 have elevations of between 4000 and 5000 feet.  The coast is one of the
 boldest and most rugged in the world, with many ve=
rtical cliffs rising
 1000 to 2000 feet high.  Occasional exceptions occur in which there are
 reliefs of several hundred feet, as in the hills a=
long the north shore of
 Lake Huron and Lake Superior.  The area is dotted with lakes, large and
 small, and of irregular outline.  A lowland of considerable extent
 stretches for some distance into Ontario and Manit=
oba from Hudson Bay.
   =
   Extending south and west form the Canadian Shield, betw=
een the Ap-
 palachian Mountains on the east and the Cordillera=
s on the west, lies the
 Great North American plain.  The northeastern portion of this plain called<=
/o:p>
 the St. Lawrence lowlands occupies southern Ontari=
o, south of a line ex-
 tending from Georgian Bay to the east end of Lake =
Ontario; eastern Ontario
 lying between the Ottawa and St. Lawrence rivers, =
and that part of Quebec
 lying adjacent to the St. Lawrence between Montrea=
l and Quebec.
   =
   The plain west of the Canadian Shield, known as the Int=
erior Plains,
 stretches northward to the Arctic Ocean between a =
line approximately join-
 ing Lake Winnipeg and Lake Athabasca, Great Slave =
Lake and Great Bear Lake
 on the east, and the foothills of the Rocky Mounta=
ins on the west.
   =
   That part of the St. Lawrence Lowlands lying in the eas=
tern angle of
 Ontario, and in Quebec south of Montreal and exten=
ding down the St. Law-
 rence is comparatively flat and lies less than 500=
 feet above sea level.
 On the lower St. Lawrence it is greatly narrowed b=
y the near approach of
 the Appalachian system to the Canadian Shield.  The part lying adjacent to<=
/o:p>
 Lakes Ontario, Erie and Huron is of less even surf=
ace, has its greatest
 elevation of over 1700 feet south of Georgian Bay =
and slopes gently to
 the Great Lakes.
   =
   The Interior Plains region is in general rolling countr=
y with broad
 undulations and a slope eastward and northward of =
a few feet per mile,
 descending from an elevation of 3000 to 5000 feet =
near the mountains on the
 west to less than 1000 feet at the eastern border.=
  The rolling character
 of the area is relieved by several flat topped hil=
ls, by flat areas that
 formed the beds of extensive lakes, and by deep ri=
ver valleys.
   =
   The Appalachain and Arcadian regions occupy practically=
 all that part
 of Canada lying east of the St. Lawrence, with the=
 exception of the lowlands
 west of a line joining Quebec City and Lake Champl=
ain.  The Applachain
 region is a continuation into Quebec of three chai=
ns of the Applachain
 system of mountains.  The most westerly of these ranges, the Green Mountains
 of Vermont, stretches northeast into the Gaspe pen=
insula, where it forms
 flat topped hills some 3000 feet high.  The Acadian region, which includes=
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
      -42-
 
 New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Islan=
d is an alternation of
 upland with hills and ridges rising 2500 feet and =
higher.  Adjacent to the<=
/o:p>
 Bay of Fundy is a series of ridges rising in place=
s to 1200 feet.  Between<=
/o:p>
 these two New Brunswick uplands, which converge to=
ward the southwest is a
 lowland forming the whole eastern part of the prov=
ince.  This lowland ex-
 tends east to include Prince Edward Island, the we=
stern fringe of Cape
 Breton Island and the mainland of Nova Scotia nort=
h of the Cobequid moun-
 tains, which have an elevation of 800 to 1000 feet=
.  South of the Cobequid<=
/o:p>
 Mountains lies a long narrow lowland stretching fr=
om Chedabucto Bay to
 Minas Basin, and along the Cornwallis Annapolis va=
lley between North and
 South Mountains.&=
nbsp; South of this lowland is a highland sloping to the Atlantic
 Coast.  The northern part of Cape Breton Island is a tableland 1200 feet
 high with its central part rising to an elevation =
of over 1700 feet.
   =
   The Cordelleran region, a mountainous area bordering th=
e Pacific
 extends from the United States through Canada into=
 Alaska and embraces
 nearly all of British Columbia and Yukon and the w=
estern edge of Alberta
 and the Northwest Territories.  The eastern part of the Cordillera is occu-=
 pied by the Rocky Mountains, with peaks rising to =
10,000 feet and 12,000
 feet.  They extend northwest and fall away towards the Liard River.  The
 western part of the Cordillera is occupied by the =
Coast Range and the
 mountains of Vancouver and Queen Charlotte Islands=
.  The Coast Range rises<=
/o:p>
 to heights of 7000 to 9000 feet. Between the Rocky=
 Mountains and the Coast
 Range lies a vast plateau 3000 to 4000 feet high a=
nd cut by deep river
 valleys.
   3. Population.
   =
   According to the census of 1931, the total population o=
n June 1, 1931
 was 10,376,786, of whom 5,374,541 were males.  The inhabited areas of the
 Dominion are essentially confined to a narrow stri=
p alolo the United States
 boundary, generally south of the 56th parallel of =
latitude west of the Lake
 Winnipeg, and south of the 49th parallel of latitu=
de east of Lake Superior.
 Approximately 10% of the total population are foun=
d in the Maritime provinces,
 61%  =
in Quebec and Ontario, 23% in the Prairie Provinces and 6% in British<=
/o:p>
 Columbia.
   =
   Of the present population, 51.86% are of British descen=
t, 28.22%
 French, and the remainder of widely scattered nati=
vity.
   4. Climate.
   =
   The climate of southern Canada is comparable to that of=
 the northern
 tier of the states of the United States.  The west coast of British Columbia
 tempered by the Pacific Ocean is mild and humid.  The prairie provinces
 generally experience extreme cold weather from Nov=
ember to March, with heavy
 snow fall.  =
The climate of southern Ontario, the St. Lawrence Valley and the
 Maritime Provinces is much milder that that of the=
 prairie provinces, but
 freezing temperatures are general between the end =
of November and the first
 of April, and the ground is usually covered with b=
etween one and three
 feet of snow.&nbs=
p; Any extensive military operations in Canada between November=
 1st and April 15th would be extremely difficult, i=
f not impossible.
   5. Communications.
   a. Railways.
   _
   =
   There are only two railway systems in Canada, both cros=
sing Canada
 east and west from the Atlantic to the Pacific.  These lines generally
 parallel the United States border, in some instanc=
es crossing through the
 United States.
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
    -43-
 
   =
   (1) The Canadian national Railways system (See inclosur=
e B) belonging
 to and operated by the government, has eastern ter=
minals at Halifax, N.S.,
 Portland, Maine (Grand Trunk), and through the Cen=
tral Vermont, at Boston,
 New London and New York.  Western terminals are Vancouver and Prince Rupert=
 B.C.  An extension from Cochrane, Ontario, to Moosonee, Ontario on James
 Bay, was completed by the Province of Ontario in J=
uly 1932, to connect with
 water routes to Churchill, Hudson Bay and with the=
 northern route to Europe.
   =
   (2) The Canadian Pacific system (see inclosure C) has i=
ts eastern
 terminus at Saint John, N.B. and it western termin=
us at Vancouver, B.C.
 As indicated by the systems maps, there are numero=
us branch lines serving
 the industrial and farming areas of the Dominion, =
and connecting lines ty-
 ing in with various railroads of the United States=
.
   =
   From a military viewpoint, these railroads provide exce=
llent trans-
 portation facilities for Blue, if invasion of Crim=
son is decided upon, and
 being located in close proximity to the border are=
, from the Crimson view-
 point, very liable to interruption.  This is particularly true at Winnipeg<=
/o:p>
 some 60 miles north of Blues border, through which=
 both transcontinental
 systems now pass.=
  This fact probably encouraged Canada to construct the
 railroad from The Pass, Manitoba and develop the p=
ort at Churchill.
   =
   Complete details concerning all railroads of Canada are=
 contained in
 Appendix No. 1.
   b. Highways.
   _
   =
   In recent years Canada has greatly increased and improv=
ed her road con-
 struction and while there are enormous stretches o=
f country, particularly
 in the northern portion of the Dominion, with few =
or no roads, the southern
 portion is well served with improved roads.  A number of transcontinental
 motor roads are under construction or projected, t=
he most important being
 the "Kings International Highway" from M=
ontreal to Vancouver, via Ottawa,
 North Bay, Sudbury, Sault Ste. Marie, Winnipeg, Ma=
cLeod, Crow's Nest Pass,
 Fernia and Cranbrook.  Another highway is being constructed from
 Calgary to Vancouver.
=
   =
   The principal roads in Ontario, Quebec and the Maritime=
 Provinces
 are shown on Inclosure D, herewith.  Roads in the Prairie Provinces and
 British Columbia are shown on inclosure E.
   =
   The majority of improved roads are classified as gravel=
; macadam and
 concrete construction amounting to only 7870 miles=
 out of a total of some
 95,000 miles improved.  Gravel roads will require extensive maintenance
 under heavy motor traffic, especially during the s=
pring.
   c. Water Transportation.
   _
   =
   (1) Inland Waterways.
   =
        The Great Lakes, with the=
 St. Lawrence River, is the most im-
 portant fresh water transportation system in the w=
orld.  At the present
 time it affords a draft of 21.0 feet over all the =
Great Lakes and through
 the Welland Canal into the St. Lawrence.  From the Atlantic Ocean to Mon-
 treal, the present head of ocean navigation on the=
 St. Lawrence, a draft
 of 30.0 feet is available, adequate for the great =
majority of ocean shipping.
 For some distance above Montreal the present chann=
el has an available depth
 of only 14.0 feet.
   =
       The inland waterway is of prime=
 importance to the economic life
 of both the United States and Canada for the trans=
portation of bulk com-
 modities, especially for the movement of wheat fro=
m the western plains to
 shipping centers on the eastern seaboard; of iron =
ore from the mines in
 Minnesota to foundaries along Lake Ontario; and fo=
r coal from  the mines of=
 Pennsylvania and West Virginia to Ontario, Quebec =
and the northwest.
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
      -44-
 
   =
       The locks at Sault Ste. Marie, =
the boundary channels between Port
 Huron and Detroit and to a lesser degree the Wella=
nd Canal are the critical
 points on this waterway and effective control of s=
uch areas is vital to
 Blue.
   =
       Navigation on the Great Lakes i=
s generally closed by ice from
 about the end of November to the first of April.
   =
       The St. Lawrence River is ordin=
arily ice bound for a similar period,
 but somewhat later about early in December to the =
latter part of April.
 While there are a number of Canadian lake ports of=
 importance, Montreal is
 the only one which would not be automatically clos=
ed by Blue control of the
 Lakes.  Montreal is also an important ocean port and will be considered
 along with other deep sea ports.=
   =
   (2) Ocean Shipping.
   =
       The Dominion of Canada owns and=
 operates a cargo and passenger
 carrying fleet consisting of some 57 cargo vessels=
 and 11 passenger ships.
   =
       The principal ocean ports and t=
he magnitude of Canadian ocean
 traffic is indicated by the following tabulation:<=
o:p>
 
 A. Number and tonnage of sea-going vessels entered=
 and cleared at the
 principal ports of Canada. (For year ending March =
31, 1934.)
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            SEA-GOING VESSELS
   =
       PORT       arrived      departed    TOTAL TONS (REGISTERED)
   =
       ____       _______      ________    _______________________
 Halifax, N.S. *&n=
bsp;       1259        1484         =
;   7,540,990
 Yarmouth, N.S.&nb=
sp;         535         519      =
      1,102,191
 St. John, N.B. *&=
nbsp;       684         688        =
    2,924,822
 Montreal, Quebec *     1078 =
;        907          &nb=
sp; 7,266,569
 Quebec, Que. =
; *     &n=
bsp;   397  &nb=
sp;      308            3,388,829
 Prince Rupert, B.C.    1141 &nbs=
p;      1155            &=
nbsp; 251,881
 Vancouver, B.C. *=
      2332=
        2137           11,705,775
 Victoria, B.C.&nb=
sp;      &=
nbsp; 1927   &n=
bsp;    1938 &n=
bsp;          8,874,481=
 New Westminster, B.C.   678  &nb=
sp;      700            3,123,606
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;         IMPORTANT SECOND=
ARY PORTS.
 
 Churchill, Man. *=
        15          15<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>       &=
nbsp;      132,000<=
pre> Three Rivers, Que=
        79          79<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>       &=
nbsp;      424,560<=
pre> Windsor, N.S.&nbs=
p;           56       &nb=
sp;  69    =
;          201,032=
 
 Note: The above figures do not indicate amount of =
commerce; Register tons
   =
            &nb=
sp;         ______
 are gross tons. (Namely cubical contents in cubic =
feet divided by 100)
 less deductions for crews space, stores, etc.=
 
   =
       A brief description of the abov=
e ports to indicate size, avail-
 able depths and important terminal facilities is i=
ncluded in Appendix No.
 2.
     &nb=
sp;    While the above tabulation lists the principal=
 ports, it should be
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
            &nb=
sp;      _________<=
pre> realized that there are a large number of less des=
irable ports having
 available depths at low water of from 20 to 30 fee=
t and provided with satis-
 factory terminal facilities, which can be used in =
an emergency for landing
 troops or supplies.  Examples of this class of harbors are:   =
            &nb=
sp;  Pictou, N.S.
   =
            &nb=
sp;  Sydney, N.S.
   =
            &nb=
sp;  Canso, N.S.
   =
            &nb=
sp;  Gaspe', Quebec
   =
               Sorel, Quebec=
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
      -45-
 
   =
   The port of Montreal, favorably located at the head of =
ocean naviga-
 tion on the St. Lawrence and the foot of inland na=
vigation of the Great
 Lakes, is a natural shipping and railroad center.<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>  The port of Quebec is
 less favorable situated economically being more th=
an 100 miles northeast
 of Montreal. =
; Strategically, however, Quebec controls the commerce of Canada
 moving to or from the Atlantic seaboard.  Its possession by Blue would
 interrupt eastern rail and water communication bet=
ween England and the Mari-
 time Provinces and the rest of Canada.<=
/span>
   =
   The port of Halifax is one of the best harbors on the A=
tlantic Coast
 and the principal winter port of Eastern Canada.  The harbor has been ex-
 tensively developed by the Dominion government as =
a modern ocean terminal
 and naval base.&n=
bsp; It is fortified, though much of the armament is obsoles-
 cent.  In case of war with Red, Halifax would become of prime importance
 to Red as a naval base and as a debarkation point =
for overseas expeditions
 in case Blue controlled the St. Lawrence.  However, the routes available
 for a Red advance from Halifax into northeastern U=
nited States or towards
 Quebec and Montreal are quite difficult.
   =
   The port of Saint John, New Brunswick is similar in man=
y respects to
 the port of Halifax.  It is open throughout the year and equipped with the<=
/o:p>
 most modern terminal facilities, including one of =
the largest drydocks in
 the world.  =
It is an important shipping center for grain and dairy products.
 Due to the proximity of the port to the United Sta=
tes border and the fact
 that the principal rail connections (C.P. Ry.) pas=
ses through the state of
 Maine, the port would be of little use to Crimson =
or Red, at least in the
 early stages of war, provided Blue made any effort=
 to control this area.
   =
   The port of Vancouver, B.C. came into prominence with t=
he opening of
 the Panama Canal, providing an alternate route to =
that of the transcontinental
 railroads for grain, dairy, lumber and the other p=
roducts of western Canada
 to Europe.
   =
   The port of Victoria, on Vancouver Island, is similarly=
 situated,
 but due to the absence of rail connection with the=
 mainland is more concerned
 with passenger and mail traffic than with bulk com=
modities.  Esquimalt, two=
 miles west of Victoria, and the only Canadian nava=
l base on the west coast,
 is equipped with a large modern drydock, and affor=
ds good anchorage for the
 largest vessels.&=
nbsp; Consequently this area is of prime importance to Crimson.=
 With the closing of the Panama Canal to Red traffi=
c and the presence of
 Blue naval forces based on Honolulu, its commercia=
l value is largely des-
 troyed.  Assuming that Blue controls the St. Lawrence and cuts Crimson's
 eastern communication with Red, the areas importan=
ce is enhanced, although
 it remains a decidedly unsatisfactory outlet.  If Red should win control of=
 the Pacific steamship lanes, the area becomes of f=
irst importance to Red.
 All factors considered, it must be controlled by B=
lue.
   =
   The port of Prince Rupert is a first class harbor with =
modern terminal
 facilities and excellent and extensive anchorages.=
  It becomes of extreme
 importance to Crimson, if and when they are denied=
 the use of the southwest
 British Columbia ports, although, as in the case o=
f Vancouver, it affords
 a most unsatisfactory and hazardous route to Europ=
e.  Physical occupation
 of Prince Rupert harbor by Blue is not vital, but =
closing the port to ocean
 traffic should be effected.   =
   The port of Churchill, Manitoba now offers a good harbo=
r and limited
 but modern terminal facilities, affording a back d=
oor to the Prairie Provin-
 ces and, by way of Moosonee, Ontario, and the Temi=
skaming and Northern
 Ontario Railroad, with central and western Ontario=
.  Hudson Bay and James
 Bay are open to navigation only about 4 months of =
the year, but this condition
 is partially offset by the fact that the distance =
from the Prairie Provinces
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
     -46-
 
 to Europe, via Churchill is from 500 to 1000 miles=
 shorter than the rail-
 water route via Montreal.  In case Red is denied the use of the Atlantic
 or Pacific ports, or both, Churchill will afford a=
n outlet for grain and
 meat products from Ontario, Manitoba and Sasketche=
wan and an inlet for mili-
 tary supplies and troops from Europe unless the no=
rthern trade route through
 Hudson Strait is controlled by the Blue fleet, and=
 this is improbable.
   d. Air Transportation (Civil).
   _
   =
   During 1933 there were 90 commercial aircraft operators=
 in Canada.
 Their activities included forest file patrols, tim=
ber cruising, air photo-
 graphy, transportation of passengers, express and =
mail, etc.
   =
   To encourage a more widespread interest and knowledge o=
f aviation
 the Department of National Defense, since 1928, ha=
s issued two light air-
 planes and made certain grants to each of 23 flyin=
g clubs and a large air
 terminal has been built at St. Hubert, seven miles=
 south of Montreal and
 a terminal airdrome at Rimouski, Quebec for the re=
ception of trans-atlantic
 mails.
   =
   At the close of 1934 there were 101 air fields of all t=
ypes, 368
 civil aircraft and 684 licensed pilots in Canada.<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>  Some details of airports=
 in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia are given in a le=
tter from the Office of
 the Chief of Air Corps, herewith. (See inclosure F=
)
   e. Telephone and Telegraph.
   _
   =
   (1) Cables.
   =
       Six transoceanic cables have te=
rmini in Canada, five on the Atlantic
 and one on the Pacific.  The Atlantic cables are landed at Halifax, though<=
/o:p>
 several of them are routed through Newfoundland.  The Pacific cable lands
 at Vancouver from whence a cable also leads to the=
 United States.
   =
   (2) Radio.
   =
       A transoceanic commercial radio=
 beam service is carried on by a
 station at Drummondville, Quebec, with Australia, =
Great Britain and the
 United States.&nb=
sp; In 1932 a direct radio telephone circuit with Great Britain=
 was opened through the medium of this beam station=
.
   =
   (3) General.
   =
       Canada is well supplied with lo=
cal telephone, telegraph and radio
 service.
   =
       Interruption of Canada's trans-=
oceanic telegraph and radio service
 will seriously handicap Red-Crimson cooperation.
   6. Other Economic Factors.
   a. Agriculture.
   _
   =
   Agriculture, including stock raising and horticulture, =
is the chief
 single industry of the Canadian people.  Canada is not only self-sustaining,
 as far as food is concerned, but has a large exces=
s for export.  Food pro-<=
/o:p>
 duction is varied and so distributed throughout th=
e dominion that each
 section is practically self-sustaining and cutting=
 her off from the outside
 would would mere serve to deny her people certain =
luxuries, such as
 coffee, tea, sugar, spices and tropical fruit.
   =
   The Maritime Provinces are noted for their fruit and ve=
getable crop,
 particularly for the oat and potato crops of Princ=
e Edward Island and New
 Brunswick and apples in Nova Scotia.  Quebec and Ontario are mixed farming<=
/o:p>
 communities with the Niagara peninsula specializin=
g in fruit.  Manitoba,
 Saskatchewan and Alberta are the principal wheat p=
roducing centers, with
 other grains and stock raising of increasing impor=
tance.  The rich valleys<=
/o:p>
 of British Columbia produce apples, other fruit an=
d vegetables.
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
      -47-
 
   b. Forests.
   _
   =
   The principal forests are in the provinces of British C=
olumbia, Ontario,
 Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.  The manufacture of lumber, lath,
 shingles and other products such as paper pulp, is=
 the second most important
 Canadian industry.
   c. Mineral Resources.
   _
   =
   Canada is one of the greatest mineral producing countri=
es of the world.
 Nova Scotia, British Columbia, Quebec, Ontario, Al=
berta and the Yukon Ter-
 ritory contain the chief mining districts.  The following summary notes
 pertinent facts concerning minerals of primary mil=
itary importance.
   =
   Aluminum.  Aluminum was the 16th ranking Canadian export in 1934. Large quantities of bauxite, the principal source =
of supply were imported
 from the United States.
   =
   Coal.
   =
       There are enormous deposits of =
coal in Canada, largely in Nova
 Soctia and New Brunswick, in the east and in Alber=
ta, Saskatchewan and
 British Columbia in the west.  Due mainly to the distance of the fields from
 the manufacturing and industrial centers, about 50=
% of the coal consumed
 is imported from the United States, via the Great =
Lakes.  Statistics for
 the calendar year 1933 show:   =
       Produced:   =
         Nova Scotia        &n=
bsp;      6,340,790 tons<=
/pre>   =
         New Brunswick        =
       314,681  "
   =
         Manitoba         =
;             <=
/span>3,036  "=
   =
         Saskatchewan        &=
nbsp;       903,776  "
   =
         Alberta         =
;          4,748,074  "<=
pre>   =
         British Columbia       &nb=
sp;  1,484,653  &q=
uot;
   =
         Yukon Territory       &nbs=
p;         638  "
    =
;      Imported:   =
         From United States<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>        =
8,865,935 tons
   =
         From United Kingdom=
       1,942,875  "=
   =
       Total - - - - - - .............=
...............22,265,235 tons.
 (see slide 14855)
   =
       In case of war with the United =
States, Canadas coal imports from
 this country would be cut off and her railroads an=
d industrial activities
 seriously handicapped.  If Blue controlled the Quebec area and Winnipeg,
 Canada's railroads and industries dependent upon &=
quot;steam power" would be
 crippled.
   =
   Copper.
   =
       The world production of copper =
in 1933 was (in short tons):
   =
         Canada        149=
,992      =
Mexico      =
   43,900
   =
         Rhodesia      144,954      Peru        &n=
bsp;  28,000
   =
         Belgian Congo  73,409      Spain and )   =
         Chile         =
179,200      Portugal  )    34,720
   =
         Japan          <=
/span>75,459     =
 United States 196,190
   =
       Canada's production was distrib=
uted approximately as follows:
   =
         Province         =
;          Tons
   =
      &nbs=
p;  ________  &=
nbsp;           &nbs=
p;    ____
   =
         Quebec         =
;            =
35,000 Eastern Townships
   =
         Ontario         =
;           72,700=
 Sudbury area
   =
         Manitoba         =
;          19,000 Flin =
Flon
   =
         Saskatchewan        &=
nbsp;       1,600
   =
         British Columbia       &nb=
sp;   21,600 Western Manitoba
=
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
      -48-
 
   =
   Iron and Steel.
   =
      Canada ranks seventh among the nation=
s as a producer of iron and
 steel but only a small percentage of her productio=
n is derived from domestic
 ores, in view of the abundant supply of higher gra=
de ores in Newfoundland
 and Minnesota.&nb=
sp; The Wabana section of Newfoundland contains the largest
 known single deposit of iron ore in the world.  There are large iron ore
 deposits in Quebec, northern Ontario and British C=
olumbia but for various
 reasons they are handicapped for blast furnace tre=
atment.  Iron and steel
 are produced in Nova Scotia (Sydney) and in Ontari=
o.  Iron ore is obtained<=
/o:p>
 from the Mesabi Range in Minnesota, via the Great =
Lakes and from Newfound-
 land. (See slide 14856)  The bulk of iron and steel products, however, are<=
/o:p>
 imported, principally from the United States and t=
he United Kingdom.
   =
   Lead.
   =
      &nbs=
p;Lead is obtained in Canada largely from deposits in British Columb=
ia,
 the largest porting being exported to England.
   =
   Nickel.
   =
       The world production of nickel =
in 1933 was about 50,736 tons, of
 which about 82% originated in the Sudbury district=
, north of Georgian Bay
 in Ontario. =
 The remainder came chiefly from New Caledonia (Fr.).  A new
 deposit of nickel was recently discovered in north=
ern Saskatchewan but has
 not yet been worked.
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'>   =
       Nickel is necessary to industry=
 and indispensable in war.  Co=
ntrol
 of the Sudbury mines, in case of war, is therefor =
of vital importance.
   =
   Petroleum.
   =
       The production of crude oil or =
petroleum in Canada during 1934
 amounted to 1,417,368 barrels, principally from th=
e Turner Valley field in
 Alberta.  A small amount is also obtained from wells near Monkton, New
 Brunswick and in southwest Ontario, between Lake H=
uron and Lake Erie.
 Considerable quantities are also imported from the=
 United States.
   =
   Zinc.
   =
       Canada ranks fourth among the w=
orlds producers of zinc.  Her =
out-
 put in 1934 totaled 298,579,531 pounds.  The principal producing mines are<=
/o:p>
 located in the Kootenay district of British Columb=
ia and near Flin-Flon
 in northwest Manitoba.  Approximately 2/3 of the zinc exported goes to Great
 Britain.
   d. Manufacturing.
   _
   =
   (1) General.
   =
       Canada is the second largest ma=
nufacturing country in the British
 Empire, with Ontario and Quebec the most important=
 industrial centers.  The=
 relative standing of the various provinces during =
1933, based on the value
 of products manufactured, was approximately as fol=
lows:
   =
            &nb=
sp; Ontario    =
         $1,000,000,000.
   =
            &nb=
sp; Quebec    &=
nbsp;      =
;      650,000,000.<=
/pre>   =
            &nb=
sp; British Columbia *  &=
nbsp;  146,500,000.
   =
            &nb=
sp; Manitoba    =
;            =
91,000,000.
   =
            &nb=
sp; Alberta    =
             55,000,000.
   =
            &nb=
sp; Nova Scotia   &n=
bsp;         53,000,000.
   =
            &nb=
sp; New Brunswick   =
        45,000,000.
   =
            &nb=
sp; Saskatchewan   &=
nbsp;        36,000,000.
   =
            &nb=
sp; Prince Edward Island  =
;   3,000,000.
   =
     *Includes Yukon Territory=
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
      -49-
 
   =
       The principal industries ranked=
 according to gross value of
 products (1932) are:
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'>   =
        Pulp and Paper         =
;        $123,415,492.=
   =
        Central Electrical Statio=
ns     117,532,=
081.
   =
        Non-ferrous metal smeltin=
g      100=
,561,297.
   =
      &nbs=
p; Slaughtering and meat packing    92,366,137.
   =
        Flour and food mills        =
;     83,322,099.
   =
        Butter and Cheese        &n=
bsp;       80,395,887.
   =
        Petroleum Products        &=
nbsp;      70,268,265.   =
        Bread and other bakery pr=
oduct   51,244,162.<=
/o:p>
   =
        Cotton yarn and cloth       &nbs=
p;    51,197,628.
   =
        Printing and publishing       &n=
bsp;  50,811,968.
   =
        Clothing factory, women's=
       =
 44,535,823.
   =
        Automobiles.         =
;            =
42,885,643.
   =
        Rubber goods.         =
;           41,511=
,556.
   =
        Hosiery and knitted goods=
       =
 40,997,210.
   =
        Sawmills.         &nbs=
p;            &=
nbsp; 39,438,057.
   =
   (2) Munitions.
   =
       (a) Aircraft.=
   =
           There a=
re at present six firms manufacturing aircraft as
 follows:
   =
             Canadian-Vickers...............Montreal, Que.<=
pre>   =
             De Haviland....................Toronto, Ont.
   =
             Curtis Reid....................Cartierville, Que.   =
             Fairchild......................Longueuil, Que.=
   =
             Boeing.........................Vancouver, B.C.=
   =
             Ottawa Car Mfg. Co.............Ottawa, Que.
   =
           Aero en=
gine factories have been established by:
   =
             Armstrong-Siddeley Motors Co. at Ottawa, Que.<=
pre>   =
             Aero Engines of Canada at Montreal, Que.
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'>   =
             Canadian Pratt-Whitney Aircraft Co. at Longueuil, Que.
   =
       (b) Miscellaneous.
   =
             During the World War Canada demonstrated her ability to
 divert her peace time industries to the production=
 of munitions, when she
 manufactured and exported large quantities of shel=
ls, fuses, cartridge
 cases, explosives, gun forgings, machine guns and =
small arms ammunition.
 This production could not be obtained in case of w=
ar with Blue but some
 munitions could be produced if her factories were =
free to operate and raw
 materials were available.  The government arsenal at Lindsey, Ont., is
 equipped to produce small arms ammunition and the =
arsenal at Quebec manu-
 factures some small arms and artillery ammunition.=
   e. Commerce.
   _
   =
   Analysis of Canada's industry and resources indicate th=
at she has a
 sufficiency or surplus of certain raw materials bu=
t a deficiency of others.
 The more important of these materials are as follo=
ws:
   =
   (1) Sufficiency or surplus;
   =
       Arsenic, asbestos, cadmium, cob=
alt, copper, feldspar, fish oil,
 fluospar, foodstuffs, furs, gold, graphite, gypsum=
, lead, leather, magnesium,
 mica, nickel, silver, talc, wood and zinc.
   =
   (2) Deficiency;
   =
       Aluminium, antimony, bauxite, b=
arytes, camphor, chromite, coal,
 cotton, flax, hemp, iron, jute, kaolin, manganese,=
 mercury, nitrates,
 phosphate, petroleum, opium, quinine, rubber, silk=
, sugar, sulphur, tea,
 tin, tobacco and wool.
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
      -50-
 
   7. Combat Estimate.
   a. All matters pertaining to the defense of Canada are under a Department=
   _
 of National Defense (Act of Jan. 9, 1923) with a m=
inister of National De-
 fense at the head.  A Defense Council has been constituted to advise the
 Minister.
   b. The Navy has an authorized complement of 104 officers and 812 men, a
   _
 large majority serving under 7 year enlistments.  In addition certain spec-=
 ialists are loaned from the British Royal Navy.  The Reserve consists of
 from 70 to 113 officers and from 430 to 1026 men r=
ecruited from sea-faring
 personnel.
   =
   The ships of the Royal Canadian Navy are:
 
 Built  =
  Class    =
; Displacement  Name       &nb=
sp;  Location   =
;  Status   Armament
 1931  Destroyer     =
1337 tons    Saguena=
y    Halifax, N.S. I=
n comm.  4-4.7"
 1931  &=
nbsp;  "   =
;       1337  "  &nb=
sp;   Skenna  &=
nbsp;   Esquimalt,B.C. "   "  =
  4-4.7"
 1919  &=
nbsp;  "   =
;        905  " &nbs=
p;    Champlain =
;  Halifax, N.S.  =
"   "    3-4"
 1919   =
  "        &nbs=
p;  905  "      Vancouv=
er   Esquimalt,B.C. "=
;   "    3-4" 1918  Mine Sweeper   360  "      Armentieres Esquimalt,B.C. "=
;   "
 1918   =
"     "     &nb=
sp; 360  "      Festubert   Halifax, N.S.  " reserve<=
pre> 1918   =
"     "     &nb=
sp; 360  "      Ypres       Halif=
ax, N.S.  "   "
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'> 
   c. Army.
   _
   =
   (1) Personnel: Estimated Strength (by G-2):<=
/span>
   =
            &nb=
sp;            Organized Forces.
   =
            &nb=
sp;            ________________
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
            &nb=
sp; Active    &=
nbsp;   Reserve &nbs=
p;   Total
   =
      &nbs=
p;            &=
nbsp;           &nbs=
p;       ______        _______     _____
 Permanent Active Militia           &n=
bsp;       403           =
           403
   =
   Officers  &n=
bsp;            =
;            &n=
bsp;  403   &nb=
sp;            =
      403
   =
   Men   &=
nbsp;           &nbs=
p;            &=
nbsp;     3300&=
nbsp;           &nbs=
p;       3,300=
 Non Permanent Active Militia   =
   Officers  &n=
bsp;            =
;            &n=
bsp;            =
;   6,911  &nbs=
p;  6,911
   =
   Men   &=
nbsp;           &nbs=
p;            &=
nbsp;           &nbs=
p;      44,962    44,962
 
 Reserves, Non-active
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'>   =
   Officers  &n=
bsp;                  &nb=
sp;            =
        10,000    10,000=
   =
   Men   &=
nbsp;           &nbs=
p;            &=
nbsp;           &nbs=
p;      30,000    30,000
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
            &nb=
sp;            __________________
   Total Organized    &=
nbsp;           &nbs=
p;       3,703         91,873    95,576 *
 Note: The Canada Year Book, 1935, pp 1114, gives p=
ermanent and non-permanent
 active militia 1934:
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'>   =
   Permanent Officers and men---------    3,760
   =
   Non-permanent officers and men-----  135,184
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
            &nb=
sp;  _________
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
       Total   138,941
   =
   The latest information concerning the distribution of t=
he active militia
 is shown on the accompanying map. (Incl. G)
   =
   (2) It is probable that the Non-permanent Active Militi=
a can be brought
 to a strength of 60,000 at M plus 15 and to full s=
trength of 126,000 in M
 plus 30 days.&nbs=
p; (Note: This estimate is approximately twice that of G-2,
 First Army.) New troops will begin to appear in 18=
0 days at the rate of
 50,000 monthly.
   d. Air Service.
   _
   =
   The Royal Canadian Air Force operates under a directora=
te in the office
 of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
   =
        Strength (Dec. 1, 1934)
   =
             Active:
   =
            &nb=
sp;  Officers   =
;       117
   =
            &nb=
sp;  Men    &nb=
sp;          664
   =
             Reserve:
   =
            &nb=
sp;  Officers   =
;        38   =
            &nb=
sp;  Men   &nbs=
p;           236
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
      _____
   =
            &nb=
sp;          Total   1,055 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
       -51-
 
   =
   The equipment consists of some 84 combat planes with pr=
obably 20 on
 order. (G-2 estimate)  The Armaments Year Book, League of Nations, gives
 a total of 166 planes of all kinds and the Statesm=
an Year Book, 1935 gives
 189 planes of all kinds.  It is probable that about one squadron of pursuit=
 and one squadron of observation could be organized=
 for immediate service.
   e. Comment.
   _
   =
   The location of Canada's industry and population along =
a narrow extent
 front facing the northern United States border and=
 her relatively weak
 military and naval forces, widely dispersed, will =
necessitate a defensive
 role until Red forces are landed.  The promptness and effectiveness of
 British aid must depend upon suitable debarkation =
points on Canada's east
 coast.  The West Coast does not favor overseas operations unless Red controls
 the Pacific, and even then is too remote from crit=
ical Blue areas.
   f. Red Reinforcements.
   _
   =
   Various estimates have been made of the size, compositi=
on, and time of
 placing Red reinforcements in Canada.  In any such estimate, the time factor
 is of prime importance but depends on an unknown q=
uantity, viz, "the period
 of strained relations."   =
   The following estimate is considered conservative:=
   =
            &nb=
sp;    Probable Enemy Forces in Canada
   =
            &nb=
sp;    _______________________________
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
       Empire<=
pre> Days after &=
nbsp;     Crimson      (Less Crimson)          &nb=
sp;      Total
=
   M Day      men      Div.     Men<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>        =
Div.     &=
nbsp;  Men   &n=
bsp;     Divisions
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'>   =
 15      <=
/span>25,000     =
 5     &nb=
sp; ---    &nbs=
p;   ---   =
;    25,000 &nb=
sp;          5
   =
 30      <=
/span>50,000     =
 5     &nb=
sp; ---    &nbs=
p;   ---   =
;    50,000 &nb=
sp;          5
   =
 60      <=
/span>50,000     =
 5     &nb=
sp; 126,000*    8       <=
/span>176,000     =
;      13
   =
 90      <=
/span>50,000     =
 5       203,000    13       253,000           13
   120      50,000      5       <=
/span>238,000    16<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>       288,000     &nbs=
p;     21
   150      50,000      5       <=
/span>255,000    16<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>       305,000     &nbs=
p;     21
   180      90,000      6       <=
/span>255,000    16<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>       345,000     &nbs=
p;     2=
2
 *Under certain conditions this force might be land=
ed in Canada by 30 M.
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
    Air Forces.
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
    __________
   =
   Red has available at once 48 squadrons of 10 to 12 plan=
es each.  The
 following forces can probably be landed in Canada =
as indicated.
   =
            &nb=
sp;       10 M         13 squadro=
ns.
   =
            &nb=
sp;       30 M         30 squadro=
ns.
   =
            &nb=
sp;       60 M         41 squadro=
ns.
   =
            &nb=
sp;       90 M         56 squadro=
ns.
   =
      &nbs=
p;            <=
/span>120 M     &=
nbsp;   74 squadrons.
   f. Conclusion.
   _
   =
   Crimson cannot successfully defend her territory agains=
t the United
 States (Blue).&nb=
sp; She will probably concentrate on the defense of Halifax
 and the Montreal-Quebec line in order to hold base=
s of operation for Red.
 Important secondary efforts will be made to defend=
 her industrial area and
 critical points on her transcontinental railroad l=
ines.
 
   8. Areas of Strategic Importance.
   =
   Analysis of the above data and discussion indicates cer=
tain areas which
 would become of considerable military importance i=
n the event of war with
 Red; namely,
   a. The Halifax Monkton St. John area, sometimes called the Martime
   _
   =
   Province area.
   b. The Montreal Quebec area, sometimes called the St. Lawrence Area.=
   _
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
       -52-
 
   c. The Great Lakes Area.
   _
   =
   (1) Niagara River Area.
   =
   (2) Sarnia-Windsor Area.
   =
   (3) Sault Ste. Marie Area.
=
   =
   (4) Sudbury Area.
   d. Winnipeg Area.
   _
   =
   (1) Winnipeg Ci=
ty and vicinity.
   =
   (2) Churchill, Manitoba Area.
   e. Vancouver-Victoria Area.
   _
   =
   (1) Ports of Vancouver and Victoria, area.
   =
   (2) Prince Rupert area.
   f. The reasons why these various areas are strategically important may be=
   _
 briefly summarized as follows:   =
   (1) Halifax Monkton St. John Area. (Maritime Province)<=
o:p>
   =
       The port of Halifax is the key =
point in the area, for while the
 port of St. John affords excellent facilities for =
an overseas expedition,
 it is so close to the United States border that un=
interrupted use by Red
 cannot be expected.  At Monkton, the peninsula connecting Nova Scotia and
 the mainland narrows to 14 miles.  With Halifax in possession of Crimson,
 this area affords the best defensive position to p=
revent any advance west-
 ward by Red.
   =
       (a). Control of Halifax by Blue=
 would:
   =
            1=
. Deny Red the only ice free port on the east coast and the
   =
            _=
 only ports, other than the St. Lawrence River port=
s, suitable as an overseas
 base.
   =
            2=
. Deny Red a prepared naval base on the east coast, from which
   =
            _=
 to operate against Blue naval forces or commercial=
 shipping.
   =
            3=
. Disrupt transoceanic submarine cable service between Crimson
   =
            _=
 and Red (except from Newfoundland) and between Cri=
mson and the West Indies.
   =
            4=
. Deny Red the use of certain air bases from which to operate
   =
            _=
 against northeastern United States.
   =
       (b) The control of Halifax by B=
lue, renders the Port of St. John
 and the Monkton area of secondary importance. Fail=
ing to secure Halifax
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
            &nb=
sp;      _______
 control of the Monkton area by Blue would:
 ___________________________   =
            1=
. Deny Red the use of St. John Harbor.
   =
            _=
   =
            2=
. Cut the lines of communication between the port of Halifax
   =
            _=
 and St. John and the remainder of Canada.
   =
            3=
. Place Blue directly across the only line of advance (by=
   =
            _=
 Red) from Halifax, on the shortest possible defens=
ive line.
   =
            4=
. Deny Red the use of certain air bases from which to operate
   =
            _=
 against northeastern United States.
   =
      &nbs=
p;     5. Give Blue the use of various smal=
l air fields at Monkton
   =
            _=
 and St. John.
   =
   (2) Montreal - Quebec Area (St. Lawrence River Area).
   =
       The ports of Montreal and Quebe=
c, while ice bound about four months
 of the year, still afford the best overseas base b=
oth as to facilities and
 location.  <=
/span>In addition the area is of great commercial importance in that
 it controls all lines of communication, by land, s=
ea and wire between in-
 dustrial and agricultural centers of Canada and th=
e eastern seaboard.  While
 Montreal has the larger and more commodius harbor =
and terminal facilities,
 Quebec, due to its physical location, is the key p=
oint of the area.
   =
      Control of this area by Blue would:
   =
      (a) Deny the use of all good St. Lawr=
ence River ports to Red.
   =
      (b) Cut all Canada, west of Quebec, v=
iz. industrial, and agricult-
 ural centers from the eastern seaboard.=
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
       -53-
 
   =
       (c) Deny Red and Crimson and ma=
ke available to Blue, the principal
 air bases in eastern Canada.   =
       (d) Deny Crimson coal and iron =
from Nova Scotia and Newfoundland as
 well as all imports via the Atlantic.
   =
   (3) The Great Lakes Area.
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'>   =
       This area comprises several cri=
tical points:
   =
       (a) Niagara River crossings and=
 Welland Canal.
   =
       (b) The waters connecting Lake =
Huron and Lake Erie.
   =
       (c) The great industrial area o=
f Canada - that part of Ontario lying
 between Lake Huron and Lakes Erie and Ontario.
   =
       (d) The waters connecting Lake =
Superior and Lake Huron, including
 the Soo Locks.
   =
       (e) The Sudbury nickel-copper m=
ines.
   =
   Control of the Great Lakes waterway is vital to Blue, f=
or the transporta-
 tion of iron ore, coal and grain and such control =
will necessitate occupation
 of a bridgehead covering the narrow boundary water=
s at and near the Soo
 Locks and in the Detroit Area.  The bridges over the Niagara River and the<=
/o:p>
 Welland Canal, connecting Lake Erie and Lake Ontar=
io are of importance to
 Blue for occupation of the Important industrial ar=
ea of the Niagara-Ontario
 peninsula.  =
The Welland Canal would become of importance as a line of communi-
 cation if Blue seized the peninsula.  While control of that area is of
 importance in crippling Crimson industry, it is pr=
obably of greater importance
 in denying the enemy Crimson and Red, a most conve=
nient base for operations
 against highly industrialized areas in the United =
States.
   =
   (4) Winnipeg Area.
   =
       Winnipeg is the nerve center of=
 the transcontinental railroad
 system.  Control by Blue will effectively separate eastern and western
 Canada and block transportation on men, grain, coa=
l, meat and oil to the
 east.  The completion of the Canadian National Railroad to Churchill<=
/span>
 Manitoba on Hudson Bay and the development of the =
port at Churchill provide
 an alternate route to Europe via Moosonee, Ont., a=
nd the Tem. and Ont.
 Ry. to northeast Ontario.  While the water route through Hudson Bay is only=
 open about four months of the year, and the ports =
are supplied by single
 track railroads, a considerable amount of traffic =
could be developed in an
 emergency.
   =
   (5) Vancouver - Victoria Area.<=
pre>   =
       As pointed out above, the ports=
 in this area are of secondary im-
 portance only under the conditions, which may reas=
onable be assumed.  How-<=
/o:p>
 ever, the area has certain military importance, du=
e to the naval base at
 Esquimalt, and is a possible outlet for the Canadi=
an plan provinces and
 western Canada.&n=
bsp; Its control by Blue would deny the enemy any base or outlet
 on the West Coast; simplify the problem of protect=
ing our shipping in the
 Puget Sound area; and interrupt cable communicatio=
n with the far east.
   =
       While Prince Rupert, B.C. has a=
n excellent harbor and terminal
 facilities with good rail connections leading east=
, naval blockade of this
 port would be readily possible, once the Vancouver=
 - Victoria area was in
 Blue control.
 
   9. Routes of Approach to the Areas of Strategic Importance.
   a. Halifax - Monkton - St. John Area (Maritime Provinces) (Incls. D &=
 H).
   _
   =
   Three possible routes of approach are considered, viz:<=
o:p>
   =
   (1) Via water from Boston or New York to Halifax or vic=
inity.
   =
   (2) Via water from Boston or New York to ports in Weste=
rn Nova Scotia
 and thence overland to Halifax.<=
/pre> 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
       -54-
 
   =
   (3) From Eastern Maine, via St. John and/or Fredericton=
 to Monkton -
 Amherst - Truro to Halifax.   b. Discussion of Routes of Approach to the Halifax - Monkton  - St. John
=
   _
 (Maritime Province) Area.<=
pre>   =
   (1) The distance by water from Boston to Halifax is 370=
 miles and from
 New York 600 miles, or in time about 30 or 50 hour=
s respectively.  The
 Port of Halifax is fortified and would undoubtedly=
 be mined.  A frontal
 attack would require a large force and would invol=
ve undesirable delays.
 Other developed ports of Nova Scotia on the Atlant=
ic are too distant from
   =
    _________
 Halifax and involve a long advance after a landing=
 is effected and this
 advance would be over difficult terrain.
   =
       A number of undeveloped bays al=
ong the east shore offer favorable
 conditions for landing operations and of these, St=
. Margarets Bay, the near-
 est, being some 16 miles by road west of Halifax, =
appears satisfactory.
 Deep water, with a minimum depth of 7 fathoms exte=
nds nearly to the head of
 the Bay, not far from Hubley and French Village, w=
hich are on an improved
 road and on the railroad from Yarmouth to Halifax.=
  The bay is protected
 from all winds and seas, except those from the sou=
th and is of sufficient
 size to harbor any fleet required for the expediti=
on.  Tidal range is the
 same as at Halifax, 6 to 6 1/2 feet.  There are numerous small but adequate=
 boat and barge landings on the west, north and eas=
t shore of the bay, from
 whence improved roads lead to the main highway.
   =
       The highway Hubbard - French Vi=
llage - Hubley - Halifax is 18
 feet wide, of macadam, with east grades and with c=
oncrete bridges capable
 of carrying heavy artillery and tanks.  The railroad is single track,
 standard gauge and parallels the road.  It has rather heavy grades and is<=
/o:p>
 of light construction.
   =
       Rocky wooded hills rise rather =
steeply to a height of 200 to 400
 feet all around St. Margarets Bay, but the roads a=
re within the 50 foot
 contour and the terrain between the roads and the =
water is greatly rolling.
 The main highway French Village - Halifax, runs th=
rough low rocky hills
 and movement off the roads by wheeled vehicles wou=
ld be practically im-
 possible.
   =
   (2) The ports on the western shore of Nova Scotia off t=
he Bay of Fundy
 are subjected to extremely high tides - 20 to 25 f=
eet, and generally afford
 only limited terminal facilities and have depths g=
enerally inadequate for
 docking transports.  Tidal currents are strong.=
  From Windsor, on the Avon
 River, to Halifax, there is one improved road and =
a branch of the Canadian
 Northern Railroad.  The distance is about 50 miles, with high ground and good
 defensive positions in the center of the island.  As a route of approach to=
 Halifax it is considered inferior to the route fro=
m St. Margarets Bay.
   =
   (3) The All Land Route via Eastern Maine.
   =
       This route involves an advance =
from the Maine border of approximately
 320 miles over difficult terrain.  The St. Johns River, rising near the border
 of northern Maine, flows south just east of the Ma=
ine - New Brunswick border
 to Woodstock, thence generally southeast through F=
redericton to St. John.  It
 is navigable from the mouth to the falls some dist=
ance above Woodstock, N.B.
 The average tidal range at St. John is 20 1/2 feet=
, decreasing up stream.  The
 river is crossed by a highway and a railroad bridg=
e at Fredericton, each
 nearly 1/2 mile long.  Two other bridges, a cantilever railroad bridge and a
 suspension bridge span the river about one mile ab=
ove the city of St. John.
 There are numerous ferries operating alone the riv=
er.  It is apparent that<=
/o:p>
 the St. John River is a serious obstacle to any ad=
vance overland from
 Maine.  While the St. John could be bridged, such operations would
 result in considerable delay. 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
      -55-
 
   =
       The railroad and road nets avai=
lable are shown on Inclosures B,
 C and D.  They are reasonably adequate for a force of the size probably
 required for this operation.   =
   (4) Conclusion.
   =
       If Halifax is to be captured wi=
thout the use of large forces and
 expenditure of considerable time and effort, it mu=
st be accomplished promptly
 before Red reinforcements can be landed or Crimson=
 organize for its defense.
 Any advance overland from Maine would eliminate al=
l elements of surprise and
 make the capture extremely difficult - a major ope=
ration.
   =
       An overseas expedition is one o=
f the most uncertain of military
 operations, and with the Red fleet on guard in the=
 North Atlantic, with
 Red's immediate military objective the retention o=
f a base in eastern
 Canada for future operations against Blue, a joint=
 operation against Halifax
 must be promptly and perfectly executed to assure =
any hope of success.  This
 route is considered the best but existing conditio=
ns at the time, may make
 this route impracticable, and the all land route n=
ecessary.
   c. The St. Lawrence Area. (Quebec - Montreal)
   _
   =
   The only practicable routes of advance for Blue, into t=
his area, are
 from northern New York, New Hampshire and Vermont =
and from northwest Maine.
 (See map) (Incl. K)
   =
   (1) Rivers.
   =
       (a) The St. Lawrence River flan=
ks the left side of all routes of
 approach to Quebec.  From Montreal to Three Rivers it flows through an
 alluvial plain, with the south bank 25 to 75 feet =
above the river.  Below
 Three Rivers the banks increase steadily in height=
 to Quebec, where they are
 140 to 175 feet high. The normal rise and fall of =
the river above the tidewater
 is 10 feet but this maybe doubled by ice jams.  Tidal range reaches a=
 maximum of 18 feet at Quebec, and practically disa=
ppears at Richelieu Rapids
 40 miles above Quebec. The river above Quebec is o=
bstructed by ice from
 November to April but ice breakers can get through=
.  The river from Quebec<=
/o:p>
 to Montreal, generally about 1/2 to 2 miles wide (=
except at Lake St. Peter)
 is navigable on a 30' draft to Montreal.  The distance from Quebec to Mon-<=
/o:p>
 treal is 160 miles.
   =
           In the =
area south of the St. Lawrence, between Quebec and Mon- treal, are several rivers of importance which will=
 naturally influence any
 plans for an advance on Quebec, viz:
   =
            &nb=
sp;          Richelieu =
River
   =
            &nb=
sp;          St. Franci=
s River
   =
            &nb=
sp;          Nicolet Ri=
ver
   =
            &nb=
sp;          Becancour =
River
   =
            &nb=
sp;      &=
nbsp;   Chaudiere River
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'>   =
            &nb=
sp;          Etchemin R=
iver
   =
           Other s=
treams will create obstacles of lesser importance.<=
pre>   =
       (b) The Richelieu River flows n=
orth from Lake Champlain to enter
 the St. Lawrence about 35 miles north of Montreal.=
  It is navigable on a
 6 1/2 foot draft throughout its length.=
   =
       (c) The St. Francis River rises=
 in St. Francis Lake some 50 miles
 northwest of Jackman, Maine.  It flows southwest to Lennoxville, Quebec,
 where it turns sharply northwest to flow into the =
St. Lawrence (Lake St.
 Peter).  Headwaters are controlled.  The regulated flow is some 3000 feet
 per second or more, with an average fall of 6.6 fe=
et per mile. It is not
 fordable below Sherbrooke.=
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            -56-
 
   =
       (d) The Nicolet River rises in =
Nicolet Lake, 8 miles west of Lake
 Alymer, and flows generally northwest to empty int=
o the St. Lawrence at the
 east end of Lake St. Peter.  The average low water flow is about 2000 feet<=
/o:p>
 per second. Banks in the upper reaches - hilly woo=
ded terrain - are steep
 and from 200 to 500 feet higher.  The average fall is about 21 feet per mile
 but there are a number of dams.  From Arthabaska to Lake St. Peter the stream
 flows through a flat open country, with banks 25 f=
eet high or less, except
 for a gorge starting about 4 miles north of St. Cl=
othilda and ending 3 miles
 from Lake St. Peter.  The river is not a serious obstacle but there are many
 swampy areas between it and the Becancour River.
   =
       (e) The Becancour River rises a=
bout 5 miles northwest of Lake St.
 Francis and flows north, then southwest, then nort=
hwest to enter the St.
 Lawrence a few miles below Three Rivers, Que.  The lower reaches of the
 river, below the vicinity of Lyster, Que, flows th=
rough generally flat country
 of gentle slope.&=
nbsp; The stream averages 300 to 400 feet wide and is fordable<=
/o:p>
 at few places.&nb=
sp; From Maddington Falls to within 3 miles of the St. Lawrence=
 the river flows through a narrow gorge 100 to 250 =
feet below the surrounding
 flat country.&nbs=
p; The river is not a serious obstacle to an advance on Quebec,=
 by reason of the general direction of flow in its =
lower reaches and the
 characteristics of the country.<=
/pre>   =
       (f) The Chaudierre River rises =
in Lake Megantic, about 45 miles
 west of Jackman, Maine and flows generally north i=
nto the St. Lawrence, op-
 posite Quebec.&nb=
sp; From Lake Megantic to Hersey Mills, it flows swiftly between
 steep banks in a narrow valley.  The adjacent terrain is rugged and heavily=
 timbered.  <=
/span>From St. George to Valley Junction the valley widens materially<=
/o:p>
 and the country is less rugged.  Below Valley Junction the river flows through
 gentle undulating country between relatively low b=
anks.  The Chaudiere is a=
 strong swift stream with an average discharge of o=
ver 4000 feet per second.
 The width varies from 200 feet at St. George to 40=
0 feet or more in the lower
 reaches.  From St. Maxine to the St. Lawrence it is 600 to 1500 feet wide.<=
/o:p>
 This river must be considered a serious obstacle.<=
o:p>
   =
       (g) The Etchemin River rises in=
 Lake Atchemin and flows northwest
 into the Chaudiere.  It is 200 to 300 feet wide in the lower reaches, with<=
/o:p>
 banks generally high and steep.  It forms a considerable obstacle.
   =
   (2) Terrain.
   =
       The southerly portion of the ar=
ea bordering on the United States,
 east of the Richelieu River, is hilly verging on m=
ountainous (up to 3000').
 The Notre Dame Mountains extend the Green Mountain=
s of Vermont in the form
 of a series of ridges, gradually decreasing in ele=
vation from Lake Champlain
 northeast to the meridian of Quebec, thence northe=
ast parallel to the St.
 Lawrence.  <=
/span>From the St. Lawrence the terrain rises smoothly and gradually
 toward the southeast to the foothills of the Notre=
 Dame Mountains.  On the<=
/o:p>
 line Montreal Sherbrooke a serious of eight hills =
(wooded) rise sharply
 to heights varying from 800 to 1500 feet or more a=
bove the surrounding
 country.
   =
       In general the hills of the Que=
bec theatre are wooded, those below
 the 500 foot contour and east of the Becancour Riv=
er sparsely, while west
 of the river there are densely forested areas at i=
ntervals.
   =
   (3) Roads.
   =
       The main roads to Montreal lead=
 north from Plattsburgh, New York and
 Burlington, Vermont.  Quebec may be reached via routes No. 1 and 5, through=
 Sherbrooke, Que; via route No. 3 along the south b=
ank of the St. Lawrence;
 or via Montreal and the north bank of the St. Lawr=
ence.  The latter is the<=
/o:p>
 longest route and undoubtedly the most difficult.<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>  Another route is available
 from Jackman, Maine, via route No. 23 through Vall=
ey Junction.  The road
 net available is shown on inclosure No. "D&qu=
ot; and "K."
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
      &nbs=
p;-57-
 
   =
   (4) Railroads.
   =
       The railroads available are sho=
wn on inclosures "B" and "C."  They
 are entirely adequate for any probable movement ag=
ainst this area.
   =
   (5) Discussion of routes.
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'>   =
       (a) Northern New York - Vermont=
 to Montreal
   =
            R=
oads: No. 9 from Plattsburgh to St. Lambert and South Mon-
 treal.  Distance 69.2 miles, all paved.
   =
            &nb=
sp;      No. 7 from Burlington, Vt., via St=
. John, Que. to
 St. Lambert or South Montreal.  Distance 94.2 miles, all paved.  There is
 a bridge across the Richelieu River at St. Johns.<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>  There are two highway
 bridges across the St. Lawrence at Montreal.<=
/o:p>
   =
           Railroa=
ds: Delaware and Hudson - Albany to Montreal.
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'>   =
            &nb=
sp;         New York Central=
 - Malone to Montreal.
   =
            &nb=
sp;         Rutland and C.P.=
 - Burlington to Montreal.
   =
            &nb=
sp;         Central Vermont =
and C.N. Montpelier to Montreal.
   =
           Comment=
s: The terrain is favorable and no physical barrier=
 to the advance as far as the St. Lawrence, except =
the crossing of the Rich-
 elieu River, for a force moving from Vermont.  An advance on Quebec from
 Montreal is possible, but offers the longest route=
, with many rivers per-
 pendicular to the line of advance (down the St. La=
wrence) which offer
 excellent defensive positions.   =
       (b) Northern Vermont and New Ha=
mpshire to Quebec.
   =
             Physical features: The Richelieu River on the west and the<=
/span>
 Chaudiere and Etchemin Rivers on the east tend to =
delimit the zone of advance.
   =
           Roads:<=
o:p>
   =
             No. 5 - Newport, Vt. to Sherbrook then No. 7 to Valley
 Junction to the highway bridge on the St. Lawrence=
 and to Quebec, or via
 No. 23 from Scott Junction to Levis, Que and the f=
erry to Quebec.  Distance=
 212.5 miles from Newport, Vt.  All improved road, mostly gravel.  Some of
 the road through the hilly country is paved.  No. 5 from Sherbrooke via
 Victoriaville is an alternate route.
   =
             No. 23, Jackman, Maine - Valley Junction - Levis.  This dis-
 tance is 109 miles.  The road is improved and about 50% paved.  It is the
 shortest route.&n=
bsp; It crosses the Chauderie and Etchemin Rivers. There are
 numerous alternate routes and connecting roads.
   =
             Railroads:
   =
      &nbs=
p;         Canadian Pac=
ific - Newport to Quebec.
   =
            &nb=
sp;   Canadian Pacific - Jackman via Megantic to Quebec.
   =
            &nb=
sp;   Canadian National - Portland, Me., via Sherbrooke to=
 Quebec.
   =
             Comments:
   =
            &nb=
sp;   While the terrain in this sector is hilly verging on=
 the
 mountainous, with several defiles and river crossi=
ngs, it offers the short-
 est and best route of advance on Quebec.
 
   =
 d. The Great Lakes Area.
   =
 _
   =
     This area must be considered under the foll=
owing subdivisions, as the
 routes of approach vary, and approach must be made=
 from all of these direc-
 tions.
   =
         The Buffalo - Niaga=
ra River Area.
   =
         The Port Huron - De=
troit Area.
   =
         The Sault St. Marie=
 or Soo Locks - Sudbury Area.
   =
    (1) The Buffalo - Niagara River Area.<=
/span>
   =
          Bridges cross=
 the Niagara River at Buffalo (Peace Bridge);
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'> at Niagara Falls (suspension Bridge) and the (lowe=
r Arch Bridge) and at
 Lewiston, New York. "      "   "
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
    -58-
 
   =
        Roads: The road net appro=
aching the Niagara River from the
 United States and leading across the river into so=
uthern Ontario and through
 Hamilton to Toronto and Montreal, is one of the be=
st along the inter-
 national boundary and is entirely adequate for any=
 probably movement.
   =
        Railroads: The Canadian P=
acific and the Canadian National rail-
 roads have a network of railways connecting Buffal=
o with Toronto and points
 east.  Branch lines lead to all important parts of the Niagara peninsula.
   =
        Comment: The crossings ov=
er the Niagara River should be promptly
 secured to assure a line of advance into the Niaga=
ra Peninsula of Ontario.
 
   =
   (2) The Detroit - Port Huron Area.   =
        This area has much the sa=
me characteristics as the Buffalo
 Niagara River Area but beyond securing the crossin=
gs over the boundary
 waters, sufficient area to cover the Great Lakes w=
ater routes against
 Crimson interference is essential.
   =
      &nbs=
p; Crossings:
   =
           Ambassa=
dor Bridge - Detroit - Windsor.
   =
           Two tun=
nels (one railroad) Detroit - Windsor.
   =
           Numerou=
s ferries.
   =
        Railroads and roads: Ther=
e is an excellent railroad and road net
 available for any advance eastward from Detroit an=
d Port Huron.
   =
        Comment: The Ontario Peni=
nsula is of great industrial importance
 to Canada and a military area of great strategic v=
alue, as a base for air
 or land operations against the industrialized area=
s between Chicago and
 Buffalo.  Any Blue operations should advance via Buffalo - Niagara Falls and
 Port Huron - Detroit simultaneously.
 
   =
   (3) Sault Ste. Marie - Sudbury Area.<=
/pre>   =
        The best route of approac=
h to the Sudbury area, about 200 miles
 east of the Soo, is obviously via Sault St. Marie,=
 along the north shore
 of North Channel.=
  An operation along this route, automatically covers the<=
/o:p>
 Soo.  The Canadian Pacific railroad and one good gravel road leads east
 from the Soo.&nbs=
p; These provide ample facilities for supply of the probable
 force required.&n=
bsp; The southern flank of this line is protected by North
 Sound and the north flank by rough heavily wooded =
terrain entirely devoid
 of roads or other communications suitable for the =
movement of armed forces.
 
   =
   (4) Winnipeg Area.
   =
         The main route from=
 the United States to Winnipeg is north
 from Grand Forks and Crookston through Emerson.  A main road follows the
 west bank of the Red River, from Emerson into Winn=
ipeg.  A good hard sur-
 face road from Grand Forks and one from Crookston =
furnishes a suitable
 road net south of the border.  There are several secondary roads on both
 sides of the border to supplement the hard surface=
 roads.
   =
         The Canadian Pacifi=
c has two main lines extending north from
 the border, one leading from Fargo through Gretna =
along the west bank of
 the Red River, and one from Thief River Falls, thr=
ough Emerson along the
 east bank of the Red River.  The Canadian Northern has a line from Grand
 Forks through Emerson Junction to Winnipeg on the =
west bank of the Red
 River and another line connecting with Duluth and =
extending through
 Warroad to Winnipeg.
<=
span
  style=3D'color:black'>   =
         The best and only p=
racticable route of approach is obviously
 north from Grand Forks and Crookston.  The terrain is flat and open and
 offers no natural obstacles to an advance.
 
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
         -59-
 
   =
         Churchill, on Hudso=
n Bay, has rail connection by the Canadian
 National system at Hudson Bay Junction about 325 m=
iles northwest of Winni-
 peg.  The best and only route of approach to cut this line is along the
 railroad from Winnipeg.
 
   =
   (5) The Vancouver Area (Vancouver - Victoria) (See Incl=
. E & L) (Omitted)
   =
         The best practicabl=
e route to Vancouver is via Route 99 through
 Bellingham, a distance of 55 miles and over a pave=
d highway, through wooded
 and farming country.  A secondary and longer route lies about 15 miles fur-=
 ther to the east running through Sumas to strike t=
he highways running east
 from Vancouver at the meridian of Mission City.
   =
          The Grand Tru=
nk Railroad extending from Vancouver to Seattle fur- nishes a satisfactory rail service.
   =
          Victoria and =
Esquimalt, on the island of Vancouver can be reached by water only. &n=
bsp;Ferry service is maintained between Vancouver and Nanaimo on
 the east shore of the island, some 50 miles north =
of Victoria and between
 Vancouver, Burlingham and Port Angeles and Victori=
a.  The best route of ap-=
 proach is by water from Port Angeles, Washington.<=
o:p>
 
  IV. =
Conclusions:
   =
   ___________
   a That the critical areas of Canada are:
   _
   =
       (1) The Halifax-Monkton-St.John=
 Area (The Maritime Provinces).
   =
       (2) The St.Lawrence Area (Quebe=
c and Montreal).
   =
       (3) The Great Lakes Area.<=
/o:p>
   =
       (4) The Winnipeg Area.
   =
       (5) The Vancouver Area (Vancouv=
er and Victoria).
 
   =
 b. That the best routes of approach to these areas are:<=
/span>
   =
 _
   =
 To  (1) By joint opera=
tions by sea from Boston.
   =
     (2) From Northern New Hampshire-Vermont are=
a.
   =
     (3) (a) From Sault St. Marie and the Soo Lo=
cks Area.
   =
         (b) From Port Huron=
 - Detroit Area.
   =
     and (c) From the Buffalo-Niagara Falls Area=
.
   =
     (4) From Grand Forks-Crookston through Emer=
son.
   =
     (5) Along Puget Sound through Everett and B=
ellingham, supported
   =
            b=
y an attack by water in Puget Sound.
 
   =
 V. Recommendations.
   =
    _______________
   =
       None.
 
   VI. Concurrences.
   =
    ____________
   =
       The committee concurs in the fo=
regoing conclusions.
 
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
           CHARLES=
 H. JONES
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
           Major, =
Infantry,
   =
            &nb=
sp;            =
        Subcommittee Chairman.