US State DEPT. DISPATCH, VOLUME 6, NUMBER 10, MARCH 6, 1995

U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH

VOLUME 6, NUMBER 10, MARCH=
 6, 1995

PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISS=
UE:

1.  The Vital T=
radition of American Leadership in the World--President

Clinton =

2.  The United Stat=
es and Canada: Reaffirming the Partnership--President

Clinton 3.  Fact Sheets:  Canada 
--U.S.-Canada T=
rade 
--U.S.-Canada Environmental Issues 
--NAFTA: Key =
Provisions and Supplemental Agreements 
--U.S.-Canada Air Service=
s Agreement 
--Global Environmental Issues 
4.  Country Profile:  Canada 
5.  Maintaining the Instruments Of America's Global Leadershi=
p--
Secretary Christopher 
6.  U.S. Interests and Russian Reform--Deputy Secretary Ta=
lbott 
7.  American =
Eagle or Ostrich? The Case for The United States in the 
United N=
ations--Deputy Secretary Talbott 
8.  Department Statements 
--Suspending Arms Sales =
to Ecuador and Peru 
--President Clinton Applauds Ecuador-Peru Pe=
ace Declaration 
--Mexico To Take Action To Curb Violence Along U=
.S. Border 
9.  What=
's in Print--Foreign Relations Of the United States 
 
 
 <=
/pre>ARTICLE 1: 
 
The Vital Tradition of American Leadership in the World President Clinton 
Remarks to the Nixon Center for Peace an=
d Freedom Policy Conference, 
Washington, DC, March 1, 1995 [intr=
oductory remarks deleted] 
 =
;
I am honored to be here tonight. Just a month before he =
passed away, 
President Nixon wrote me the last letter I received=
 from him about his 
last trip to Russia. I told some people at t=
he time that it was the best 
piece of foreign policy writing I h=
ad received, which angered my staff 
but happened to be the truth=
. And, as with all of our correspondence and 
conversations, I wa=
s struck by the rigor of his analysis, the energy of 
his convict=
ions, and the wisdom of the practical suggestions that he 
made t=
o me. 
 
B=
ut more than the specifics of the letter, which basically argued for =
the imperative of the United States continuing to support political an=
d 
economic reform in Russia, I was moved by the letter's larger =
message--a 
message that ran throughout Richard Nixon's entire pu=
blic life and all 
of his prolific writings. President Nixon beli=
eved deeply that the 
United States simply could not be strong at=
 home unless we were strong 
and prepared to lead abroad. And tha=
t made a big impression on me.  
 
When =
I was running for President in 1992, even though there was this 
=
little sticker up on the wall of my campaign headquarters that said, =
"It's the economy, stupid," I always said in every speech th=
at we had to 
have two objectives: We had to restore the American=
 dream for all of our 
people, but we also had to make sure that =
we move into the next century 
still the strongest nation in the =
world and the world's greatest force 
for peace and freedom and d=
emocracy. 
 
Tonight, I want to talk about the vital tradition of American leadership=
 
and our responsibilities--those which Henry Kissinger mentioned=
 and 
those which President Nixon recognized so well. Our mission=
 especially I 
want to discuss--to reduce the threat of nuclear w=
eapons. 
 
Today, if we are going to be strong at home and lead abroad, we have to overcome what we all recognize, I think, is a dangerous and growin=
g 
temptation here in our own land to focus solely on the problem=
s we face 
here in America. I have tried to do it for the last tw=
o years. I look 
forward to working with this new Republican-led =
Congress in the next 
two, but not solely. 
 
There is a struggle now going=
 on between those of us who want to carry 
on the tradition of Am=
erican leadership and those who would advocate a 
new form of Ame=
rican isolationism--a struggle which cuts curiously 
across both =
party and ideological lines. If we are going to continue to 
impr=
ove the security and prosperity of all our people, then the 
trad=
ition of American leadership must prevail. 
 
We live in a moment of hope. We all kno=
w that. The implosion of 
communism and the explosion of the glob=
al economy have brought new 
freedoms to countries on every conti=
nent. Free markets are on the rise. 
Democracy is ascendant. The =
slogan says, "after victory."&nb=
sp; Today, more 
than ever before, people across the globe=
 do have the opportunity to 
reach their God-given potential. And=
 because they do, Americans have new 
opportunities to reach thei=
rs as well. 
 =
At the same time, the post-Cold War world has revealed a whole web of =
problems that defy quick or painless solutions--aggression of ro=
gue 
states, transnational threats like overpopulation and enviro=
nmental 
degradation, terrible ethnic conflicts, and economic dis=
location. But at 
the heart of all these complex challenges, I be=
lieve, lies an age-old 
battle for power over human lives--the ba=
ttle between the forces of 
freedom and tyranny, tolerance and re=
pression, hope and fear. The same 
idea that was under attack by =
fascism and then by communism remains 
under attack today in diff=
erent ways all across the world--the idea of 
the open society of=
 free people. 
 American leadership is necessary for the tide of history to keep run=
ning 
our way and for our children to have the future they deserv=
e. Yet, there 
are some who would choose escapism over engagement=
. The new 
isolationists oppose our efforts to expand free trade =
through GATT or 
NAFTA, through APEC and the Summit of the Americ=
as. They reject our 
conviction that democracy must be nurtured w=
ith investment and support--
a conviction that we are acting on f=
rom the former Soviet Union to South 
Africa. And some of them, b=
eing hypocritical, say that we must trumpet 
the rhetoric of Amer=
ican strength. At the same time, they argue against 
the resource=
s we need to bring stability to the Persian Gulf or to 
restore d=
emocracy to Haiti, or to control the spread of drugs and 
organiz=
ed crime around the world, or even to meet our most elemental 
ob=
ligations to the United Nations and its peacekeeping work. 
 
The new isolationists--=
both on the left and the right--would radically 
revise the funda=
mentals of our foreign policy that have earned 
bipartisan suppor=
t since the end of World War II. They would eliminate 
any meanin=
gful role for the United Nations which has achieved, for all 
of =
its problems, real progress around the world, from the Middle East to Africa. They would deny resources to our peacekeepers and even to our=
 
troops, and, instead, squander them on Star Wars. They would re=
fuse aid 
to the fledgling democracies and to all those fighting =
poverty and 
environmental problems that can literally destroy ho=
pes for a more 
democratic, more prosperous, more safe world.  
The new is=
olationists are wrong. They would have us face the future 
alone.=
 Their approach would weaken this country, and we must not let the 
ripple of isolationism that has been generated build into a tidal wave. =
 
If we w=
ithdraw from the world today, mark my words, we will have to 
con=
tend with the consequences of our neglect tomorrow and tomorrow and <=
pre>tomorrow. This is a moment of decision for all of us without regard to =
our party, our background, or our accent. This is a moment of de=
cision. 
 
The extraordinary trend toward democracy and free markets is not 
inevitable, and as we have seen recently, it will not proceed easily in <=
/pre>an even, uninterrupted course. This is hard work, and at the very=
 time 
when more and more countries than ever before are working =
to establish 
or shore up their own freedom in their fragile demo=
cracies, they look to 
us for support. At this time, the new isol=
ationists must not be allowed 
to pull America out of the game af=
ter just a few hours of debate because 
there is a modest price a=
ttached to our leadership. 
&nbs=
p;
We now know, as President Nixon recognized, that there =
must also be 
limits to America's involvement in the world's prob=
lems--limits imposed 
by clear-headed evaluation of our fundament=
al interests. We cannot be 
the world's policemen; we cannot beco=
me involved in every problem we 
really care about. But the choic=
e we make must be rooted in the 
conviction that America cannot w=
alk away from its interests or its 
responsibilities. 
=
 
That is why, from =
our first day in office, this Administration has 
chosen to reach=
 out, not retreat. From our efforts to open markets for 
America =
to support democracy around the world, to reduce the threat 
pose=
d by devastating weapons and terrorists, to maintaining the most 
effective fighting force in the world, we have worked to seize the <=
pre>opportunities and meet the obligations of this moment.

None of this could have=
 happened without a coalition of realists--people

in both Houses=
 of  Congress and, importantly=
, people from both parties;

people from coast to coast in our to=
wns and cities and communities who

know that the wealth and well=
-being of the United States depends upon

our leadership abroad. =
Even the early leaders of our republic who went

to great pains t=
o avoid involvement in great power conflicts recognized

not only=
 the potential benefits, but the absolute necessity of engaging

=
with the world.

 Before Abraham Lincoln was elected President, our farmers were sel=
ling 
their crops overseas. We had dispatched the trade mission a=
ll the way to 
Japan trying to open new markets--some problems do=
n't go away--and our 
Navy had already sailed every ocean. By the=
 dawn of this century, our 
growing political and economic power =
already imposed a special duty on 
America to lead--a duty that w=
as crystallized in our involvement in 
World War I. But after tha=
t war, we and the other great powers abandoned 
our responsibilit=
ies, and the forces of tyranny and hatred filled the 
vacuum, as =
is well-known. 
 After the Second World War, our wise leaders did not repeat that mistake. With the dawn of the nuclear age and the Cold War, and wi=
th the 
economies of Europe and Japan in shambles, President Trum=
an persuaded an 
uncertain and weary nation, yearning to shift it=
s energies from the 
front lines to the home front, to lead the w=
orld again. 
 =
A remarkable generation of Americans created and sustained alliances a=
nd 
institutions--the Marshall Plan, NATO, the United Nations, th=
e World 
Bank, the IMF--the things that brought a half century of=
 security and 
prosperity to America, to Europe, to Japan, and to=
 other countries all 
around the world. Those efforts and the spe=
cial resolve and military 
strength of our own nation held tyrann=
y in check until the power of 
democracy, the failures of communi=
sm, and the heroic determination of 
people to be free consigned =
the Cold War to history. Those successes 
would not have been pos=
sible without a strong, bipartisan commitment to 
America's leade=
rship. 
 
=
Senator Arthur Vandenburg's call to unite our official voice at the <=
pre>water's edge joined Republicans to Truman's doctrine. His impact was al=
l 
the more powerful for his own past as an isolationist, but as =
Vandenburg 
himself said, Pearl Harbor ended isolationism for any=
 realist. 
 
Today, it is Vandenburg's spirit that should drive our foreign policy and our politics. The practical determination of Senators Nunn and=
 Lugar 
to help Russia reduce its nuclear arsenal safely and secu=
rely; the 
support from Speaker Gingrich and Leader Gephardt, fro=
m Chairman 
Livingston and Representative Obey for aid to Russia =
and the New 
Independent States; the work of Senators Hatfield, L=
eahy, and McConnell, 
and Chairman Gilman, and Representative Ham=
ilton for peace in the Middle 
East; the efforts of Senator Warne=
r to restructure our intelligence--all 
these provide strong evid=
ence of the continuing benefits and vitality of 
leadership with =
bipartisanship.  If we continu=
e to lead abroad and work 
together at home, we can take advantag=
e of these turbulent times. But if 
we retreat, we risk squanderi=
ng all these opportunities and abandoning 
our obligations which =
others have entrusted to us and paid a very dear 
price to bring =
to us in this moment in history. 
 
I know that the choice to go forward in a lot of =
these areas is not easy 
in democracies at this time. Many of the=
 decisions that America's 
leaders have to make are not popular w=
hen they are made, but imagine the 
alternative. Imagine, for exa=
mple, the tariffs and barriers that would 
still cripple the worl=
d trading system for years into the future if 
internationalists =
coming together across party lines had not passed GATT 
and NAFTA=
. Imagine what the Persian Gulf region would look like today if 
=
the United States had not stepped up with its allies to stop Iraqi 
aggression. Imagine the ongoing reign of terror and the flood of <=
pre>refugees at our borders had we not helped to give democracy a second chance in Haiti. Imagine the chaos that might have ensued if we ha=
d not 
moved to help stabilize Mexico's economy. In each case, th=
ere was 
substantial and sometimes overwhelming majority opinion =
against what 
needed to be done at the moment. But because we did=
 it, the world has a 
better chance at peace and freedom. <=
pre>

But above all,=
 now I ask you to imagine the dangers that our children

and gran=
dchildren--even after the Cold War is over--can still face if we

do not do everything we can to reduce the threat of nuclear arms, to

curb the terrible chemical and biological weapons spreading around th=
e

world, to counter the terrorists and criminals who would put t=
hese

weapons into the service of evil. As Arthur Vandenburg aske=
d at   the

daw=
n of the nuclear age, after a German V-1 attack had left London in

flames and its people in fear, "How can there be isolation when men= can

devise weapons like that?"

President Nixon understood the wis=
dom of those words. His life spanned

an era of stunning increase=
s in humankind's destructive capacity--from

the biplane to balli=
stic missiles, from mustard gas to mushroom clouds.

He knew that=
 the atomic age could never be won, but could be lost. On

any li=
st of his foreign policy accomplishments, the giant steps he took

toward reducing the nuclear threat must stand among his greatest achievement. As President, I have acted on that same imperative. <= pre>

Over the past =
two years, the United States has made real progress in

lifting t=
he threat of nuclear weapons. Now, in 1995, we face a year of

pa=
rticular decision in this era--a year in which the United States will pursue the most ambitious agenda to dismantle and fight the spread of=

weapons of mass destruction since the atom was split.
We know that ours is an enormously complex an=
d difficult challenge.
There is no single policy, no silver bull=
et, that will prevent or
reverse the spread of weapons of mass d=
estruction, but we have no more
important task. Arms control mak=
es us not only safer, it makes us
stronger. It is a source of st=
rength. It is one of the most effective
insurance policies we ca=
n write for the future of our children.
Our Administration has focused on two dist=
inct but closely connected
areas--decreasing and dismantling exi=
sting weapons and preventing
nations or groups from acquiring we=
apons of mass destruction and the
means to deliver them. We have=
made progress on both fronts.
=
As the result of an agreement President Yeltsin and=
I reached, for the
first time in a generation Russian missiles =
are not pointed at our
cities or our citizens. We have greatly r=
educed the lingering fear of an
accidental nuclear launch. We pu=
t into force the START I Treaty with
Russia that will eliminate =
from both our countries delivery systems that
carry more than 9,=
000 nuclear warheads--each with the capacity to
incinerate a cit=
y the size of Atlanta.
START I--negotiated by two Republican Administrations and p=
ut into force
by this Democratic Administration--is the first tr=
eaty that requires the
nuclear powers actually to reduce their s=
trategic arsenal. Both our
countries are dismantling the weapons=
as fast as we can, and, thanks to
a far-reaching verification s=
ystem, including on-site inspections which
began in Russia and t=
he United States today, each of us knows exactly
what the other =
is doing. And, again, through the far-sighted program
devised by=
Senators Nunn and Lugar, we are helping Russia and the other
Ne=
w Independent States to eliminate nuclear forces in transport and
safeguard and destroy nuclear weapons and material.

Ironically, some of the chan=
ges that have allowed us to reduce the

world's stockpile of nucl=
ear weapons have made our non-proliferation

efforts harder. The =
breakup of the Soviet Union left nuclear materials

dispersed thr=
oughout the New Independent States. The potential for theft

of n=
uclear materials, therefore, increased. We face the prospect of

=
organized criminals entering the nuclear smuggling business. Add to this volatile mix the fact that a lump of plutonium the size of a soda =
can is 
enough to build a bomb, and the urgency of the effort to =
stop the spread 
of nuclear materials should be clear to all of u=
s. 
 
That=
 is why from our first day in office, we have launched an 
aggres=
sive, coordinated campaign against international terrorism and 
n=
uclear smuggling. We are cooperating closely with our allies, working with Russia and the other New Independent States, improving security =
at 
nuclear facilities, and strengthening multilateral export con=
trols. 
 
=
One striking example of our success is Operation Sapphire, the airlift of nearly 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium--enough to make <=
/pre>dozens of bombs from Kazakhstan to the United States for disposal=
. We 
have also secured agreements with Russia to reduce the uran=
ium and 
plutonium available for nuclear weapons, and we're seeki=
ng a global 
treaty banning the production of fissile material fo=
r nuclear weapons. 
 
Our patient, determined diplomacy also succeeded in convincing =
Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to sign the Non-Proliferation T=
reaty and give up 
the nuclear weapons left on their territory wh=
en the Soviet Union 
dissolved. One of our Administration's top p=
riorities was to assure that 
these new countries would become no=
n-nuclear nations, and now we are 
also achieving that goal.  
Because of =
these efforts, four potential suppliers of ballistic 
missiles--R=
ussia, Ukraine, China, and South Africa--have all agreed to 
cont=
rol the transfer of these missiles and related technology. Pulling 
back from the nuclear precipice has allowed us to cut U.S. defense expenditures for strategic weapons by almost two-thirds, a savings of=
 
about $20 billion a year--savings which can be shifted to vital=
 needs 
such as boosting the readiness of our armed forces, reduc=
ing the 
deficit, and putting more police on our own streets. By =
spending 
millions to keep or take weapons out of the hands of ou=
r potential 
adversaries, we are saving billions in arms costs an=
d putting it to 
better use. 
 
Now, in this year of decision, our ambition=
 for the future must be even 
more ambitious. If our people are t=
o know real lasting security, we have 
to redouble our arms contr=
ol, non-proliferation, and anti-terrorism 
efforts. We have to do=
 everything we can to avoid living with the 21st-
century version=
 of fallout shelters and duck-and-cover exercises to 
prevent ano=
ther World Trade Center tragedy. 
 
In just four days, we mark the 25th anniversary o=
f the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. Nothing is more important to pre=
vent the spread of nuclear 
weapons than extending the treaty ind=
efinitely and unconditionally. And 
that is why I have asked the =
Vice President to lead our delegation to 
the NPT conference this=
 April and to work as hard as we can to make sure 
we succeed in =
getting that indefinite extension. 
 
The NPT is the principal reason why scores of n=
ations do not now possess 
nuclear weapons; why the doomsayers we=
re wrong. One hundred and seventy-
two nations have made NPT the =
most widely subscribed arms limitation 
treaty in history for one=
 overriding reason; it is in their self-
interest to do so. Non-n=
uclear weapons states that sign on to the treaty 
pledge never to=
 acquire them. Nuclear weapons states vow not to help 
others obt=
ain nuclear weapons, to facilitate the peaceful uses of atomic 
e=
nergy, and to pursue nuclear arms control and disarmament--commitments I strongly reaffirm, along with our determination to attain universa=
l 
membership in the treaty. 
 
Failure to extend NPT indefinitely could op=
en the door to a world of 
nuclear trouble. Pariah nations with r=
igid ideologies and expansionist 
ambitions would have an easier =
time acquiring terrible weapons, and 
countries that have chosen =
to forego the nuclear option would then 
rethink their position; =
they would certainly be tempted to reconsider 
that decision.  
To further=
 demonstrate our commitment to the goals of the treaty, today 
I =
have ordered that 200 tons of fissile material, enough for thousands =
of nuclear weapons, be permanently withdrawn from the United States nuclear stockpile--two hundred tons of fissile material that will =
never 
again be used to build a nuclear weapon. 
 
A second key goal of our=
s is ratifying START II. Once in effect, that 
treaty will elimin=
ate delivery systems from Russian and American 
arsenals that car=
ry more than 5,000 weapons. The major reductions under 
START I, =
together with START II, will enable us to reduce by two-thirds 
t=
he number of strategic warheads deployed at the height of the Cold War. At my urging, the Senate has already begun hearings on START II, an=
d I 
am encouraged by the interest of the senators from both part=
ies in 
seeking quick action. I commend the Senate for the action=
 taken so far, 
and I urge again the approval of the treaty as so=
on as possible. 
 President Yeltsin and I have already instructed our experts to beg=
in 
considering the possibility after START II is ratified for ad=
ditional 
reductions and limitations on remaining nuclear forces.=
 We have a chance 
to further lift the nuclear cloud, and we dare=
 not miss it. 
 To stop the development of new generations of nuclear weapons, we mu=
st 
also quickly complete negotiations on a comprehensive test ba=
n treaty. 
Last month, I extended a nuclear testing moratorium th=
at I put into 
effect when I took office, and we revised our nego=
tiating position to 
speed the conclusion of the treaty while rea=
ffirming our determination 
to maintain a safe and reliable nucle=
ar stockpile. 
 We will also continue to work with our allies to fully implement the=
 
agreement we reached with North Korea--first to freeze, then to=
 
dismantle its nuclear program, all under international monitori=
ng. The 
critics of this agreement, I believe, are wrong. The dea=
l does stop 
North Korea's nuclear program, and it does commit Py=
ongyang to roll it 
back in the years to come. I have not heard a=
nother alternative proposal 
that isn't either unworkable or fool=
hardy, nor one that our allies in 
the Republics of Korea and Jap=
an--the nation's most directly affected--
would fail to support. =
 
If Nort=
h Korea fulfills its commitment, the Korean Peninsula and the 
en=
tire world will clearly be less threatened and more secure. The NPT, =
START II, the comprehensive test ban treaty, the North Korean Agreed <=
/pre>Framework: They top our agenda for the year ahead. There are othe=
r 
critical tasks we also face if we want to make every American =
more 
secure, including winning Senate ratification of the Chemic=
al Weapons 
Convention, negotiating legally binding measures to s=
trengthen the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, clarifyin=
g the ABM Treaty so as 
to secure its viability while permitting =
highly effective defenses 
against theater missile attacks, conti=
nuing to support regional arms 
control efforts in the Middle Eas=
t and elsewhere, and pushing for the 
ratification of conventiona=
l weapons which, among other things, would 
help us to reduce the=
 suffering caused by the tens of millions of anti-
personnel mine=
s which are plaguing millions of people all across this 
world. <=
/pre> 
My frien=
ds, this is a full and challenging agenda. There are many 
obstac=
les ahead. We cannot achieve it if we give in to a new 
isolation=
ism, but I believe we can do no less than make every effort to 
c=
omplete it. 
 =
Tonight, let us remember what President Nixon told the joint session o=
f 
Congress when he returned from his historic trip to Moscow in =
1972. He 
said: 
 =
;
We have begun to check the wasteful and dangerous spiral=
 of nuclear 
arms. Let us seize the moment so that our children a=
nd the world's 
children can live free of the fears and free of t=
he hatreds that have 
been the lot of mankind through the centuri=
es. 
 
Now=
 it is within our power to realize the dream that Richard Nixon 
=
described over 20 years ago. We cannot let history record that our 
generation of Americans refused to rise to this challenge; that we withdrew from the world and abandoned our responsibilities when we kn=
ew 
better than to do it; that we lacked the energy, the vision, =
and the 
will to carry this struggle forward--the age-old struggl=
e between hope 
and fear. 
 
So let us find inspiration in the great tradit=
ion of Harry Truman and 
Arthur Vandenburg--a tradition that buil=
ds bridges of cooperation, not 
walls of isolation; that opens th=
e arms of Americans to change instead 
of throwing up our hands i=
n despair; that casts aside partisanship and 
brings together Rep=
ublicans and Democrats for the good of the American 
people and t=
he world. That is the tradition that made the most of this 
land,=
 won the great battles of this century against tyranny, and secured <=
pre>our freedom and our prosperity. 
 
Above all, let's not forget that these efforts=
 begin and end with the 
American people. Every time we reduce th=
e threat that has hung over our 
heads since the dawn of the nucl=
ear age,      we help to ensure that--
from the far stretches of the Aleuti=
ans to the tip of the Florida Keys--
the American people are more=
 secure. That is our most serious task and 
our most solemn oblig=
ation. 
 
=
The challenge of this moment is matched only by its possibility. So let us do our duty.   (###) 
 
=
 
 
ARTICLE 2: 
 
The United States and Canada:  Reaffirming the Partnership President Clinton 
Remarks to the Canadian Parliament, Ot=
tawa, Canada, February 23, 1995 
 
Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Chretien, Mr. Speaker =
of the Senate, Mr. 
Speaker of the House of Commons, honorable se=
nators and members of the 
House of Commons, distinguished member=
s of the diplomatic corps, ladies 
and gentlemen: 
 
I have pondered for so=
me time the differences between the Canadian 
political system an=
d the American one, and when the Prime Minister 
pointed out the =
unanimous resolution you passed yesterday, I realized 
that, in o=
ne respect, clearly, you are superior. We do not control the 
wea=
ther in Washington, DC, and I am grateful that you do. I also thank <=
pre>the Prime Minister for his history lesson. I have never believed in the=
 
iron laws of history so much as I do now.  
 =
I thank the Prime Minister and all of you for welcoming m=
e to this 
magnificent capital city. The Prime Minister first cam=
e to this chamber 
to represent the people of Canada when Preside=
nt Kennedy was in the 
White House. I resent that because when Pr=
esident Kennedy was in the 
White House, I was in junior high sch=
ool--and now the Prime Minister has 
less gray hair than I do. He=
 does, in spite of the fact that since that 
time he has occupied=
 nearly every seat in his nation's cabinet. The 
first time I met=
 him, I wondered why this guy could not hold down a job. 
I can t=
ell you this: We in the United States know that his service to 
t=
his nation over so many years has earned him the gratitude and the 
respect of the Canadian people. It has also earned him the gratitude and=
 
the respect of the people of the United States.  
=
 
I know it is traditional for American presidents, w=
hen they address this 
body, to speak of their affection for thei=
r ties to the Canadian people. 
On behalf of the United States, l=
et me stay with that tradition and say, 
l'amitie solide. But let=
 me say to you that it is a big part of our 
life. I remember so =
well, more than a decade ago, when Hillary and I, 
with our then =
very young daughter, came to Canada to celebrate the new 
year. W=
e started in Montreal and drove to Chateau Montebello. Along the 
way, we drove around Ottawa, and we watched all those wonderful people skating along the canal. I come from a southern State. I could not =
imagine that anybody could ever get on skates and stand on any b=
ody of 
water for very long. I could see that always--Hillary has=
 had in the 
back of her mind all this long time how much she wou=
ld like to be 
skating along this canal. I think, tomorrow, Mrs. =
Chretien is going to 
give her her wish, and we are looking forwa=
rd to that.  
 
My wife has visited Toro=
nto, and we had a wonderful, wonderful family 
vacation in Wester=
n Canada--in Victoria and Vancouver back in 1990--one 
of the bes=
t times that all of us have ever had together anywhere. We are 
d=
eeply indebted to your culture. Our daughter's name was inspired by <=
pre>Canadian songwriter Joni Mitchell's wonderful song, Chelsea Morning.  
All of yo=
u know that in the spring of 1993, the first time I left the 
Uni=
ted States as President, I came to Vancouver for the summit with 
President Yeltsin. Both of us, at that time, were under a significant amount of stress as we tried to reaffirm our relationship and solidi=
fy 
democracy in Russia. I can say, without any equivocation, tha=
t the 
reception we received from the people of Canada, as well a=
s from the 
government and the Prime Minister, made it very, very=
 easy for us to 
have a successful meeting. For that we are very =
grateful. 
 
I come here today to reaffirm the ties that bind the United States and <=
/pre>Canada, in a new age of great promise and challenge--a time of ra=
pid 
change, when both opportunity and uncertainty live side by s=
ide in my 
country and in yours; a time when people are being lif=
ted up by new 
possibilities and held down by old demons all acro=
ss the world. I came 
here because I believe our nations together=
 must seize the opportunities 
and meet the challenges of this ne=
w age. We must--I say again--do this 
together.  
&n=
bsp;
From the oil from Alberta that fires factories in the=
 United States to 
the silicon chips from California that power y=
our computers, we are 
living proof of the value of partnerships =
and cooperation. Technologies 
produced in your nation save lives=
 in our hospitals, while food from our 
farms line your supermark=
ets. 
 
Ou=
r horizons have broadened because we in the United States have 
l=
istened  to the CBC. Our cultu=
re is much richer because of the 
contributions of writers like R=
obertson Davies--whom Hillary had the 
pleasure of meeting last w=
eek after reading him for years--and Margaret 
Atwood, and becaus=
e of the wonderful photography of Josef Karsh, whose 
famous pict=
ure of Churchill I just saw. He took some pictures of Hillary 
an=
d me that are not so distinguished, but I love them anyway. As a 
musician, I have  
=
to thank you especially for Oscar Peterson, a man I consider to be the greatest jazz pianist. 
&=
nbsp;
Ours is the world's most remarkable relationship--th=
e Prime Minister 
said--whether we like it or not. I can tell you=
 that, on most days, I 
like it very, very, much.  
=
 
We have to strengthen that relationship. We have to=
 strengthen it for 
our own benefit through trade and commerce an=
d travel. We have to 
strengthen it because it is our job to help=
 spread the benefits of 
democracy, freedom, prosperity, and peac=
e beyond our shores. We are 
neighbors by the grace of nature. We=
 are allies and friends by choice. 
 
There are those in both our nations who say we =
can no longer afford to--
and perhaps we no longer even need to--=
exercise our leadership in the 
world. When so many of our people=
 are having their own problems, it is 
easy to listen to that ass=
ertion. But it is wrong. 
 =
We are two nations blessed with great resources and great=
 histories, and 
we have great responsibilities. We were built, a=
fter all, by men and 
women who fled the tyranny and intolerance =
of the old world for the new. 
We are the nations of pioneers--pe=
ople who were armed with the 
confidence they needed to strike ou=
t on their own and to have the 
talents that God gave them shape =
their dreams in a new and different 
land. 
 Culture and tradition, to be sure, disti=
nguish us from one another in 
many ways that we are still learni=
ng about every day. But we share core 
values, and that is more i=
mportant--a devotion to hard work, an ardent 
belief in democracy=
, a commitment to giving each and every citizen the 
right to liv=
e up to his or her God-given potential, and an understanding 
of =
what we owe to the world for the gifts we have been given. 
 
These common values hav=
e nourished a partnership that has become a model 
for new democr=
acies all around this world. They can look at us and see 
just ho=
w much stronger the bonds between nations can be when their 
gove=
rnments answer the citizens' desires for freedom and democracy and 
enterprise, and when they work together to build each other up instead <=
/pre>of working overtime to tear each other down. 
 
Of course, we have our diff=
erences. Some of them are complex enough to 
tear your hair out o=
ver. But we have approached them directly and in 
good faith--as =
true friends must. We in the United States come more and 
more ev=
ery day to respect and understand that we can learn from what is 
different about your nation and its many people. 
 
Canada has shown the world how t=
o balance freedom with compassion and 
tradition with innovation =
in your efforts to provide health care to all 
your citizens; to =
treat your senior citizens with the dignity and 
respect they des=
erve; and to take on tough issues such as the move afoot 
to outl=
aw automatic weapons designed for killing, not hunting. I might 
=
say--since you applauded so--you are doing it in a nation of people who respect the right to hunt and understand the difference between law=
 and 
order and sportsmanship. 
 
Those of us who have traveled here especi=
ally appreciate the reverence 
you have shown for the bounty of G=
od's nature--from the Laurentians to 
the Rockies. In a world dar=
kened by ethnic conflicts that literally tear 
nations apart, Can=
ada has stood for all of us as a model of how people 
of differen=
t cultures can live and work together in peace, prosperity, 
and =
respect. 
 
The United States, as many of my predecessors have said, enjoys its excellent relationship with a strong and united Canada, but we =
recognize--just as the Prime Minister said to us a moment ago, with regard to your relationships--that your political future is, of co=
urse, 
entirely for you to decide. That is what a democracy is al=
l about. 
 
Now I will tell you something about our political system. You want to know why my State of the Union address took so long? It was because=
 I 
evenly divided the things that would make the Democrats clap =
and the 
Republicans clap. We doubled the length of the speech in=
 common 
enthusiasm. 
=
 
I ask you--all of you--to remember that we do look =
to you, and to 
remember what our great President of the postwar =
era, Harry Truman, said 
when he came here in 1947. "Canada'=
s eminent position today," he said, 
is a tribute to the pat=
ience, tolerance, and strength of character of 
her people. Canad=
a's notable achievement of national unity and progress 
through a=
ccommodation, moderation, and forbearance can be studied with 
pr=
ofit by sister nations.   
 
These words ring every bit as true today =
as they did then. 
 =
For generations, our countries have joined together in efforts t=
o make 
the world more secure and more prosperous. We have reache=
d out together 
to defend our values and our interests--in World =
War I, on the beaches 
of Normandy, and in Korea. Together, we he=
lped to summon the United 
Nations into existence. Together, we s=
tood fast against communist 
tyranny and prevailed in the Cold Wa=
r. Together, we stood shoulder to 
shoulder against aggression in=
 the Gulf War. Now our nations have 
stepped forward to help Hait=
i emerge from repression and to restore its 
democracy. I thank t=
he Prime Minister for what he said about that. When 
it was not p=
opular anywhere in the world to worry about poor, 
beleaguered, a=
bandoned Haiti, Canada was truly a friend of Haiti. 
 
In one international forum af=
ter another, we stand side by side to shape 
a safer and better w=
orld. Whether it is at the World Population 
Conference, pushing =
together for an indefinite extension of NPT, or in 
any number of=
 ways--we are working together. 
 
We know that for Canada, this history of action is=
 a matter of deep 
tradition and personal conviction. The traditi=
on runs from Lester 
Pearson to Jean Chretien. It says we must be=
 engaged in the affairs of 
the world. You have always shown the =
wisdom of reaching out instead of 
retreating, of rising to new r=
esponsibilities instead   of retrenching. 
Your tradition of engagement continues to this =
day, and, believe you me, 
it earns respect all around the world =
from people of all races,  eth=
nic 
groups, and political systems. 
 
In places such as Cyprus and the Sin=
ai, Canadian troops have played an 
invaluable role in preventing=
 more violence in those critical hot spots. 
Today, your 2,000 pe=
acekeepers in the former Yugoslavia are courageously 
fulfilling =
their mission in the midst of one of the most intractable, 
diffi=
cult situations in our lifetime. 
 
For a half century, the United States has shared =
your philosophy of 
action and consistent exercise of leadership =
abroad. I am determined, 
notwithstanding all the cross-currents =
in our country, that we shall 
preserve that commitment. These ti=
mes may be turbulent, but we have a 
historic opportunity to incr=
ease security and prosperity for our own 
people and for people a=
ll around the world. I want you to know that I 
intend to do ever=
ything in my power to keep our country constructively 
involved i=
n the problems that we must face if we are going to guarantee 
th=
at our children will live in a peaceful, sane, and free world. 
<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> 
Imagine what the Pe=
rsian Gulf would look like today if we had not risen 
to the chal=
lenge of Iraqi aggression. Imagine what tariffs and barriers 
wou=
ld plague the world trading system if we had not worked so hard 
=
together over such a long period of time, from the end of World War II to the events the Prime Minister described--to NAFTA, to GATT, to th=
e 
Asia-Pacific cooperation, to the Summit of Americas that was h=
eld in 
Miami in December. Imagine how different it would have be=
en. Imagine how 
much worse the horrible tragedy in Rwanda would =
have been if we had not 
been there to provide essential help in =
those refugee camps to keep 
people alive. 
 
We cannot let anyone or anyth=
ing break this great tradition of our 
nations. In our partnershi=
p, we will find the key to protecting our 
people and increasing =
their prosperity and the power to reach beyond our 
shores in the=
 name of democracy and freedom--not only because it is 
right, bu=
t because it is in our interest to do so. 
 
Just before we came down here, the Prime=
 Minister and I agreed again 
that if we are going to meet these =
new challenges in the 21st century, 
we must adapt the institutio=
ns that helped us to win the Cold War so 
they can serve us as we=
ll in the 21st century. We have to do that. Some 
have evolved wi=
th the changing world. Some have, clearly, already 
discarded the=
ir old missions and assumed new roles. But we have also 
seen tha=
t the end of the East-West  co=
nflict, the advent of 24-hour 
financial markets, sudden environm=
ental disasters, the rise of 
international terrorism, the resurg=
ence of ancient ethnic hatreds--all 
these things have placed new=
 demands on these institutions that the 
statesmen of 50 years ag=
o simply did not imagine. The 21st century will 
leave behind tho=
se who sit back and think that these problems will be 
solved aut=
omatically. We simply have to face these challenges and ask 
ours=
elves what we have to change and how are we going to do it. 
 
For example, to meet t=
he security needs of the future, we must work 
together to see th=
at NATO--the most successful military alliance in all 
of history=
--adapts to this new era. That means that we must make certain 
t=
hat the inevitable process of NATO expansion proceeds smoothly, 
=
gradually, and openly. There should be no surprises to anyone about what we are about. We will work so that the conditions, the timing, and=
 the 
military implications of NATO expansion will be widely know=
n and clearly 
understood in advance. 
 
To parallel the enlargement of NAT=
O, we have to develop close,  =
strong 
ties with Russia. I have worked hard for that, and so has=
 the Prime 
Minister. We must continue working together at the Un=
ited Nations, where 
our nations have, together, taken the lead i=
n efforts to reform our 
peace-keeping operations--to control the=
 costs, to improve information 
gathering, and to make sure we ha=
ve the right kind of command and 
control system before the young=
 people who put on our uniforms are put 
in harm's way. 
 
We also must con=
tinue to work at reforming the international economic 
institutio=
ns. We already have made great strides in reshaping the new 
glob=
al economy with the passage of GATT, which is the most comprehensive =
trade agreement in history. But the work is only beginning. At the upcoming G-7 summit in Halifax, which we are very much looking forw=
ard 
to, we will be working to ensure that our international trad=
ing 
institutions advance the cause of trade liberalization in wa=
ys that 
produce   tangible gains for the people of the countries involved. 
 
We also have to re-ex=
amine the institutions that were created at the 
time of Bretton =
Woods--the IMF and the World Bank--to make sure that 
they are go=
ing to be able to master the new and increasingly complex 
genera=
tion of transnational problems that face us-- problems such as 
e=
xplosive population growth and environmental degradation and problems such as those we have been facing together in Mexico and throughout <=
/pre>Latin America during the recent financial crisis. Real progress i=
n these 
areas will depend, not only on our willingness to be inv=
olved, but our 
willingness to lead as partners. Together, Canada=
 and the United States 
are striving to seize all the advantages =
the new global economy has to 
offer. Trade produces high-wage jo=
bs; we know that--the kinds of jobs 
that give our people the opp=
ortunity to care for their families, to 
educate their children, =
and to leave the next generation better off than 
they were; a dr=
eam that has been called into question in many advanced 
economie=
s in the last few years. 
 =
The success of NAFTA, which is generating new jobs and cr=
eating new 
markets from Monterrey to Medicine Hat is the proof. =
Now, as the Prime 
Minister has said so well, we in NAFTA are on =
our way to becoming the 
"Four Amigos." That phrase wil=
l go down in history; I wish I had thought 
of it. We will soon s=
tart our consultations with Chile for accession in 
NAFTA; it wil=
l be a very good partner. The addition of that thriving 
economy =
will only continue to increase the benefits for all of us. 
 
I want to take another =
moment here to thank Canada for its recent 
support during the fi=
nancial crisis in Mexico. You understood what we 
had on the line=
--that more than Mexico was involved; that jobs, trade, 
futures,=
 and our support for democracy and stability throughout Latin 
Am=
erica were at issue. You understood it, and we are grateful. Because =
we stood shoulder to shoulder, we have a chance to preserve this remarkable explosion of democracy that we saw at the Summit of the Americas, and we should continue to do that. 
 
I want to say a word, if I m=
ight, about the environment. As we expand 
trade, we have to reme=
mber: We must defend that which we have inherited 
and enhance it=
 if we can. The natural riches of this continent we share 
are st=
aggering. We have cooperated to such great effect on our continent 
in the past: Our air quality agreement is solving the acid rain problem;=
 
the Great Lakes are on the road to recovery; and the eagles hav=
e 
returned to Lake Erie. Now we have to build on those accomplis=
hments. 
 
With the NAFTA Environmental Commission located in Montreal, your 
country will play a key role in ensuring that we protect the 
=
extraordinary bounty that has been given us for our children and 
grandchildren. NAFTA is only one of several fronts on which we can work together to both increase our prosperity and protect our environme=
nt: We 
must do both. 
 
Our nations are building on the progress of last y=
ear's Summit of the 
Americas, as well. It will create a free tra=
de area embracing the entire 
hemisphere. Across the Pacific, as =
the Prime Minister said, we paved the 
way for new markets and fo=
r free trade among the dynamic economies in 
the Asia-Pacific are=
a. That was a very important thing for us to do 
because they are=
 growing very fast, and we did not want this world to 
break up i=
nto geographical trading blocks in ways that would shrink the 
po=
tential of the people of Canada and the United States for decades to =
come. 
 <=
pre>These efforts will only enhance what is now the greatest trading =
relationship--yours and ours. Every day, people, ideas, and goods stre=
am 
across our border. Bilateral trade now is more than $1 billio=
n Canadian 
every day--I learned to say that--and about $270 bill=
ion U.S. last year-
-by far the worlds largest bilateral relation=
ship. 
 
O=
ur trade with each other has become an essential pillar in the 
a=
rchitecture of our economies. Today, 4.5 million Americans have jobs =
that involve trade between our two countries. Those are the concrete <=
/pre>benefits of our partnership. Between 1988 and 1994, trade between=
 our 
nations rose about 60%. Last year alone, it increased by 15=
%. 
 
But =
the statistics do not give the human reality behind the flourishing <=
pre>exchange of goods and ideas. Our trade is creating real jobs for real <=
/pre>people. In Boscawen, New Hampshire, for example, a small company =
called 
Secure Care Products produces monitoring systems for pati=
ents in nursing 
homes. 
 
Recently, Secure Care began exporting its produc=
ts to Canada. Sales 
there are already growing fast, and the comp=
any expects them to triple 
this year. So Secure Care is hiring p=
eople like Susan Southwick, the 
granddaughter of Quebeckers, the=
 mother of two, and now the company's 
26th employee. Giving Susa=
n and her husband a shot at the dream which 
Canadians and Americ=
an share--that is what this partnership is all 
about. 
 
Much further away=
 from you, in Greensboro, North Carolina, another small 
company =
called Createc Forestry Systems is showing how our trade helps 
p=
eople turn their hopes into realities. It was founded by a man named =
Albert Jenks in his family's kitchen. Createc makes hand-held computer=
s 
that track lumber mill inventories. Those computers help manag=
ers better 
assess their needs so fewer trees are cut unnecessari=
ly. A few years 
ago, Createc began to export to Canada, and now =
those sales accounts 
have risen to nearly 20% of their total bus=
iness. That means a more 
secure future for the company, for Mr. =
Jenks, and for his son, Patrick, 
who works with his father in th=
e family business. That shows how our 
trade can increase our pro=
sperity and protect the environment as well. 
 
Your companies are thriving in our ma=
rkets, bringing tangible benefits 
to Canadians. Whether it is re=
pairing the engines of some of the U.S. 
Air Force's largest plan=
es, manufacturing software to manage our natural 
resources, or b=
uilding some of the Olympic Village for Atlanta's 1996 
games, Ca=
nadian firms are a strong presence in the United States. Their 
s=
uccesses there help your people turn their hopes into facts and their dreams into reality. 
&nbs=
p;
The example of our biggest industry shows another side =
of this remark- 
able story. Working together, U.S. and Canadian =
companies have 
integrated North America's auto industry and stag=
ed one of the most 
remarkable comebacks in the history of the In=
dustrial Revolution. We 
have drawn on each other's strengths, an=
d, today, our companies work so 
closely that we no  longer speak of U.S. or Canadian in these =
vehicles, 
but of North American content--whether it is a Chrysle=
r minivan made in 
Windsor or a Chrysler jeep made in Detroit. I =
think that was the 
ambassador from Michigan--I mean from the Uni=
ted States clapping down 
there. 
 
Productivity and employment have risen =
to such a point that when I 
visited Detroit last fall, the bigge=
st complaint I heard in a state that 
was given up as lost econom=
ically a decade ago--the biggest complaint I 
heard from the auto=
 workers was that they were working too much 
overtime. Now, wher=
e I come from, that is known as a high-class problem. 
The auto i=
ndustry now provides more than 1 million jobs in our 
countries.<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>  
 
To reinforce our commitment to NAFTA=
 and to dramatically expand an 
important market, tomorrow, the U=
nited States and Canada will sign an 
agreement to open the skies=
 between our nations. This agreement, which 
allows for a dramati=
c expansion of U.S. and Canadian service to each 
other's nations=
, will create thousands of new jobs and billions of 
dollars of e=
conomic activities in our cities--yours and mine. We have 
reache=
d a fair solution that will make life easier for travelers on both 
sides of the border, that will profit both Canadian and U.S. airline carriers, and that will increase the mutual travel and interconnect=
ion 
of our people. That we have done so amicably provides yet an=
other model 
of how neighboring nations can settle their differen=
ces. Friendship, 
engagement--Canada and the United States have s=
hown the best there is in 
partnerships between nations; all the =
great potential that awaits all 
the free people of this earth if=
 they can join in common cause. We are, 
as the monument at the S=
t. Lawrence Seaway declares, two nations whose 
frontiers are the=
 frontiers of friendship, whose ways are the ways of 
freedom, wh=
ose works are the works of peace. 
 
Every day, we see the enormous benefits this par=
tnership gives to us in 
jobs, in prosperity, and in the great cr=
eative energy that our 
interchanges bring. But we have seen only=
 the beginning. For the Susan 
Southwicks who want a chance to bu=
ild better lives and the companies 
such as Createc that are tryi=
ng to build solid businesses that will 
last, this partnership of=
 ours holds a great promise with horizons as 
vast as our great c=
ontinent. 
 
Together, we have turned our energies toward improving the world around =
us for nearly a century. Today, more than ever, let us reaffirm =
and 
renew that great tradition. Let us engage and confront the g=
reat 
challenges of the end of this century and the beginning of =
the next. We 
must sustain our efforts. We must enhance our effor=
ts. We must maintain 
our partnership. We must make it stronger. =
This is our task and our 
mission. Together, we will be equal to =
it. The border separates our 
people, but there are no boundaries=
 to our common dreams.  (###) =
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3: 
 
Fact Sheets:  Canada
 
U.S.-CANAD=
A TRADE 
 
Canada and the United States share the world's largest bilateral trading <=
/pre>relationship, with each serving as the largest market for the oth=
ers' 
goods. Total U.S.-Canada goods and services trade was estim=
ated at $270 
billion in 1994 and should reach $300 billion in 19=
95. Canada sent 84% 
of its 1994 exports to the U.S. It buys twic=
e as much from the U.S. as 
does Japan, and its trade accounts fo=
r 17% of U.S. exports. The 
estimated merchandise trade deficit w=
ith Canada for 1994 was $14 
billion. 
 
The two countries trade many of th=
e same kinds of products, which 
reflects the close integration o=
f the two economies. This is 
particularly seen in two-way autos =
and auto parts trade, which accounts 
for about one-third of bila=
teral merchandise trade. Other major Canadian 
exports to the U.S=
. include resource-based products--lumber, paper, and 
energy--an=
d high-tech goods. Manufactured goods, such as electronics, 
plas=
tics, and steel, make up most of U.S. exports to Canada. 
 
Over the years, the two c=
ountries have worked to deepen and expand this 
successful trade =
relationship. Bilateral efforts began 30 years ago with 
the 1965=
 Auto Pact that allowed for duty-free trade for most autos and 
a=
uto parts. Free trade was broadened considerably by the U.S.-Canada <=
pre>Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), which came into effect in 1989. The CFTA <=
/pre>eliminated many trade barriers and provided for consultative mana=
gement 
of trade disputes. CFTA gains were broadened by the signi=
ng of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which add=
ed new areas of economic 
activity--additional service sectors an=
d investment--and a new country--
Mexico. With the establishment =
of the CFTA and NAFTA, trade has grown 
rapidly, with growth aver=
aging more than 7% annually for each of the 
last 5 years.  
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has increa=
sed along with trade flows. 
U.S. FDI in Canada reached $68.4 bil=
lion in 1992, a 7% increase since 
the FTA became effective. Cana=
dian FDI in the United States was $38.9 
billion, a 29% increase =
during the same period.   
 <=
/o:p>
U.S.-CANADA ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
 
The United States and Canada have=
 one of the world's oldest and most 
effective partnerships for e=
nvironmental protection and preservation. 
Cooperation on measure=
s related to air, water, and flood control in 
shared watersheds =
spans a border of more than 5,000 miles and involves 
17 U.S. sta=
tes, eight Canadian provinces and the Yukon territory, many 
eco-=
regions, and three oceans. 
&nbs=
p;
The environmental relationship dates from the 1909 Boun=
dary Waters 
Treaty, which was set up to ensure cooperation on wa=
ter uses, levels, 
and flows, and to protect water quality in the=
 Great Lakes and other 
boundary waters. It put in place an endur=
ing pattern of joint efforts to 
conserve and protect the environ=
ment. 
 
I=
nternational Joint Commission 
&=
nbsp;
Established by the 1909 treaty, the U.S.-Canada Inte=
rnational Joint 
Commission (IJC) is a small, binational organiza=
tion which has 
contributed to the governments' efforts to restor=
e and clean up boundary 
waters. Under the 1909 treaty, it has is=
sued numerous recommendations to 
protect water quality. It carri=
es out multi-year monitoring duties on 
the Great Lakes and the S=
t. Croix, Rainy, and Red Rivers. In addition, 
it responds to joi=
nt requests from the governments for studies and 
advisory activi=
ties.  
 
The Great Lakes 
 
The Great Lakes are =
on the road to recovery from past pollution. Both 
countries' ado=
ption of a more coordinated ecosystem approach for the 
protectio=
n of the Great Lakes contributed to this progress. Such 
protecti=
on efforts included a U.S. investment of more than $8 billion in 
municipal wastewater treatment around the lakes in the 1970s and 1980s and major changes in industrial and agricultural practices. The res=
ults 
have been dramatic. For example, pollution discharges nearl=
y killed Lake 
Erie in the 1960s, but now  eagles have returned to the Lake Erie basin, <=
pre>and its fisheries are a great boon to recreation and tourism. 
 
Air Quality Agre=
ement 
 
I=
n 1991, the IJC assumed a new responsibility--assisting the governments with public comment on the Air Quality Agreement, which was signed =
that 
year after a decade of debate. This agreement, also called =
the "Acid 
Rain" agreement, includes important measures=
 to improve air quality. The 
two countries are working toward re=
ducing sulfur dioxide and nitrous 
oxide emissions in Canada and =
the United States. Under the U.S. Clean 
Air Act, the United Stat=
es will continue its aggressive programs to 
address the problem =
of ground-level ozone known as smog and its effects 
on health. T=
he United States is reviewing its ozone standard with a view 
tow=
ard formal revision in 1997. 
&n=
bsp;
Future Challenges 
 
The challenge today is to continue close c=
ooperation within separate 
national frameworks. Canada's Nationa=
l Round Table on Economics and the 
Environment, Model Forests Pr=
ogram, and federal and provincial linkages 
represent innovative =
opportunities for cooperation. The U.S. Great Lakes 
Initiative w=
ill set new goals for water quality. The U.S. Clean Air Act 
and =
U.S. Toxics Release Inventory are comprehensive tools that enable 
the U.S. to engage in important common efforts with Canada. 
 
Following the Presid=
ent's visit to Ottawa in February 1995, the two 
countries will s=
ign an agreement on national parks and undertake 
cooperation on =
regional ground-level ozone concentrations affecting 
citizens in=
 both countries. On-going cooperation will continue to 
improve a=
ir and water quality, reduce and eliminate certain toxic 
dischar=
ges, maintain hazardous materials emergency preparedness and 
res=
ponse capability, and address pollution prevention and waste 
man=
agement. Other cooperative efforts include sharing "planet earth"=
 
data obtained from joint ventures in space, devising approaches=
 to 
climate change via "sister forests" and other envi=
ronmentally 
sustainable North American programs, and joint effor=
ts to protect 
wildlife and critical habitats.  
&nb=
sp;
Broader International And Global Agenda 
 
Both nations support =
the North American Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation, con=
sult regularly on G-7 environmental issues, work 
together to mak=
e cost-effective progress in response to UN sustainable 
developm=
ent challenges, and develop new environmental protection 
approac=
hes and technologies.  <=
pre> 
 
NAFTA: KEY PROVISIONS AND SUPPL=
EMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
 
Overview 
 
U.S. leadership in the next century will depend on its abilit=
y to 
compete in the global marketplace. The North American Free =
Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) created the world's largest market: 380 =
million people 
producing nearly $8 trillion of goods and service=
s. NAFTA expands export 
markets in Mexico and Canada for U.S. go=
ods and services, boosts 
economic growth, creates jobs, strength=
ens cooperation with our 
neighbors on labor standards and the en=
vironment, and enables us to 
better compete against Europe and A=
sia. It builds on the 1989 U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA=
) and enhances free trade in goods and 
services between the Unit=
ed States, Canada, and Mexico by eliminating 
import restrictions=
--such as tariffs, quotas, and licenses--and 
restrictions on for=
eign ownership and investment. 
=
 
Key Provisions 
 
Tariffs. NAFTA eliminates all tariffs on U.=
S., Mexican, and Canadian 
goods by 2008. Many were removed immed=
iately, and others will be phased 
out over 5, 10, and 15 years. =
 
Customs=
. NAFTA expands and improves on procedures in the U.S.-Canada FTA 
and provides for uniform regulations to ensure consistent 
inte=
rpretation, application, and administration of the rules of origin. <=
pre> 
Quotas. NAFTA =
eliminates import and export quotas unless consistent with 
rules=
 of the World Trade Organization (WTO--successor organization to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) or explicitly mentioned in the agreement.  =
 
National Trea=
tment. NAFTA reaffirms WTO principles preventing 
discrimination =
against imported goods. 
 <=
/span>
Standards. NAFTA prohibits use of product standards as a t=
rade barrier 
but preserves each country's right to establish and=
 enforce its own 
product standards, particularly those designed =
to promote health and 
safety and to protect human, animal, and p=
lant life and the environment. 
=
 
Government Procurement. NAFTA opens new procurement=
 markets in Mexico, 
particularly the petrochemical, heavy electr=
ical, and pharmaceutical 
areas. 
 
Safeguards. NAFTA partners can impose a=
 safeguard action during the 
transition period if increased impo=
rts constitute a "substantial cause 
or threat" of &quo=
t;serious injury" to a domestic industry. This follows WTO 
=
practice. 
 
Agriculture. NAFTA eliminates immediately or phases out tariffs on agricultural goods. It converts most quotas and other quantitative restrictions to tariff rate quotas, which allow a certain quantity=
 of a 
product to enter duty-free. These tariff rate quotas will =
apply to U.S. 
exports of corn, dry beans, powdered milk, poultry=
, malted barley, 
animal fats, potatoes, and eggs. For some produ=
cts--such as wheat, 
grapes, tobacco, other dairy products, and d=
ay-old chicks--quotas and 
other quantitative restrictions will b=
e converted to tariffs, which then 
will be phased out. U.S. stan=
dards regarding food imports will be 
maintained. Special agricul=
tural safeguards for certain import-sensitive 
products will be a=
vailable to limit the impact of sudden import surges. 
 
Energy. NAFTA lifts investme=
nt restrictions on most of the basic 
petrochemicals industry and=
 on most electricity-generating facilities. 
It eliminates or pha=
ses out tariffs on oil and gas field equipment and 
on coal.  
Autos. NAFT=
A provides for the immediate reduction of Mexican duties on 
vehi=
cle imports and a timetable for their elimination. It eliminates 
Mexican quotas on new auto imports. It also removes tariffs on certain automotive parts and phases out others. It reduces the Mexican dome=
stic-
content requirement to zero over 10 years and reduces Mexic=
o's trade-
balancing requirement. Most U.S.-Canada auto trade was=
 already duty-free 
under the 1965 U.S.-Canada Auto Pact, which w=
as incorporated into the 
FTA. 
 
Textiles and Apparel. NAFTA eliminated so=
me tariffs immediately and 
phases out others over a 10-year peri=
od. It removes quotas on imports 
from Mexico that qualify under =
the rules of origin. 
 
Financial Services. NAFTA allows investment by U.S. and Canad=
ian firms 
in the Mexican banking market. It provides for the eli=
mination of all 
restrictions on such investment by January 2000.=
 U.S. and Canadian 
insurance firms with existing joint ventures =
in Mexico may increase 
their ownership to 100%. The agreement al=
so permits U.S. insurance 
companies to issue reinsurance policie=
s and establish subsidiaries in 
Mexico. It allows U.S and Canadi=
an companies to invest in the brokerage 
industry in Mexico.  
Transportat=
ion. NAFTA eliminates, over a five-year period, restrictions 
on =
access by U.S. and Canadian trucking companies to Mexico. It gives 
charter and bus tour operators full access to the Mexican market. It allows U.S. and Canadian investment in Mexican bus and truck compan=
ies, 
in international cargo subsidiaries, and in Mexican port fa=
cilities. The 
agreement does not alter U.S. safety standards.  
Telecommu=
nications. NAFTA eliminates duties and non-tariff barriers on 
mo=
st Mexican imports of telecommunications equipment, including private branch exchanges, cellular systems, satellite transmission, earth station equipment, and fiber optic transmission systems. It also eliminates restrictions on foreign investment in voice mail and ot=
her 
value-added and information services. North American firms w=
ill have 
access to and use of public telecommunications  networks and services. 
 
Investment. NAFTA pro=
vides for member state investors to receive the 
more favorable o=
f national or MFN treatment in setting up operations or 
acquirin=
g firms. It phases out most performance requirements over 10 
yea=
rs and states that NAFTA partners may not impose new ones. The 
a=
greement guarantees the free transfer of capital and profits and that investors will be compensated at the fair market value of the investm=
ent 
in cases of expropriation. 
 
Intellectual Property. NAFTA protects No=
rth American producers in two 
new areas: computer programs and c=
ompilations of individually protected 
material. It establishes a=
 minimum 50-year term for the protection of 
sound recordings and=
 motion pictures. The agreement requires companies 
to register b=
oth service marks and trademarks. It prohibits compulsory 
licens=
ing or mandatory linking of trademarks. It provides protection for 
independently created industrial designs and for trade secrets and proprietary information. 
=
 
Environment. NAFTA maintains existing federal and s=
ub-federal standards. 
It allows a country to prohibit entry of g=
oods that do not meet its 
standards. The agreement states that p=
arties, including states, may 
enact tougher standards, and it pe=
rmits each country to impose 
environmental requirements on forei=
gn investment. 
 Implementation. The Free Trade Commission ensures that NAFTA is implemented properly. Commission working groups monitor implementat=
ion 
of the various chapters of the agreement. 
 
Rules of Origin. Rules of=
 origin define goods eligible for NAFTA 
treatment and prevent &q=
uot;free riding" by third countries. Only goods 
produced in=
 North America qualify for NAFTA treatment. Goods containing 
imp=
orted components qualify if they are transformed enough to result in =
a tariff classification change. In some cases, goods also must have a =
specified percentage of North American content. There is a speci=
al rule 
of origin for textiles and apparel. 
 
Dispute Settlement. NAFTA e=
xtends the dispute settlement provisions of 
the U.S.-Canada FTA =
to Mexico while providing new safeguards to ensure 
fairness. It =
establishes the  North America=
n Free Trade Commission and a 
Secretariat to administer the pane=
l review system. The mechanism for 
resolution is as follows:  
-- Notific=
ation and consultation between parties; 
 
-- If no resolution, referral to the commi=
ssion; 
 
=
-- If necessary, referral to a panel of private sector experts; and <=
pre> 
-- Resolution =
or retaliation. 
 If the defending party does not comply with the panel ruling, the =
other 
party may suspend equivalent trade benefits until the disp=
ute is 
resolved. 
&nb=
sp;
Supplemental Agreements 
 
The three parties also have concluded=
 supplemental agreements on the 
environment, on labor, and on im=
port surges. 
 Environment. The NAFTA supplemental agreement on environmental =
cooperation creates the Commission on Environmental Cooperation. The <=
/pre>commission is located in Montreal, Canada, and its activities inc=
lude: 
 
-=
- Providing expertise to dispute settlement panels in cases where one party has failed to enforce its laws affecting a sector involving tra=
ded 
goods and services; 
 
-- Considering the environmental implications o=
f processing and 
production methods; and 
 
-- Promoting greater public a=
ccess to information about hazardous 
substances. 
 
Labor. The NAFTA suppl=
emental agreement on labor creates the Commission 
on Labor Coope=
ration, which promotes labor principles, laws, and 
standards and=
 their effective application and enforcement. The supple- 
mental=
 agreement provides that each country will promote public 
awaren=
ess of its laws as well as ensure compliance. 
 
These agreements provide for the use=
 of fines and trade sanctions as a 
last resort if a party believ=
es that another is demonstrating a 
persistent pattern of failure=
 to enforce labor or environmental laws. 
 
Import Surges. The NAFTA supplemental agr=
eement on import surges allows 
parties to impose trade restricti=
ons if increased imports cause or 
threaten serious injury to a d=
omestic industry. 
 =
Additional Activities 
 
Border Cleanup. The United States and Mexico have=
 established the Border 
Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC=
) and the North American 
Development Bank (NADBank). These innov=
ative institutions help 
coordinate and finance environmental inf=
rastructure projects, including 
those focusing on water pollutio=
n along the U.S.-Mexico border. 
 
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties Working Gro=
ups. The three 
countries established these working groups to bui=
ld on the results of 
the Uruguay Round and seek solutions that r=
educe the possibility of 
disputes concerning the issues of subsi=
dies, dumping, and the operation 
of trade remedy laws regarding =
such  
practices.  
 
 
U.S.-CANAD=
A AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT 
 =
Growing economic interdependence among nations--the "=
;globalization" of 
the world economy--rapidly has expanded =
demand for international air 
services and challenged governments=
 to rethink approaches to regulating 
this vital sector of the ec=
onomy. Nowhere was the need for new thinking 
more important than=
 in the U.S.-Canada bilateral aviation market--the 
world's large=
st air passenger market. The United States and Canada have 
just =
completed a new air transport agreement, thereby demonstrating a 
commitment to cooperation and economic progress in this key area. 
 
Breakthrough Ag=
reement 
 
The new U.S.-Canada transborder aviation agreement, which was signed during the President's visit to Ottawa in February 1995, dramatically=
 
improves air services for consumers on both sides of the border=
. It 
replaces a highly restrictive regime with a liberal agreeme=
nt which will 
allow significantly increased integration of the t=
wo countries' domestic 
air transportation networks. This result =
is consistent with the open 
border which traditionally has symbo=
lized the excellent relationship 
that the two countries enjoy. <=
/pre> 
Based on=
 the same fundamental open-market principles as NAFTA, this new 
=
aviation agreement will contribute to economic expansion in both 
countries as it is implemented over a three-year, phase-in period.  
By modernizing the critic=
al infrastructure pillar which air transport 
represents, the new=
 agreement not only reinforces, but also expands the 
benefits of=
 NAFTA by allowing for a fuller realization of its potential. 
 
U.S. International A=
ir Transportation Policy 
 =
The new air transport agreement also represents a milesto=
ne in the 
Administration's efforts to promote freer trade and cl=
early meets the 
objectives outlined in the Clinton Administratio=
n's international 
aviation policy statement of 1994. The new agr=
eement will provide the 
aviation industry with the opportunities=
 it needs to meet new demands 
and compete effectively in this ma=
rket. It will provide consumers and 
shippers with more and bette=
r service options and contribute to: 
 
-- Expanding the international aviation marke=
t; 
 
-- I=
ncreasing service opportunities for airlines; 
 
-- Raising productivity and skilled =
job opportunities within the 
aviation industry; and 
<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> 
-- Promoting aerosp=
ace exports. 
 The World's Largest Bilateral Market 
 
The U.S.-Canada aviation market is the =
largest bilateral market in the 
world in terms of passenger move=
ments, even though it has, until now, 
been severely constrained =
by one of the most restrictive aviation 
regimes. Despite the con=
straints of an outdated agreement--which has not 
allowed direct =
service between the two capitals and which had prevented 
one-thi=
rd of the top 50 city-to-city markets from having any direct 
ser=
vice--13 million people still traveled across the border on 
comm=
ercial flights in 1993. This cross-border movement generated more 
than $2.5 billion in direct revenues and many times this amount in =
indirect benefits to the travel and tourism industries in both <=
pre>countries. 
 It is difficult to estimate precisely this agreement's potential economic impact due to the scale and scope of liberalization. Comp=
arison 
with the growth achieved in other aviation relationships,=
 though, offers 
some indication of its magnitude. Since 1978, fo=
r example, U.S.-Canada 
air travel has grown by less than 4% annu=
ally, while other U.S. aviation 
markets have grown several times=
 faster. 
 
Air cargo carriers and the businesses which rely on specialized, time-sensitive air deliveries also will see immediate benefits from the =
agreement. Severely hampered by the former agreement's limitatio=
ns on 
aircraft size and package weight and dimensions and by con=
straints on 
routes and frequencies, all-cargo carriers now will =
be freed of many 
restrictions immediately and largely deregulate=
d within 12 months. 
 
Key Elements of New Agreement 
 
-- This agreement substantially frees t=
his huge aviation market from the 
governmental regulation which =
has hindered its growth in the past and 
permits introduction of =
the passenger and cargo services demanded by the 
U.S. and Canada=
's expanding economic ties. 
&nb=
sp;
-- Canadian airlines will have immediate open access t=
o all points in 
the U.S. 
 
-- U.S. carriers will achieve open access to C=
anada after a short, 
three-year transitional phase. 
<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> 
-- The markets for =
all-cargo and charter services will be largely 
liberalized.  
-- Numerous=
 U.S. cities will receive new and better service. 
 
-- This air agreement is an esse=
ntial complement to the NAFTA and  
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.  
 =
 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES <=
/pre> 
The envi=
ronmental challenges confronting the world today are greater 
tha=
n at any time in recent history. Threats to the global environment--<=
pre>such as climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and the loss of =
biological diversity and forests--affect all nations, regardless=
 of 
their level of development. As a result, the environment is =
increasingly 
important to U.S. foreign policy. The United States=
 accords high 
priority to addressing global environmental proble=
ms and pursues wide-
ranging actions to protect the environment a=
nd promote sustainable 
development. 
 
Global Climate Change 
 
The possibility that=
 human activities may cause climate change is one of 
the most se=
rious international environmental concerns. The United States 
ha=
s been a leader in the effort to respond to this threat. Negotiations on a Framework Convention on Climate Change, which began near <=
pre>Washington, DC, in early 1991, culminated in an agreement that received=
 
more than 150 signatures at the UN Conference on Environment an=
d 
Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992; the conven=
tion 
entered into force on March 21, 1994. 
 
The climate change conventio=
n began an effective process for confronting 
this global issue. =
Industrialized countries are developing specific 
action plans to=
 limit their emissions of greenhouse gases and enhance 
forests a=
nd other greenhouse gas "sinks," or absorption areas. Other countries are to take similar actions in the future. 
 
President Clinton annou=
nced in April 1993 that the U.S. intends to 
return its greenhous=
e gas emissions to their 1990 levels by the year 
2000. In Octobe=
r 1993, the President presented the national Climate 
Change Acti=
on Plan, containing nearly 50 domestic measures designed to 
meet=
 the U.S. commitment. 
 
The United States made its national submission under the cli=
mate change 
convention in September 1994. The U.S. Climate Actio=
n Report details 
U.S. actions in all areas to address the threat=
 of global climate 
change. It includes a U.S. Initiative on Join=
t Implementation to promote 
cooperation between countries on pro=
jects that will reduce or sequester 
greenhouse gas emissions. In=
 early February 1995, the first seven 
projects for inclusion in =
the initiative were announced. Partner 
countries include Belize,=
 Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Honduras, and 
Russia. It is hoped t=
hat these programs and others like them will serve 
as a model fo=
r an international joint implementation regime. 
 
During fiscal years 1993 and 1994,=
 the United States provided $25 
million in financial support and=
 technical assistance to developing 
countries and countries in t=
ransition to market economies for studies to 
help establish anal=
ytical foundations to address the threat of climate 
change. Elig=
ible studies included inventories of greenhouse gas 
emissions, v=
ulnerability studies, and analyses of options to address 
vulnera=
bilities and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The United States 
=
works with more than 50 countries on such studies. 
 
The U.S. urges that a discuss=
ion on "next steps" for the post-2000 era 
be part of t=
he February 1995 preparatory session for the First 
Conference of=
 Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change as 
well a=
s part of the conference itself, which is to be held in Berlin, 
=
Germany, March 27-April 7, 1995. 
 
Protection of the Ozone Layer 
 
The depletion of the ozone=
 layer continues to be another serious 
problem. The U.S. has led=
 efforts to address this threat to the 
atmosphere, beginning wit=
h a decision in 1978 to ban the use of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs=
) in non-essential aerosols. Because protection 
of the ozone lay=
er is possible only if all countries participate, the 
U.S. urged=
 the conclusion of an agreement to restrict the use of CFCs 
and =
other ozone-depleting substances. 
 
This effort has led to a succession of landmark =
international agreements 
since 1985 designed to protect the ozon=
e layer, including the 1985 
Vienna Convention and the 1987 Montr=
eal Protocol. Based on an amendment 
under which countries will c=
ompletely phase out the production of CFCs 
and most other ozone-=
depleting substances by the end of 1996, the U.S. 
has met its co=
mmitments to phase out halons by the end of 1994 and 
continues t=
oward meeting phase-out targets for CFCs and allied 
substances b=
y January 1, 1996. 
 
UN Conference on Environment And Development 
 
The June 1992 UNCED was a=
 landmark event in addressing the global 
environment. Unlike oth=
er environmental conferences, UNCED focused on 
sustainable devel=
opment--economic growth that takes into account 
environmental co=
ncerns. UNCED resulted in adoption of three key 
documents:  
-- Agenda 21=
--an action program to guide national and international 
environm=
ental and development efforts into the 21st century; 
 
-- The Rio Declaration--a sta=
tement of principles regarding the 
environment and development;<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>  and 
 
-- A statement of principles for=
 the conservation and sustainable use of 
forests worldwide.  
Based on UN=
CED recommendation, the United Nations established a new 
Commiss=
ion on Sustainable Development (CSD) to monitor implementation of 
Agenda 21 recommendations. The U.S. strongly sup- ports the CSD as a primary international body for promoting sustainable development worldwide. The CSD will convene its next annual meeting in April 19=
95 to 
follow up on the Rio Conference. 
 
The United States works domestic=
ally to implement the recommendations 
made at the Rio Conference=
. On June 14, 1993, President Clinton 
announced the formation of=
 the President's Council on Sustainable 
Development (PCSD) to de=
velop specific policy recommendations for a 
national strategy on=
 sustainable development that can be implemented by 
the public a=
nd private sectors. The PCSD represents a groundbreaking 
commitm=
ent to explore and develop policies that encourage economic 
grow=
th, job creation, and effective use of natural resources. 
 
In addition to the treat=
ies on biodiversity and climate change, UNCED 
also endorsed a co=
nvention to combat desertification, particularly in 
Africa. Nego=
tiation of this new treaty was completed in Paris, France, 
on Ju=
ne 18, 1994. 
 Conservation of Biological Diversity 
 
The United States is party to a large n=
umber of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements designed to prote=
ct endangered species and 
ensure wildlife conservation. One of t=
he most important is the 
Convention on International Trade in En=
dangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES), by which the 1=
22 CITES signatories monitor and 
control international trade in =
wild species. CITES was crucial in 
efforts by the U.S. and other=
 countries to protect the African elephant 
by banning trade in e=
lephant ivory, and it is now involved in efforts to 
protect the =
rhinoceros and tiger. The Ninth CITES Conference of Parties 
was =
held in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on November 7-18, 1994. 
 
While CITES has been eff=
ective in protecting species that are threatened 
as a direct res=
ult of international trade, the main cause of species 
loss is ha=
bitat destruction. The U.S. seeks to address this issue 
through =
a variety of means, such as increased funding for forest 
conserv=
ation programs, the establishment of protected areas under the 
W=
orld Heritage Convention and other agreements, and the Ramsar Treaty on International Wetlands. The U.S. Agency for International Developme=
nt 
provides more than $160 million annually in assistance for tr=
opical 
forestry and biological diversity programs. 
 
On June 4, 1993, the=
 U.S. signed the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity, which es=
tablishes a framework for countries to work together 
to protect =
the earth's species. The treaty is now before the U.S. Senate 
fo=
r ratification. The United States believes that the convention 
p=
resents a unique opportunity for nations not only to conserve the 
world's biological diversity, but also to realize economic benefits from =
the conservation and sustainable use of its genetic resources. <=
/pre> 
Populati=
on and Environment 
 
During the 1990s, world population growth will be greater than =
ever, 
with annual increases between 90 and 100 million. Unaddres=
sed, global 
population will almost certainly double and could tr=
iple before the end 
of the next century. The implications of suc=
h growth for global 
economic, political, social, and environment=
al security are profound. 
 =
;
The third UN International Conference on Population and =
Development 
convened in Cairo, Egypt, September 5-13, 1994. The =
Cairo conference 
provided a once-in-a-decade opportunity to mars=
hal resources behind a 
comprehensive global effort   to stem rapid population growth. The=
 U.S. 
worked with its international partners to develop comprehe=
nsive 
programs, which include addressing the unmet need and dema=
nd for family 
planning and reproductive health services; develop=
ing strategies for 
improving women's health needs and improving =
child survival; improving 
the social, economic, and political st=
atus of women; and mobilizing 
institutional and financial resour=
ces to meet these goals. All these 
initiatives influence populat=
ion growth and are most effective when 
pursued together ; effort=
s in this regard will continue.  
 
Fina=
ncing Environmental Protection 
=
 
The U.S. supports effective use of resources and in=
stitutions to promote 
sustainable development and environmental =
protection. It long has been a 
leader among bilateral donors in =
supporting environmental programs 
abroad and ensuring that envir=
onmental considerations are taken into 
account in assistance pro=
grams. The U.S. foreign assistance budget 
emphasizes sustainable=
 development, including programs for reducing 
natural resource d=
egradation, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and 
supporting bi=
ological diversity. 
 
Multilateral institutions remain essential to efforts to promo=
te 
economic reforms and development in a rapidly changing world;=
 they also 
are important instruments to promote sustainable deve=
lopment and 
environmental protection. The United States helps en=
sure that the 
multilateral development banks take environmental =
considerations into 
account in all lending programs. The U.S. al=
so strongly supported 
creation of the Global Environmental Facil=
ity, which helps fund projects 
that provide global environmental=
 benefits, such as those related to 
climate change and the loss =
of biodiversity. 
 <=
/pre>Marine Conservation and Pollution 
 
The world's oceans are threatened by h=
uman activities such as 
unsustainable resource use and pollution=
. The United States long has 
played an active role in ocean cons=
ervation programs, from the efforts 
in the early 1980s to protec=
t whales to a UN-sponsored moratorium in 
1992 on the destructive=
 practice of driftnet fishing. Work also is 
underway to ensure t=
hat fishing practices by tuna and shrimp fleets 
minimize impacts=
 on populations of dolphins and sea turtles. 
 
The United States is a leading propon=
ent of two major international 
agreements to address  marine pollution: the Convention for th=
e 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, which regulates discharges=
 of 
harmful substances during the normal operation of ships at s=
ea and the 
London Convention, which bans the ocean disposal of a=
 number of wastes 
and lists others that may be disposed of only =
with special care. 
 
Because pollution from land-based sources represents the most s=
erious 
threat to the marine environment, the United States promo=
tes efforts to 
address this concern. Delegates to UNCED adopted =
a U.S. proposal calling 
for an Inter-governmental Conference on =
the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Land-based Activit=
ies. This important conference will 
be hosted by the United Stat=
es in Washington, DC, from October 23 to 
November 5, 1995. (###)=
 
 
 
[BOX]
Climate =
Action Report
Copies of the U.S. Climate Action Report may be obt=
ained from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Prin=
ting Office at a cost 
of $14.&n=
bsp; The GPO stock number is 004-000-02416-1.  Call (202) 512-1800 
for further ordering=
 information.
 
The report also is avai=
lable on-line through:
 
--  GPOâs Federal Bulletin Board Serv=
ice (in Environment under Global 
Issues) by dialing (202) 512-13=
87; or
-- The Internet (under Publications and Major Reports) at =
gopher 
dosfan.lib.uic.edu.
 
(###)
 
 
 <=
/pre>ARTICLE 4: 
 
Country Profile:  Canada 
Official Name:  <=
/span>Canada 
 
Geography 
 
Area: 9.9 million sq=
. km. (3.8 million 
sq. mi.); second-largest country in the world=
.  
Cities: Capital-=
-Ottawa pop. 833,000. Other major cities--Toronto 3.5 
million, M=
ontreal 2.9 million, Vancouver 1.4 million.  
Terrain: Mostly plains with mountains in the west=
 and lowlands in the 
southeast.=
  
Climate: Temperate to arctic. 
 
People 
 
Nationality: Noun and adjec=
tive--Canadian(s).  
Population (1994 est.): 29 million. =
 
Annual growth rate: 1.5%.  
Ethnic groups: British 28%, French 23%, other Eu=
ropean 15%, 
Asian/Arab/African 6%, indigenous Indian and Eskimo =
1.5%, mixed 
background 26%.&nbs=
p; 
Religions: Roman Catholic 46%, Protestant 41%.  
Languages: English, Frenc=
h. 
Education: Literacy--99% of population aged 15 and over have =
at least a 
ninth grade education.  
Health: Infant mortality rate--7/1,000. Life exp=
ectancy--75 yrs. male, 
82 yrs. female.  
Work force (13.8 million, 1992): Trade--18%=
. Manufacturing--15%. 
Transportation and communications--8%. Fin=
ance--7%. Public 
administration--7%. Construction--6%. Agricultu=
re--4%. Forestry and 
mining--2%. Other services--33%. 
 
Government =
 
Type: Confede=
ration with parliamentary democracy. =
 
Independence: July 1, 1867.  
Constitution: The amended British North Americ=
a Act of 1867 patriated to 
Canada on April 17, 1982, Charter of =
Rights and Freedoms, and unwritten 
custom. 
Branches: =
Executive--Queen Elizabeth II (head of state, represented by a 
g=
overnor general), prime minister (head of government), cabinet. 
=
Legislative--bicameral parliament (104-member Senate, 295-member House of Commons). Judicial--Supreme Court. 
Political parties: =
Progressive Conservative Party, Liberal Party, New 
Democratic Pa=
rty, Reform Party, Bloc Quebecois. 
Subdivisions: 10 provinces, 2=
 territories.  
Suff=
rage: Universal at 18. 
Flag: A red maple leaf on a white backgro=
und flanked by vertical red 
bands. 
 
Economy 
 
GDP (1994): $550 billion.  
Annual growth rate: 6.8%  
Per capita GDP (1994=
 est.): $19,000. 
Natural resources: Petroleum and natural gas, h=
ydroelectric power, 
metals and minerals, fish, forests, wildlife=
. 
Agriculture: Products--wheat, livestock and meat, feed grains,=
 oilseeds, 
dairy products, tobacco, fruits, vegetables. 
Industry: Types--motor vehicles and parts, machinery and equipment, aircraft and components, other diversified manufacturing, fish and <=
/pre>forest products, processed and unprocessed minerals. 
T=
rade (1994 est.): Exports--$146 billion: motor vehicles and parts, 
lumber, wood-pulp and newsprint, crude and fabricated metals, natural gas, crude petroleum, wheat. Partners--U.S. 84%, EU 5%, Japan 4%. =
Imports--$135 billion: motor vehicles and parts, industrial mach=
inery, 
crude petroleum, chemicals, agricultural machinery. Partn=
ers--U.S. 74%, 
EU 5%, Japan 4%. 
Exchange rate: U.S.$1=
=3DC$0.73. 
 <=
pre>Principal Government Officials 
 
Prime Minister--Jean Chretien 
Minist=
er of Foreign Affairs--Andre Ouellet 
Ambassador to the U.S.--Ray=
mond Chretien 
Ambassador to the UN--vacant  (###) 
=
 
  
ARTICLE 5: <=
/pre> 
Maintain=
ing the Instruments Of America's Global Leadership 
Secretary Chr=
istopher 
Statement before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,=
 and State of the 
Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, D=
C, March 1, 1995 
 <=
/pre>Good morning. I am pleased to appear before this subcommittee. I =
am here 
to give you an overview of our proposed fiscal 1996 budg=
et and to 
highlight the objectives that it supports--in particul=
ar, those which 
fall under this subcommittee's jurisdiction.  
The Americ=
an people justifiably expect that their government will do 
what =
is necessary to protect our nation's interests in the world. At the <=
pre>same time, the American people rightly demand that we apply the most rigorous standards to federal spending. We have been tough-minded =
in 
putting together an austere budget. 
 
The international affairs budget=
 represents only 1.3% of total federal 
spending. It has absorbed=
 substantial real cuts in the last several 
years and is now 45% =
lower in real terms than it was in 1984. Despite 
the extraordina=
ry challenges we face, our 1996 spending request is 
essentially =
what we are spending in the current fiscal year. Indeed, the 
res=
ources we are requesting are the rock-bottom minimum that we need to =
advance our nation's vital interests. 
 
Last November's elections, Mr. Chairman=
, certainly changed a great many 
things. But they were not a lic=
ense to lose sight of our global 
interests or to walk away from =
our commitments in the world. Approving 
this budget will be a te=
st of our willingness to devote the necessary 
resources to prote=
ct the security and prosperity of the American people. 
It will b=
e a stern test of our commitment to lead. 
 
Our foreign policy strategy is driven by=
 four principles: 
  <=
/span>
First, the imperative of American leadership in the world;=
  
 
Second, the need to maintain effect=
ive relations with the world's most 
powerful nations;  
 
Third, the importance of adapting and building=
 institutions that will 
promote economic and security cooperatio=
n; and  
 
Fourth, the need to continue =
to support democracy and human rights. 
 
In my oral testimony today, I would like to=
 devote particular emphasis 
to the first--the imperative of Amer=
ican leadership. 
 <=
/pre>The end of the Soviet empire removed the central threat to Americ=
an 
security, but it did not eliminate in any way our vital stake=
 in 
international engagement. I think a clear-eyed assessment of=
 our 
interests makes it plain that American leadership remains e=
ssential. 
 
The spread of open societies and open markets gives us an unprecedented =
opportunity to advance our interests. But we must not be complac=
ent. 
Aggression, intolerance, and tyranny still challenge the ma=
rch of 
democracy and threaten our interests in many regions of t=
he world. And 
problems such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism,=
 and environmental 
degradation pose growing dangers to our natio=
n. 
 
As w=
e address both these opportunities and threats, we must set strict 
priorities that are consistent with our interests. But we also know that=
 
we cannot assure our security and prosperity by building a wall=
 around 
our nation or by abandoning the instruments of global le=
adership. 
 
Today, America faces a series of choices: between engagement and <=
pre>retreat; between the concrete benefits of integration and the illusion =
of isolation; between sharing burdens and responsibilities with =
others 
and shirking them altogether. We are the nation that spen=
t trillions of 
dollars to defend the free world during the four =
decades of the Cold 
War. It would be a historic mistake if we no=
w refused to spend a 
fraction of that sum to consolidate the rem=
arkable gains we have made. 
&nb=
sp;
Of course, there is room to differ on specific issues-=
-on the best ways 
to make peace-keeping more effective, for exam=
ple, or the best possible 
targeting of our assistance programs. =
But, nevertheless, I believe that 
the wholesale rejection of all=
 the instruments of our engagement would 
undermine America's abi=
lity to lead. 
 Those who say they are for a strong America have a responsibility to=
 
help keep America strong. We simply cannot have it both ways. W=
e cannot 
be the world's most powerful nation if we do not marsha=
l the resources 
to stand by our commitments. We cannot lead if w=
e do not have all the 
tools of leadership at our disposal. Preve=
ntive diplomacy is often the 
first line of defense. Those who wo=
uld undermine our diplomatic capacity 
threaten our national inte=
rest at a vital stage in the process when 
peaceful solutions are=
 still possible. 
 <=
/pre>To maintain our leadership, we must always be ready to back our <=
/pre>diplomacy with credible threats of force. Yet no American believe=
s that 
our soldiers should have to take all the risks or that ou=
r taxpayers 
should have to pay all the bills. That is why levera=
ging our power 
through institutions such as the United Nations i=
s a sensible bargain 
that the American people support. 
 
There is no ques=
tion that the UN can be and should be more effective. We 
are com=
mitted to the reform and reinvention of the UN system. Some 
prog=
ress is being made, and we will press for more. But some people seem =
to argue that we should back away from the UN entirely. That, in my judgment, would be a terrible mistake. 
 
In the last two years, we have dev=
eloped clear peace-keeping guidelines 
designed to ensure that to=
ugh questions are answered before new missions 
are approved and =
that tough measures are taken to ensure that money is 
not wasted=
. And we are improving our consultation with Congress at every 
s=
tep. As a result, there have been fewer new missions and better 
=
management of existing ones. And the UN has established an inspector =
general, who is aggressively working on oversight questions. 
 
But two weeks ag=
o, the House of Representatives passed legislation--the 
so-calle=
d National Security Revitalization Act--which would end, 
intenti=
onally or not, over four decades of U.S. support for UN peace-
ke=
eping. That would violate a solemn treaty commitment--something we as a great nation should not do. If our NATO allies and Japan were to ad=
opt 
similar policies, UN peace-keeping would end overnight. We w=
ould lose a 
tool that every American President since Harry Truma=
n has used to 
advance American interests. And the United States =
would be left with an 
unacceptable choice whenever an emergency =
arose--a choice between acting 
alone and doing nothing. 
 
In connection w=
ith our second principle--the importance of constructive 
relatio=
ns with the world's most powerful nations--let me take a moment 
=
to discuss our relations with Russia. 
 
There is little doubt that the conflict in C=
hechnya has clearly been one 
of the most serious crises for refo=
rm in Russia since the Soviet Union 
collapsed. We have been deep=
ly concerned about the use of excessive and 
indiscriminate force=
 in Chechnya and the corrosive implications that has 
for Russia'=
s future as a democratic, multi-ethnic state. We have 
emphasized=
 strongly to the Russian Government that the fighting must end 
a=
nd that a process of reconciliation must begin. And we strongly support the call of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE for a continuous OSC=
E 
presence in Chechnya. 
 
But the tragedy of Chechnya has not altered our=
 interest in helping 
Russian reformers build a nation finally at=
 peace with itself and its 
neighbors. Our assistance to Russia i=
s important precisely because it 
advances that interest. It supp=
orts the dismantlement and safe transport 
of nuclear weapons and=
 the development of a private economy in Russia. 
It backs solemn=
 commitments we made to encourage Russian troops to leave 
the Ba=
ltic states. 
 It is important to recognize that most assistance is distributed not =
through the government but through private groups, in areas outs=
ide 
Moscow. Cutting aid now would hurt the friends of democracy =
in Russia--
the very people who have been most critical of the Ch=
echnya operation. 
 =
At the same time, let me stress that the pace and substance of R=
ussia's 
dealings with the United States and with institutions su=
ch as NATO and 
the G-7 will depend in large measure on the pace =
and direction of 
Russia's transformation. To the extent the Russ=
ian Government upholds 
international norms in its internal and e=
xternal policies, the cause of 
Russia's integration is bound to =
advance. But further violence in 
Chechnya will only set back tha=
t cause. 
 
With respect to our third guiding principle--adapting and revitalizing institutions of security and economic cooperation--we are requesti=
ng 
funds in this budget for our assessed contributions to more t=
han 50 
international bodies. This includes the UN, NATO, and the=
 Organization 
of American States--bodies that promote peace, dem=
ocracy, and economic 
development around the world. 
 
Our budget request a=
lso supports our fourth principle--our commitment to 
democracy a=
nd human rights. That commitment is based on a sober 
assessment =
of our interest in a world where the rule of law protects not 
ju=
st political rights but international stability and the essential 
elements of free market economies. In this respect, our budget includes <=
/pre>funds to enable the United States Information Agency to continue =
to 
foster American ideals and international understanding in an =
interdependent world. 
 
To give you a sense of my priorities for 1995, le=
t me mention five areas 
that offer particularly significant oppo=
rtunities this year. 
 
First, we must sustain the momentum we have generated through=
 the GATT, 
APEC, and the Summit of the Americas--a momentum towa=
rd the open trading 
system that is vital to American exports and=
 American jobs. At the same 
time, it is essential that American =
companies and workers be in a 
position to take advantage of the =
opportunities that an open trading 
system provides. That is why =
I sit behind what I call the America Desk 
at the State Departmen=
t and why I am determined to keep economic and 
commercial diplom=
acy at the core of the Department's work. 
 
I think we really have changed the cultu=
re of the State Department in 
this respect. I am pleased to see =
several CEOs quoted in national 
publications saying they have ne=
ver seen our Department and our 
embassies more supportive of Ame=
rican business around the world. Seldom 
a week goes by that I do=
n't get a letter to that effect. 
 
In a second area of opportunity, we are taking co=
ncrete steps to build a 
new security architecture in Europe. Our=
 focus is on maintaining strong 
relations with Western Europe, c=
onsolidating democracy in Central Europe 
and the former Soviet U=
nion, and engaging Russia in promoting European 
security.  With American leadership, we and ou=
r allies have begun a 
steady and open process that will lead to =
NATO expansion. 
 The third area of opportunity is advancing comprehensive peace in =
the 
Middle East. We stand at a decisive moment in the peace proc=
ess. The 
President and I are determined to do all we can to sust=
ain the momentum. 
Next week, I will be traveling to the region o=
nce again to consult with 
key parties about how best to move the=
 negotiations forward. I do not 
want to underestimate the challe=
nges we face. But neither can we 
underestimate the opportunities=
 to work for a lasting peace. 
&=
nbsp;
The fourth area of emphasis is to intensify our effo=
rts to stop the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction and their =
means of delivery. Our 
global and regional strategies for 1995 c=
omprise what I am quite 
confident is the most ambitious non-prol=
iferation effort in history, 
beginning with the indefinite and u=
nconditional extension of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Our 1996=
 budget supports the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, includ=
ing funds for implementing the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.  
As a fifth =
area of opportunity, we plan to implement a comprehensive 
strate=
gy to combat international terrorists, criminals, and drug 
traff=
ickers. And, as the President has announced, we will be proposing 
legislation to combat alien smuggling and illegal immigration. The =
President has also transmitted our proposed Omnibus Counterterrorism A=
ct 
of 1995, which will give the executive branch new tools to im=
prove 
prevention, investigation, and prosecution of terrorism. <=
/pre> 
Beyond t=
hese five key areas, I want to stress that we will continue to 
a=
ddress many other issues important to our nation's interests, such as promoting stability and democracy in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.=
 
And we will ensure that global challenges such as environmental=
 
degradation and rapid population growth have an important place=
 on our 
foreign policy agenda. 
 
Our nation's ability to achieve all thes=
e objectives, Mr. Chairman, 
depends on the dedicated men and wom=
en who serve our nation's foreign 
affairs agencies. At 266 diplo=
matic posts overseas, these men and women 
help our companies ope=
n markets and create American jobs. They protect 
their fellow ci=
tizens abroad. They help keep our borders secure and keep 
drugs =
off our streets. They even, on occasion, provide assistance to 
c=
ongressional delegations. 
 =
;
I know that every member of this Congress is committed t=
o America's 
defense readiness. I believe that we must maintain t=
he same level of 
diplomatic readiness as one of the most effecti=
ve ways to avoid having 
to call upon our armed forces. Our forei=
gn affairs personnel must be 
equipped to fight for America's int=
erests. They must have access to 
modern information technology. =
They must work in facilities that help, 
not hinder, their produc=
tivity. 
 
As we seek to meet these challenges, we have a continuing obligation to make our operations as efficient as possible. As you know, Vice President Gore has been heading up a major effort to reinvent government. I have taken the strong position that the foreign affair=
s 
agencies are far from exempt from that process. Each of the fo=
reign 
affairs agencies is proceeding vigorously with streamlinin=
g efforts. I 
also support the Vice President's decision that eac=
h of these agencies--
ACDA, AID, and USIA--has a distinct mission=
 that can best be performed 
if they remain distinct agencies.  
At the St=
ate Department, we have been involved in the National 
Performanc=
e Review process since the outset. Let me tick off some of the 
t=
hings we have done in the last two years. We have closed 17 posts 
overseas. We have 1,100 fewer people at State than when I arrived. We have abolished 20% of our deputy assistant secretary positions. We =
have 
absorbed a 26% increase in passport workload with no increa=
se in staff. 
We have reduced total senior officer positions to t=
he point where we 
will meet congressional targets ahead of sched=
ule. We have reduced 
overseas allowances and eliminated cash awa=
rds for senior officers. 
After four years of essentially flat bu=
dgets, this year's request of 
$2.6 billion for State Department =
operations represents a significant 
decrease in real terms.  
Pushing for=
 greater efficiency and higher productivity in the management 
of=
 our foreign affairs is a personal commitment of mine. I am working <=
pre>hard on a strategic plan to change the way we do business. 
<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> 
We have a lot of wo=
rk to do in the next few years. Here are some of the 
areas I've =
targeted.  
 
-- We will streamline our =
overseas missions.  
 
-- We will close =
15 more posts.  
 
-- I want to push dec=
ision-making and responsibility downward by a 
further reduction =
in mid-level managers.  =
 
-- We need to=
 significantly cut back on administrative overhead. I want 
to ex=
pand the use of teams to better coordinate policy development at 
the Department and among different agencies in Washington.  
=
 
-- And I want to better focus our reporting and ana=
lysis to be sure we 
are not duplicating what other agencies do a=
nd what we can get on the 
open market. 
 
But, Mr. Chairman, I would be ne=
glecting my responsibility as Secretary 
if I did not tell this s=
ubcommittee that some of the recent budget 
cutbacks have taken a=
 toll on our readiness. Because we have not had 
adequate funding=
 for language training, 50% of our language-designated 
positions=
 are filled by people who have not reached the targeted 
proficie=
ncy levels. Almost 75% of the telephone systems serving our 
over=
seas posts are outdated--so outdated that when we needed repairs in <=
pre>our vital 24-hour operations center, the AT&T repairman had to cons=
ult 
with Bell Labs on how to service the antiquated equipment. A=
lmost 80% of 
our automated data processing equipment is obsolete=
--our computer system 
is so old that we can't get maintenance co=
ntracts any longer, and we 
can't locate spare parts. 
=
 
That is why our FY=
 1996 request supports a modest $32.8 million Capital 
Investment=
 Fund. This will be used to upgrade information systems, 
replace=
 overseas telephone systems, and purchase a classified mainframe 
computer. It will improve our efficiency and productivity, reduce our maintenance costs on antiquated equipment, and help us continue to d=
o 
more with less. 
&n=
bsp;
Mr. Chairman, since my first week in office, I have c=
onsulted closely 
with both parties in Congress on every importan=
t issue on our agenda. I 
commit myself to continue to do so. I a=
m committed to do all I can to 
sustain the bipartisan foreign po=
licy that is America's tradition and 
strength. And I am committe=
d to make our operations cost-effective and 
efficient, so that w=
e can devote more of our resources to the domestic 
challenges th=
e American people demand we meet. I look forward to 
continuing t=
o work with you and with members on both sides of the aisle 
to p=
rovide American leadership to build a more peaceful, free, and 
p=
rosperous world. (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6: 
 
U.S. Interests a=
nd Russian Reform 
Deputy Secretary Talbott 
Excerpts o=
f remarks before the Arms Control Association, Washington, DC, 
F=
ebruary 23, 1995 
 <=
/pre>We are, indeed, looking ahead with resolve--but also with realism=
--to 
several big tests coming up soon.  Secretary Christopher has called the 
global=
 and regional arms control challenges we face in 1995 "the most =
ambitious non-proliferation agenda in history." It includes no fe=
wer 
than 13 key initiatives. 
 
--  =
We're working toward a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a convention <=
/pre>cutting off the production of fissile material, and, of course, t=
he 
indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I know =
that Tom 
Graham spoke to many of you on this last subject at the=
 ACA annual 
luncheon two months ago. 
 
--  We're pushing for START II ratification in both the U.S. Sen=
ate and 
the Russian Parliament; we're intensifying our effort to=
 use the Nunn-
Lugar program--one of the most important and posit=
ive pieces of 
legislation of the post-Cold War era--to dismantle=
 and destroy nuclear 
weapons and provide peaceful alternative pr=
ofessional outlets for the 
skills and expertise of nuclear weapo=
ns scientists in the former Soviet 
Union; and we're working to c=
omplete the ABM treaty talks on the 
demarcation between theater =
and strategic missile defenses.  
 
--  We're seeking Senate ratificat=
ion of the Chemical and Toxic Weapons 
Convention and also ratifi=
cation of the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons, with its restr=
ictions on the use of landmines; we're 
negotiating legally bindi=
ng measures that will ensure compliance with 
the Biological Weap=
ons Convention; and we're developing a new 
international exports=
 control regime to succeed COCOM.  
 
--=
  We're committed to blocking =
Iraq and Iran's attempts to develop a 
nuclear weapons capability=
; to implementing the Agreed Framework with 
North Korea; and we'=
re trying to head off a destabilizing competition in 
nuclear wea=
pons and ballistic missiles between India and Pakistan.  
&nbs=
p;
In short, we're going all-out to take full advantage of=
 the historic 
opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War=
 and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. 
 
Our success will depend, in larg=
e measure, on the political context in 
which we pursue that ambi=
tious arms control agenda.  Th=
ere are many 
factors that will determine that context, but the s=
ingle-most important 
is what happens in the former Soviet Union.=
 Quite simply and starkly, if 
the 12 New Independent States that=
 used to make up the U.S.S.R. evolve 
in the direction of stabili=
ty, democracy, market economics, and 
integration with the rest o=
f the world, then arms control and non-
proliferation will be mor=
e likely to succeed--globally as well as 
regionally. If, however=
, that vast area slips back into the past or 
veers off into any =
of a number of dangerous and ugly possibilities for 
the future, =
the worthy enterprises to which the ACA is so deeply 
devoted--an=
d to which it so consistently and significantly contributes--
wil=
l suffer. 
 
There is plenty of reason for concern about what will happen in the former Soviet Union during the months and years ahead, and I will sp=
eak 
to that point in a moment. But we should maintain some sense=
 of 
perspective; we should balance our apprehensions about the f=
uture with 
appreciation of what has been accomplished to date.   
 
Let me, in this connection, r=
ecall our discussion the last time we met. 
It was 26 months ago,=
 in December of 1992, at the ACA annual luncheon. I 
was in my fi=
nal days at Time magazine, worrying only about how Professor 
Kee=
ny would grade my columns--an easier course than the one in which I'm now enrolled. In my remarks to you then, I stressed three concerns ab=
out 
future developments in the New Independent States. 
 
First, I warned =
of "the possibility that there could end up being three 
or =
four nuclear-weapons states where before there was one." I sketched a =
few nightmare scenarios--one involving instability and conflict =
both 
within and between adjacent nuclear weapons states in the N=
IS and 
another featuring a nuclear arms buildup involving not on=
ly the New 
Independent States themselves but, in the future, oth=
er European powers 
as well. 
 
Second, I argued that the fate of Ukraine w=
as key to stability in 
Central Europe--that if Ukraine could dev=
elop as an independent, 
sovereign nation, secure in its current =
borders, with normal, peaceful 
relations with its neighbors, the=
n the entire region would have a better 
chance for peace and pro=
sperity. 
 
Third, I argued that it would be a blunder of historic proportions to abandon our support for Russian reform. I argued that President-ele=
ct 
Clinton needed to follow through on the Bush Administration's=
 promises 
of economic assistance, and that, whenever possible, h=
e needed to 
cooperate with--rather than browbeat--the Russian re=
formers. 
 
Looking back at these points two years later, I'm struck not by what a splendid crystal ball I had--the points I was making were pretty m=
uch 
self-evident; rather, I'm struck by how far we've come in th=
e right 
direction on all three fronts. 
 
Thanks in large part to Presiden=
t Clinton's leadership, issue number 
one--the danger that the So=
viet Union would give way to four nuclear 
weapons states in the =
NIS--is well on its way to being resolved. In 
Budapest two month=
s ago, at the ceremony for START I's entry into force, 
we saw Uk=
raine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan accede to the Non-Proliferation 
T=
reaty as non-nuclear weapons states. =
 After persistent efforts on our 
part, these nations have=
 also joined wholeheartedly in innovative Nunn-
Lugar initiatives=
, such as Operation Sapphire, which airlifted nearly 
600 kilogra=
ms of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan to secure 
storage =
in the United States.  <=
pre> 
We've also see=
n encouraging progress on issue number two--the 
independence of =
Ukraine. In October, after a year-and-a-half of patient 
encourag=
ement by President Clinton, Vice President Gore, Secretary 
Chris=
topher, and other Administration officials, the Ukrainians took the <=
pre>courageous step of launching genuine, broad-gauge economic reform. The =
benefits of that policy will help cement the bonds of nationhood=
; 
Ukrainians from Donetsk to Simferopol to Lviv now share a comm=
on stake 
in reform and a common interest in strengthening the so=
vereignty and 
unity of the Ukrainian state. 
 
Russia has done its own par=
t to encourage the chances that Ukraine will 
survive and, ultima=
tely, prosper.  Moscow has rea=
ffirmed its acceptance 
of current borders and kept a prudent dis=
tance from ethnic separatist 
movements in the Crimea and elsewhe=
re.  The Russian and Ukrainian=
 
Governments have worked cooperatively to manage a number of dif=
ficult 
issues, such as START I implementation, and the status of=
 the Black Sea 
Fleet. 
 
Good Russian-Ukrainian relations have helped to f=
acilitate Russia's 
relations with the other nations of Central E=
urope. On August 31 of last 
year--after years of patient but fir=
m diplomacy by Presidents Bush and 
Clinton--Russian troops withd=
rew from Germany and the Baltics. To the 
south, Russia is commit=
ted to withdraw its 14th army from Moldova by 
1997, in accordanc=
e with the agreement that those two governments 
reached last Oct=
ober. The door is now open for Russia to build 
effective, mutual=
ly beneficial economic ties to all of these nations.  
 <=
/span>
That brings me to the third and final issue I flagged in D=
ecember 1992--
the doubts we all felt then about the fate of inte=
rnal reforms in Russia 
and concern over what, if anything, the U=
nited States could do to 
influence events there. Only three days=
 before I spoke to you, Boris 
Yeltsin had named as his Prime Min=
ister Victor Chernomyrdin, a baron of 
the oil and gas sector, to=
 replace Yegor Gaidar, the Russian 
Government's most visible cha=
mpion of economic reform.  Che=
rnomyrdin was 
widely presumed to be a throwback to the Soviet ma=
nagerial mentality, 
wedded to the command economy, and to author=
itarian methods. Meanwhile, 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev had just ob=
served April Fool's Day in December 
by delivering a speech in St=
ockholm that proclaimed "the resumption of 
the Cold War&quo=
t; and Moscow's intention to launch "a campaign of bringing 
the 15 republics together again." Having thus gotten his audience's <=
/pre>attention, Kozyrev said he was just kidding--but not entirely: He=
 was 
warning that forces precisely so disposed were alive and we=
ll and 
growing stronger in Russia. 
 
In retrospect, of course, that clust=
er of scary moments two years and 
two months ago was merely the =
calm before the storm--repeated storms, in 
fact.  In the spring of 1993, President Yeltsin was=
 locked in a 
confrontation with the Soviet-era parliament and fo=
ught to win a 
national referendum on his leadership; in Septembe=
r 1993, he suspended 
the parliament; in October, he ordered troo=
ps to attack the White House 
after supporters of mutinous deputi=
es took to the streets with automatic 
weapons and rocket-propell=
ed grenades.  Two months later=
, Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky, ultranationalists, unreconstructed commu=
nists, and other 
opponents of reform made sweeping gains through=
 the ballot box. 
 <=
/pre>At each of those critical, worrisome junctures, many commentators=
--in 
both Russia and the West--believed that reform was mortally=
 wounded, 
perhaps even dead. With the benefit of some hindsight,=
 we can now see 
that the interim verdict should have been more q=
ualified: Reform was 
down but not out--threatened, yes; defeated=
, no.  Incidentally--or, perhaps, I should say, not incidentally--one reason that reform survi=
ved 
was that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin did not live up to his =
ominous 
billing; he established himself as an effective proponen=
t of economic 
reform and a key figure in U.S.-Russian cooperatio=
n, largely through the 
extraordinary working relationship he has=
 developed with Vice President 
Gore. 
 
Now, in Chechnya, there is a new c=
risis for reform in Russia--the most 
serious to date. On Wednesd=
ay, Defense Minister Grachev said that "there 
should be no =
more cease-fire talks" with the Chechens, and the fighting 
=
on the outskirts of Groznyy continues. We are now hearing reports that there already have been as many as 25,000 civilian casualties in Gro=
znyy 
alone and that some 300,000-400,000 people have been displa=
ced from 
their homes by the fighting.  
 
But Chechnya is more than an on-going tragedy and outrage in a=
 remote 
corner of the North Caucasus.  Chechnya is, literally and figuratively, 
bro=
adcasting to the world an image that conjures up the worst memories <=
pre>of Russia's past and clouds the best visions of her future. People all =
over the globe, including a great many Russians, are now asking:=
 How can 
Russia develop as a multi-ethnic democratic state while=
 its central 
government is waging an all-out war against tens of=
 thousands of its own 
people? And how will Russia continue on a =
course of economic reform 
while its human and financial resource=
s are being squandered on an ill-
conceived military operation ag=
ainst one of its own cities?  =
 
Disturb=
ing as these questions are, they are not new. From the day that 
=
the hammer and sickle came down over the Kremlin and the Russian 
tricolor went up in its place, we--and most Russians, too--have been asking ourselves where Russia is going. What kind of state it will be=
 in 
the next century? Chechnya has sharpened the debate over wha=
t might be 
called the existential question about Russia--about i=
ts very nature, 
past, present, and future. But Chechnya did not =
begin that debate, nor 
will its resolution answer the fundamenta=
l questions. 
 There are plenty of voices--some quavering and some strident--arguing=
, 
in effect, that the debate is over; they are saying, in effect=
, "We told 
you so."&n=
bsp; They believe that Chechnya confirms, decisively and 
=
conclusively, the worst about Russia; that it proves Russia is a country doomed--for reasons of geography, political culture, and history--=
to an 
authoritarian, if not totalitarian, domestic order, and to=
 aggressive, 
imperialistic international behavior. 
 
Our view is differen=
t. We don't believe in historical or geographical 
determinism. H=
istory and geography are hugely important factors, of 
course, in=
 any state's identity and destiny. &n=
bsp; 
 =
But we should beware of stereotypes about national character, 
particularly ones that would--if they become the basis of policy--=
consign whole peoples to dictatorship on the perverse theory that that=
 
is the kind of government they deserve, or the political system=
 encoded 
in their genes. That's the lesson that Nelson Mandela, =
F.W. de Klerk, 
and the people of South Africa have taught the wo=
rld: Nations can turn 
back from a disastrous course, alter their=
 destinies, and transform 
their identities--and they are especia=
lly likely to do so in the age of 
global interdependence and the=
 communications revolution. 
&nb=
sp;
That is not, however, an argument for determinism of a=
 utopian sort.  
The=
re is nothing automatic or guaranteed about happy endings, either in =
history or in our increasingly interdependent but still highly uncerta=
in 
future. We do not--we cannot--know for sure what kind of stat=
e Russia 
will be in the 21st century. What we do know is that th=
ere is a titanic 
struggle going on between forces of reform and =
those of regression, 
between the new and the old, and between va=
rious visions of the new, 
some hardly more savory than the old. =
The outcome of this struggle is 
anything but foreordained, and i=
t is precisely because we cannot bet on 
a predetermined outcome =
that we have invested in measures intended to 
affect the course =
of events in a way that is consistent with our 
interests and val=
ues. President Clinton underscored this premise of our 
policy wh=
en he visited Moscow just over a year ago. In a town meeting at 
=
Ostankino television studio, broadcast throughout Russia and around the world, he asked the Russian people: "How will you define your =
role in 
the world as a great power? Will you define it in yester=
day's terms, or 
tomorrow's?" 
 
These were not merely rhetorical ques=
tions.  The President did not =
imply 
that he knew the answer. He made quite clear that it is up=
 to the 
Russian people themselves to find their own answer. But =
he also made 
clear that he--and all of us--have our own hopes ab=
out what answers will 
eventually emerge, and that our nation's r=
elationship with Russia will, 
ultimately, depend on the choices =
that the Russian people make.  
 
In ord=
er to get a sense of the very different possibilities for Russia's 
future, it's important to keep in mind the many transformations that are=
 
now taking place in Russian villages and cities all across that=
 vast 
land. Many of the most visible of these changes are thorou=
ghly bad news. 
I'm thinking of the emergence of increasingly sop=
histicated organized 
criminal syndicates or ultranationalistic, =
often anti-democratic 
political groups. But there are also a lot=
 of reformers among the 150 
million people who live across the 1=
1 time zones of Russia.   
We have seen=
 President Yeltsin and his advisers in the Kremlin take a 
giant =
step backward in Chechnya. But at the same time, an active, highly 
critical press is accurately reporting what is going on throughout the <=
/pre>crisis and playing a vital role in shaping public opinion. Those =
opposed 
to Kremlin policy are speaking out freely, and often ang=
rily, on Russian 
television, and they are traveling abroad to en=
courage international 
criticism of their government's behavior. =
The Russian Parliament is 
vigorously and openly debating what ha=
s happened and what is to be done. 
Regional leaders such as Pres=
idents Boris Nemtsov of Nizhny-Novgorod and 
Mikhail Nikolayev of=
 Sakha are voicing their disapproval of the 
Kremlin's handling o=
f Chechnya as well.  
 
A majority of Ru=
ssians and of Russian leaders now accept the idea that 
political=
 combat should be waged on the floor of the parliament, in the 
p=
ress, and on the hustings, rather than on the streets or underground. That doesn't mean that we will always welcome the results of Russian =
domestic politics. But it is, I would contend, a net positive th=
at real 
politics is emerging as the basis of the system that gov=
erns the largest 
country on earth. 
 
For President Yeltsin, Chechnya has =
been a personal and political 
debacle.  The brutality and ineptitude of the military campaign =
has 
shrunk his political base and reduced his approval in Russia=
 to an all-
time low. And it has jeopardized his international su=
pport as well. 
 The main question now is what lessons will he and the rest of the <=
/pre>Russian leadership learn from Chechnya? Will they uphold the rule=
 of law 
and human rights, or will they try to give priority to &=
quot;order" and 
"security" in a fashion that ends=
 up undermining both, as it did so 
spectacularly and fatally dur=
ing the Soviet period of Russian history? 
Will they embrace the =
obligations that come with membership in the 
international commu=
nity, or will they choose the path of self-enforced 
isolation, a=
nd economic and political backwardness? 
 
The most recent indications of President Y=
eltsin's own thinking--from 
his speech last Thursday to the Russ=
ian parliament--are mixed. While he 
took the opportunity to reit=
erate his commitment to democratic reform, 
he stopped short of c=
alling for a peaceful political settlement in 
Chechnya--in our j=
udgment, the only genuine resolution to this crisis 
that is cons=
istent with democratic principles. 
 
As I've already said, one way to look at what i=
s happening in Russia 
today is as a struggle between the forces =
of reform and reaction, 
between the old and the new. Another way=
 is as a struggle between the 
forces of integration and disinteg=
ration.  Chechnya obviously re=
presents 
disintegration. Moreover, it stands as a warning for th=
e future: If the 
central Russian Government attempts to enforce =
unity with brute 
strength--if it insists on imposing integration=
 on people who feel 
disenfranchised or oppressed--the result wil=
l likely be more 
disintegration, more violence, more instability=
, and more insecurity for 
Russia itself and also for her neighbo=
rs. 
 
Our=
 own policy in this regard is clear: We support the sovereignty and <=
pre>territorial integrity of a democratic Russian Federation within its current borders. We want to see Russia develop as a strong, prosper=
ous 
state in the 21st century, but we have also made clear that =
we think 
that will happen only if Russia continues to develop a =
pluralistic 
political system, a constitutional order, and federa=
l structures that 
permit all the peoples of Russia to identify t=
hemselves as citizens of a 
multi-ethnic state rather than as sub=
jects of Moscow.  
<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> 
Integration is also=
 a goal of Russian foreign policy. The Yeltsin-
Chernomyrdin-Kozy=
rev government has, to its credit, placed a high 
premium on part=
icipating in and benefiting from the various 
organizations that =
make up the international order. These include GATT, 
the Europea=
n Union, the G-7, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and, perhaps most 
im=
portant, the newly emerging arrangements that will define a post-Cold War security order for an undivided Europe: the OSCE, the Partnership=
 
for Peace, and, in due course, some sort of relationship betwee=
n Russia 
and NATO. 
&=
nbsp;
Since integration serves the goal of Russian reform,=
 it serves American 
national interest as well. Indeed, it is the=
 hallmark of the Clinton 
Administration's foreign policy to stre=
ngthen existing international 
structures and build new ones that=
 will serve the interrelated 
objectives of open markets and open=
 societies--of global peace and 
prosperity. We want Russia to be=
 as much a part of those structures as 
possible and as soon as p=
ossible. 
 
At the same time, the pace, tone, and content of Russia's dealings with <=
/pre>the outside world will depend, in large measure, on the pace, ton=
e, and 
direction of Russia's ongoing internal transformation. Co=
ntinued 
integration with the West will enhance Russia's security=
 and expand its 
access to capital. But it also carries with it a=
n obligation to the 
political norms and market practices that un=
dergird the strength of the 
industrialized democracies. The way =
in which Russia defines statehood 
internally will be a major fac=
tor in how quickly and fully Russia 
achieves its laudable goal o=
f membership in the community of democratic 
nations.  
 
That, too, is part of the lesson of Chechnya: =
When the Russian 
Government violates international norms in its =
handling of an internal 
crisis, as it has unquestionably and egr=
egiously done in Chechnya, the 
cause of external as well as inte=
rnal integration suffers. 
 =
;
That said, however, what we should not do is to treat ea=
ch and every 
disagreement we have with the Russians as some sort=
 of final, "High-
Noon" showdown that puts the entire r=
elationship, including support for 
reform, on the line. Obviousl=
y, our aid will be calibrated to be sure 
that it does what it is=
 intended to do: namely, support reform.&n=
bsp; But 
threatening to pull the plug on our reform assis=
tance programs is a card 
we can play exactly once. Having done i=
t, we won't be able to do it--or 
even plausibly threaten to do i=
t--again. 
 
The key point here, however, is that support for economic and political =
reform in Russia is in our own national interests--even, and I'd=
 say 
especially, when there are tensions in the overall, governm=
ent-to-
government relationship.=
  Just as the Nunn-Lugar program and START II 
are de=
fense by other means, so, too, are our assistance programs an 
in=
vestment in a safer future. Encouraging the growth of democracy and <=
pre>economic freedom in Russia remains the best and least- expensive =
investment we can make in our own security and in the security of all =
the peoples of Europe. Reformers have, indeed, come under fire i=
n recent 
months, but that seems to us to be all the more reason =
to step up our 
efforts to help them. As President Clinton said i=
n Cleveland last month, 
"if the forces of reform are embatt=
led, we must renew, not retreat from, 
our support for them."=
; 
 
In co=
nclusion, let me say that I appreciate your allowing me to wander 
so far afield from those subjects that are of most intense and immediate =
interest to your organization--from those subjects, in other wor=
ds, that 
Stan Resor and I used to talk about on the park bench o=
n the New Haven 
Green. But I hope you agree that there is the ti=
ghtest possible 
connection between arms control on the one hand =
and the future of 
Russian politics and foreign policy on the oth=
er, and that connection is 
more than just because the latter pro=
vides a context for the former. 
It's also because one of the pri=
nciples that served us so well during 
the arms control negotiati=
ons of the Cold War will also serve us well 
now that the Cold Wa=
r is over and now that we have a much broader, 
deeper, more comp=
licated agenda in our dealings with the former Soviet 
Union. Tha=
t principle is steadiness; it's consistency, continuity, and 
det=
ermination; it's keeping our eye on the big picture and the long-term objective. 
 <=
/pre>Many of you here tonight preached, and practiced, that principle =
when 
the issue was how to work with the Soviet Union on virtuall=
y the only 
issue on which we had a common interest, which was di=
minishing the 
danger that we'd blow each other up. That same pri=
nciple of steadiness 
is crucial now that we have a chance to wor=
k with Russia, Ukraine, and 
the other New Independent States of =
the former Soviet Union on the less 
apocalyptic--but no less dif=
ficult and no less important--task of 
building a more peaceful, =
prosperous, and integrated world. . . . (###) 
 
&nb=
sp;
 
ARTICLE 7: 
 American Eagle or Ostrich? The Case for The United States in the Uni=
ted 
Nations 
Deputy Secretary Talbott 
Remar=
ks to the Denver World Affairs Council, Denver, Colorado, February 
28, 1995 
 =
Thank you both for that kind introduction and for inviting me to Denve=
r 
today. I've been a frequent visitor to Colorado over the years=
--not just 
for purposes of risking life and limb on the slopes o=
f Vail, Snowmass, 
and Telluride, but also because for nearly 15 =
years the Aspen Institute 
provided me with an opportunity each A=
ugust to spend a week in some of 
the loveliest country on earth =
thinking and talking with colleagues and 
mentors about the U.S. =
role in the world. 
 
That is my topic this afternoon. More specifically, I would lik=
e to talk 
about the need for vigorous American engagement and le=
adership in the 
world. More specifically still, I'd like to talk=
 to you about the United 
States in the United Nations, why we're=
 in it, and what's in it for us. 
I chose this topic precisely be=
cause it is controversial; I chose it 
because the UN, and Americ=
a's leadership of it, are under attack from a 
number of quarters=
--and because it's important that the debate take 
place not just=
 inside the Washington beltway, or on the floor of the 
U.S. Cong=
ress, but in the country as a whole. 
 
Let me start with the general issue of intern=
ational engagement. I know 
that I don't need to lecture this aud=
ience on how U.S. foreign policy 
can affect every community in e=
very state of the union. Denver companies 
are doing record amoun=
ts of business overseas and are actively pursuing 
opportunities =
to expand further--in industries ranging from mining to 
telecomm=
unications to agricultural processing to environmental 
technolog=
y.  
 
Back in Washington, we were pleas=
ed to hear when the Colorado House of 
Representatives unanimousl=
y supported NAFTA. One of the follow-ups to 
NAFTA will take plac=
e here in Denver on June 30, when U.S. Trade 
Representative Mick=
ey Kantor will host a hemispheric trade ministers' 
meeting, foll=
owed by a commercial forum co-hosted by Commerce Secretary 
Ron B=
rown.   
 
These international vent=
ures--the quest to create good jobs at home by 
developing market=
s abroad--are an important aspect of one of the central 
themes o=
f the era and of the world in which we live: namely, global 
inte=
rdependence. That's a somewhat fancy, slightly suspect term because <=
pre>it smacks of what Clare Booth Luce dubbed, a half century ago, 
"globaloney."  Bu=
t the phenomenon is real; to a steadily increasing 
extent, what =
happens beyond our borders affects us here in the United 
States-=
-sometimes for better, sometimes for worse. For instance, the 
li=
ves of our children and grandchildren will be dramatically influenced by our efforts to ensure sustainable population growth, combat threat=
s 
to the global environment, and win the struggle against drug <=
/pre>traffickers. These last three challenges are the focus of my frie=
nd and 
colleague Tim Wirth's work since he came to the State Dep=
artment as 
Under Secretary for Global Affairs. 
 
With interdependence amo=
ng nations comes the need for global cooperation 
among them. The=
 consolidation of a liberal international trading order 
and the =
opening of markets for American trade and investment are more 
im=
portant than ever. But there's much more at stake here beyond 
ec=
onomics and commerce. We can't free our own neighborhoods from drug-<=
pre>related crime unless we work closely with countries where drugs are produced. We can't track down terrorists, such as Carlos the Jackal=
 or 
World Trade Center bombing suspect Ramzi Ahmed Yousef--both =
of whom are 
now in custody--without help from the police of othe=
r countries. And we 
can't keep nuclear weapons from falling into=
 the hands of dictators and 
terrorists through our own vigilance=
 alone.  All this should be ob=
vious, 
but not everyone seems to get it.  
 
Today, as there was in the aftermath of other great struggl=
es earlier in 
our nation's history, there is a temptation to dra=
w back into ourselves, 
to turn our attention and our resources t=
o fixing our own problems, and 
let other countries take care of =
themselves. This is particularly 
evident in Congress, where ther=
e are those, in each party, who counsel 
us to duck--not deal wit=
h--the international challenges that we face. 
 
This sentiment echoes that of the na=
rrow-visioned naysayers of the 
1920s, who rejected the League of=
 Nations, embraced protectionism, 
downplayed the rise of Mussoli=
ni, Hitler, and Stalin; who opposed help 
to the victims of aggre=
ssion and inadvertently endangered our security--
chanting all th=
e while the crowd-pleasing mantra of "America first." 
=
 
Arguments that wou=
ld turn the American eagle into an ostrich have always 
had a cer=
tain appeal, in part, because we're separated by vast oceans 
fro=
m both Europe and Asia, because we've long been at peace with our 
immediate neighbors on this continent, and because our Founding Fathers' =
advice to avoid foreign entanglements still rings in our ears. <=
/pre> 
But the =
leaders of the great coalition that triumphed in the Second 
Worl=
d War learned several, if not all, of the lessons from the aftermath =
of the First. Instead of humiliating and impoverishing their defeated =
enemies, the victors of World War II helped rebuild Japan and Ge=
rmany. 
Through the Marshall Plan, GATT, and the international fi=
nancial 
institutions born at Bretton Woods, the diplomats who we=
re present at 
the creation of the post-World War world establish=
ed the basis for a 
community of Western democracies and for an i=
ncreasingly interdependent 
and prosperous global economy. And th=
ey created a mechanism to further 
the cause of enduring peace th=
rough the UN Charter--a document inspired 
by American ideals and=
 largely written by American statesmen. 
 
It's natural that internationalism is more=
 likely to be popular when 
there is a clear-cut enemy, such as S=
oviet communism. During the Cold 
War, much of what we were for w=
as dictated by what we were against. =
 The 
imperative of containing communism permeated our pol=
icies. We formed 
alliances to defend against Soviet expansion; w=
e doled out assistance to 
maintain our influence against encroac=
hments; and we strove to counter 
the Soviets in every forum, inc=
luding the United Nations. 
&nbs=
p;
With the end of the Cold War, we face historic opportun=
ities, not just 
to combat threats and enemies, but also to help =
build a world that is 
ordered according to our interests and val=
ues.   
 
Nonetheless, with the col=
lapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, 
it's natural that=
 the old isolationist instinct would twitch again in 
the America=
n body politic. It's twitching now. It's twitching in calls 
for =
us to reject free trade agreements, or to have nothing to do with 
any foreign conflict, or in the fantasy that we can build multi-billion- =
dollar space-based shields that will keep us safe from any milit=
ary 
attack.  =
 
The argument =
against isolationism and in favor of internationalism is 
simple;=
 its rooted in our history and in our national interest: As this 
century has amply demonstrated, our freedom, security, and prosperity cannot be ensured without the active help of other free peoples, all=
 of 
whom are looking to us for leadership. 
 
Now, the ultimate guarantor =
of our security remains our capacity and 
willingness to act forc=
efully and unilaterally when our interests are 
threatened. Our m=
ilitary must remain modern, mobile, ready, and strong, 
and--as P=
resident Clinton pledged in his State of the Union address--it 
w=
ill. But we must also preserve the option of acting through NATO and =
other coalitions. That brings me to the United Nations. 
 
As our President who =
was in office when the Cold War ended, President 
Bush observed t=
hat the United Nations was "emerging as a central 
instrumen=
t for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the 
preserv=
ation of peace."  Former =
President Reagan called for "a standing 
UN force, an army o=
f conscience--equipped and prepared to carve out 
humanitarian sa=
nctuaries through force if necessary." 
 
That was yesterday. Today, some of the=
 loudest voices in our national 
debate propound something quite =
different. The UN is "the longtime 
nemesis of millions of A=
mericans," says one leader on Capitol Hill. It 
is "a t=
otally incompetent instrument anyplace that matters," says 
=
another.  
 
A bill, the so-called Natio=
nal Security Revitalization Act, has been 
passed by the House--a=
nd is now making its way through the Senate. It's 
part of the so=
-called Contract with America. It is designed not to 
reform UN p=
eace-keeping but to kill it. If enacted into law, this 
proposal =
would be a blunder--a giant step backward--of truly historic 
pro=
portions. 
 
Under the guise of being a Contract with America, it would abrogate the =
United States' half-century-old contract with the international =
community--the contract that Harry Truman signed, that the U.S. =
Senate 
ratified, and that every President since has reaffirmed.<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>  
 
The National Security Revitalization=
 Act would be an out-and-out 
repudiation of our treaty obligatio=
ns under the UN Charter. It would 
cancel our entire UN peace-kee=
ping payment. Other nations--Japan and our 
NATO allies--would su=
rely follow by withholding their own funds, and UN 
peace-keeping=
 would end virtually overnight.  
 
This=
 would cause massive disruptions and quite possibly mean the 
res=
umption of a number of conflicts. I can think of few quicker ways to =
undermine global stability than to yank UN peacekeepers out of Cyprus,=
 
Lebanon, Kashmir, and the border between Kuwait and Iraq. Furth=
ermore, 
if America reneges on its commitments under the UN Chart=
er, it would 
undermine our ability to argue that other nations s=
hould meet their 
obligations under international law. This would=
 particularly impair our 
ability to maintain sanctions against r=
ogue states such as Libya, Iraq, 
and Serbia. 
 
Those are negative argumen=
ts--bad things that would happen if we pulled 
the plug at the UN=
. Here's the positive one for strengthening the UN 
through U.S. =
leadership: Peace-keeping, itself, is a vitally important 
enterp=
rise in which we must remain engaged. It has the capacity, under 
the right circumstances, to separate our adversaries, maintain cease-fires, speed the delivery of humanitarian relief, enable refugees to =
return home, demobilize combatants, and create conditions under =
which 
free elections may be held. In so doing, it can nurture ne=
w democracies, 
lower the global tide of refugees and the huge co=
st of rescuing and 
sustaining them, reduce the likelihood of unw=
elcome interventions by 
regional powers, and prevent small wars =
from growing into larger 
conflicts which would be far more costl=
y in lives and treasure. 
 =
Speaking of cost, let me emphasize this point: peace-keep=
ing--and UN 
peace-keeping in particular--is a good investment fo=
r the United States. 
The per capita price to Americans, for the =
entire UN system--from blue 
helmets for peacekeepers to polio va=
ccines for babies--is less than $7 
per year. That is about the p=
rice of a ticket to our nation's most 
popular movie which, by th=
e way, currently is a film called "Dumb and 
Dumber."   
 
Our own country's direct part=
icipation in UN peace operations is modest. 
As of January 1, 199=
5, the U.S. ranked 26th among nations in the number 
of troops pa=
rticipating in peace-keeping operations around the world--
behind=
 not only Canada and Poland, but also Ghana and Zambia. All this 
said, obviously, we do not look to the UN to defend America's vital =
interests. That we're prepared to do on a moment's notice by ourselves=
 
if necessary.   
We know th=
at UN peace-keeping cannot be effective where the swift and 
deci=
sive application of military force is required. But in many 
circ=
umstances, acting through the UN will enable us to influence events <=
pre>without assuming the full burden of costs and risks. Let me mention a <=
/pre>few of those operations. 
 
--  On the tense border between India and Pakistan, UN troops monitor a cease-fire between two regional rivals presumed to have nuclear weapo=
ns. 
 
--<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>  In El Salvador, where America=
 spent more than $1 billion in economic 
and military aid during =
the 1980s, the UN brokered an end to the civil 
war, disarmed and=
 reintegrated the rebel forces into society, monitored 
human rig=
hts and elections, and oversaw the creation of a new civilian 
po=
lice.  
 
--  In Cambodia, where I was a few weeks ago, the UN has su=
cceeded in 
clearing mines, repatriating refugees, and organizing=
 elections, thus 
making an astonishing transition to democracy p=
ossible. 
 
One of the myths that has gained currency in recent months is that the United States is running around the world doing the bidding of the=
 UN, 
regardless of, if not contrary to, its own interests and pr=
iorities. 
Many would argue that the reverse is closer to the tru=
th. Under the UN 
Charter, it is the Security Council that has re=
sponsibility for 
authorizing responses to lawless international =
behavior, including 
threats to peace. As a permanent member of t=
he Council, with veto 
powers, we have enormous influence over wh=
at it decides.  
 
Frequently, a Council=
 resolution will lend international backing to 
causes we support=
 and make it easier to bring others aboard for military 
operatio=
ns or sanctions enforcement--thereby allowing us to share in the 
costs and the risks assumed in defense of our interests. For instance, the UN Security Council played a key role in bringing together the =
multinational coalition for Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait, an=
d the 
Council performed a similar service for Operation Uphold D=
emocracy in 
Haiti. As Secretary Christopher puts it, were there =
no United Nations, 
"it would leave us with an unacceptable =
option each time an emergency 
arose: a choice between acting alo=
ne or doing nothing." 
&nbs=
p;
Now there is a small minority of Americans who will alw=
ays mistrust the 
UN because they fear it will evolve into a worl=
d government--that it 
represents globaloney run amuck--which is =
nonsense; or they are upset 
that it's so full of foreigners, whi=
ch, I guess, probably can't be 
helped. 
Far more serio=
us are concerns about the effectiveness of UN operations, 
decisi=
on-making, and management. 
&nbs=
p;
Here, some of the critics have several valid points: Th=
e United Nations 
does not always offer the perfect response.  But, then again, neither <=
pre>does NATO, nor does unilateral action, nor does unilateral inaction. Th=
e 
right cure for the ills of UN peace-keeping is not to call for=
 the 
services of Dr. Kevorkian, which is what the Contract with =
America 
prescribes, but rather to administer sound treatment--to=
 work to make 
this tool as useful and efficient as possible--and=
 that is exactly what 
the Clinton Administration is doing.  
At our insis=
tence, the UN Security Council is now more disciplined about 
whe=
n and under what circumstances to begin a peace mission. Today, the <=
pre>tough questions are asked before such a mission is started or renewed. =
We are ensuring that UN operations have clear and realistic obje=
ctives, 
that peacekeepers are properly equipped, that money is n=
ot wasted, and 
that an endpoint to each UN mission can be identi=
fied. This policy has 
resulted in fewer and smaller new operatio=
ns and better management of 
existing ones.  
 =
Some opponents of UN peace-keeping feel that the United S=
tates is 
somehow being played for a sucker; that we are turned t=
o constantly for 
help by those who are unwilling to pay their ow=
n way or to take their 
own fair share of risks. This perception =
is not new. In the years 
immediately following World War II, sim=
ilar emotions prompted opposition 
to American participation in N=
ATO and to the Marshall Plan. When 
President Roosevelt devised L=
end Lease to save a Great Britain that was 
under daily bombardme=
nt by Nazi planes, the predictable complaints were 
heard: We can=
't afford it; the British already owe us money; this is 
Europe's=
 battle, not our own. 
 
Such feelings are understandable, and sometimes play well at=
 home. But 
in each instance, when we have come to the aid of oth=
ers, we have also 
acted in our own interest. That was true of Le=
nd Lease; it was true of 
the costly, but necessary, steps we too=
k to contain communist expansion; 
it is true of our participatio=
n in, and support for, UN peace-keeping 
and enforcement of UN re=
solutions against Libya and Iraq. America is not 
just another co=
untry; we are a global power with global interests--and 
if we do=
 not lead, we cannot expect that others will. Our position in 
th=
e world may, to some, be grounds for complaint, but to most Americans, it is grounds for pride and a sense of security.  
&nbs=
p;
The Administration is committed to taking full advantag=
e of the 
opportunities and to confronting squarely the dangers t=
hat we face with 
the end of the Cold War. We have a responsibili=
ty in our own time, as 
our predecessors did in theirs, to build =
a world not without conflict, 
but in which conflict is contained=
; a world, not without repression, but 
in which the sway of free=
dom is enlarged; a world not without lawless 
behavior, but in wh=
ich the law-abiding are progressively more secure. 
 
We have the responsibility to=
 lead in building such a world for three 
reasons: first, because=
 of the strength and global appeal of our 
democratic values and =
institutions; second, because of the strength of 
our economy, wh=
ich depends on global peace and stability --on open 
societies an=
d open markets; and third, because of the strength of our 
milita=
ry power. In short, we have the heart, the brains, and the muscle 
to lead in a world that often looks to us for all three.  (###) 
 
 =
 
ARTICLE=
 8: 
 
Dep=
artment Statements 
 
Suspending Arms S=
ales To Ecuador and Peru 
Statement by Department Deputy Assistan=
t Secretary/Spokesman Christine 
Shelly, Washington, DC, February=
 10, 1995. 
 <=
pre>In response to the continuing conflict on the border between Ecuador an=
d 
Peru, the U.S. Government has suspended deliveries of defense =
articles 
through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program as well=
 as new 
International Military Education and Training assignment=
s to those two 
countries. =
 
 
In addition, the Department of State has suspended all previously issued <=
/pre>licenses and approvals authorizing the export or other transfer o=
f 
defense articles or defense services to Peru or Ecuador. It is=
 also the 
policy of the U.S. Government to deny all applications=
 for licenses and 
other approvals to export or otherwise transfe=
r defense articles or 
services to Peru or Ecuador. How- ever, ex=
ceptions to this policy may be 
made with regard to certain U.S. =
Munitions List Category XIII(b)(1) 
items for banking and financi=
al institutions. 
 <=
/pre>We understand that the other Rio guarantor countries--Argentina, =
Brazil, 
and Chile--are taking similar measures. 
 
 =
President Clinton Applauds Ecuador-Peru Peace Declaration 
S=
tatement by White House Press Secretary Michael McCurry, Washington, =
DC, February 17, 1995. 
&nb=
sp;
The President welcomes the peace declaration signed ea=
rly today in 
Brasilia by Ecuador and Peru. The agreement brings =
to an end the 
hostilities which caused tragic loss of life and m=
arred the principle of 
peaceful resolution of disputes that is a=
 hallmark of our hemisphere. 
&n=
bsp;
The declaration was signed in the presence of the neg=
otiators of the 
four guarantor nations--Argentina, Brazil, Chile=
, and the United States-
-who worked tirelessly to broker the acc=
ord. 
 
Th=
e President wrote to President Duran of Ecuador and President Fujimori of Peru on February 2 to urge an immediate cease-fire. Secretary Christopher and other senior Administration officials worked intens=
ively 
with the two warring parties to bridge their differences. =
 
We are =
working with the other guarantors to organize and deploy as soon 
as possible an observer mission.  In addition, the guarantors have 
issued a statement in Bras=
ilia calling on resolution of the border 
dispute which sparked t=
hese hostilities. The United States and the other 
guarantor coun=
tries are prepared to offer their good offices to assist 
Ecuador=
 and Peru in finding a durable solution to their remaining 
probl=
ems. 
 
 
Mexico To Take Acti=
on To Curb Violence Along U.S. Border 
Statement by Department De=
puty Assistant Secretary/Spokesman Christine 
Shelly, Washington,=
 DC, February 16, 1995. 
 <=
/span>
Yesterday, delegations from the U.S. and Mexico issued a j=
oint 
communique in which Mexico states that it will take several=
 concrete 
actions to curb violence and crime along the border in=
 California, 
Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. 
 
The commitments were made =
during discussions on a broad range of 
migration issues at the f=
irst working group meeting of the Binational 
Commission held sin=
ce the inauguration of President Zedillo. The meeting 
took place=
 February 13 and 14 in Mexico. 
=
 
In the communique, Mexico states that it will:  
-- Strength=
en and expand Grupo Beta, a successful law enforcement effort 
th=
at has effectively curtailed  =
criminal trafficking in migrants as a 
result of its efforts to p=
revent violence against them. The Mexican 
Govern- ment will bols=
ter the current efforts of Grupo Beta in San Diego 
and Nogales a=
nd expand its operations to two other border cities. 
 
-- Deploy sufficient personne=
l and equipment to ensure the safe 
operation of border bridges a=
nd crossings, particularly in San Diego, 
Nogales,  
El Paso, and Laredo. This effort=
 will address the serious problem of 
lane and port runners that =
has arisen in reaction to strengthened U.S. 
border enforce- ment=
. 
 
-- Ta=
ke immediate action to close the remaining access to the Nogales 
flood tunnels. 
 --  Work with the U.S=
. to delineate procedures for interior repatriation 
within Mexic=
o of certain illegal aliens. 
&n=
bsp;
INS Commissioner Doris Meissner said "These acti=
ons by Mexico represent 
significant progress in our efforts to e=
nsure a border that is safe and 
functional." 
 
The U.S. informed Mex=
ico of the Clinton Administration's commitment to 
control and pr=
event illegal migration and facilitate and support legal 
migrati=
on. The President's FY 1996 budget proposal to bolster border 
en=
forcement and return of criminal and other deportable aliens was also discussed. The U.S. also informed Mexico on the Immigration and Naturalization Service's efforts to facilitate naturalization and improve border crossing card issuance procedures. 
 
Both delegations committ=
ed to continued strengthening of border liaison 
mechanisms, incl=
uding plans for Mexico to convene a regional conference 
addressi=
ng migration patterns in North and Central America, and joint 
re=
search to better understand the Mexican-U.S. migration phenomenon.  
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 9: 
 
What's in Print 
Foreign Relations Of the United =
States 
 
=
The Department of State has recently released additional volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States  series. They are a microfiche 
supple- ment to =
Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volumes XVII (Indonesia) 
and XVIII=
 (Japan; Korea); and Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume 
XXIII,=
 Southeast Asia. 
 <=
/pre>Microfiche Supplement To Foreign Relations 1958-1960 
<=
span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> 
The supplement incl=
udes approximately 1,310 pages of documentation on 
Indonesia, 54=
0 pages on Japan, and 1,310 pages on Korea. It supplements 
the d=
ocumentation of U.S. relations with these countries printed in 
V=
olumes XVII and XVIII.  =
 
The efforts o=
f President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Administration to deal 
with t=
he potential communist threat to Indonesia, the modernization and 
rationalization of the Republic of Korea's defense forces, and security <=
/pre>and trade issues with Japan are recorded. The supplement is desig=
ned to 
be used in conjunction with the print volumes, providing =
more detail and 
information. 
 
This latest supplement is part of the offi=
cial record in the Foreign 
Relations series about the East Asian=
 region during the 1958-1960 
period. In addition, supplements ha=
ve been published concerning Vietnam; 
South and Southeast Asia; =
and the East Asia-Pacific region, Cambodia, 
and Laos. Volume XIX=
 on China is scheduled to be published later this 
year. 
 
A printed guide=
 with a preface that describes the methodology used to 
select do=
cuments and to evaluate the results of their declassification 
re=
view is contained. 
 
This microfiche supplement (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02420-9) may =
be 
purchased for $23 postpaid ($28.75 for foreign orders).  
Foreign Rela=
tions, 1961-1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia 
 
This volume documents U.S. policy d=
eliberations and decisions concerning 
Southeast Asia beyond Viet=
nam and Laos. It contains a regional 
compilation of documents th=
at focus on the role of the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (=
SEATO) and bilateral compilations on U.S. relations 
with Burma, =
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand.  
The wars =
in South Vietnam and Laos encouraged the Government of Thailand 
=
to seek additional security commitments from the United States. The most public confirmation of these assurances was the March 1962 joint <=
/pre>communique of then Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Foreign Minis=
ter 
Thanat Khoman. Private assurances were given as well, and in=
 mid-1962, 
the U.S. dispatched troops to Thailand both as a sign=
al to the North 
Vietnamese and their allies in Laos and as an ov=
ert assurance to 
Thailand. The conflict in South Vietnam caused =
friction between Prince 
Sihanouk of Cambodia and the United Stat=
es. U.S. relations with Burma 
were not as directly tied to the c=
onflicts in Laos and South Vietnam as 
was U.S. policy toward SEA=
TO. 
 
U.S=
. objectives in Southeast Asia were complicated further by opposition by the Philippines and Indonesia to the creation of the Federation of=
 
Malaysia. U.S. relations with Australia also were influenced by=
 these 
events. 
 =
;
The documents in this volume were drawn from the Departm=
ents of State 
and Defense, the White House, the Central Intellig=
ence Agency, and from 
papers of key participants. 
 
This volume (GPO Stoc=
k No. 044-000-02389-0) may be purchased for $46 
postpaid ($57.50=
 for foreign orders). 
 
Both items may be purchased using VISA, MasterCard, or perso=
nal check 
from: 
&nbs=
p;
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintende=
nt of Documents 
P.O. Box 371954 
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-=
7954 
 
To=
 order by phone, call (202) 512-1800; =
; to fax your order, call (202) 
512-2250. 
 
For further informatio=
n, contact the Office of the Historian, Chief of 
the Asia and Am=
ericas Division, Edward C. Keefer at (202) 663-1131 or 
fax (202)=
 663-1289.  
&n=
bsp;
 
(###)
 
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 6, NO 10]

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